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Building New York’s Sewers
Developing Mechanisms of Urban Management
by Joanne Abel Goldman
“. . . fills an important gap in the history of public utilities . . . [Goldman’s] real
achievement is showing how political and economic factors shaped water supply
and sewer policy.”—Technology and Culture
cloth, ISBN 1-55753-095-5
Enabling American Innovation
Engineering and the National Science Foundation
by Dian Olson Belanger
“As Dian Olson Belanger ably shows in this book, the entire history of
engineering in the National Science Foundation is intimately bound up with











When perception is allowed to rule government response, the
result can be chaotic at best, potentially fatal at worst. The
need for improved methods of decision making in the field of
public works will become more dramatic in the coming
decades, as decades-old infrastructure begins to decay.
Learning from Milwaukee’s mistakes may save cities time,
money, frustration, and lives.






P U R D U E
PU R D U E  U N I V E R S I T Y  PR E S S
At a time when East Coast
cities had been providing water
for half a century and Midwestern
cities had begun to offer such ser-
vice as a necessary component of
urban life, Milwaukee was still
struggling with balancing the de-
sires of its citizens, the opinions
of different political parties re-
garding the best method for ser-
vice provision, and the best means
of providing those services. Hard
Water shows how these struggles
have continued over Milwaukee’s
155-year history, and how costly
the consequences can be.
Kate Foss-Mollan’s story of
how Milwaukee got its water sup-
ply weaves together strands from
political science, urban history,
technology and biology, and
media studies. From arguments
about supplying poor neighbor-
hoods with water to partisan de-
bates over the need for a filtration
plant, the history of Milwaukee’s
water supply supplies many les-
sons for today.
An engaging narrator, Foss-
Mollan focuses on specific land-
marks in Milwaukee’s eventful
history, such as the incorporation
of suburbs and the crypto-
sporidium outbreak of 1993.
She also looks at the political
power struggle between the state
and local governments during
the days of the city’s Socialist
administrations and shows how
decisions about Milwaukee’s
water would ultimately lead to
the imposition of state control
over utilities. Throughout this
often turbulent history, the
reader sees how such a basic hu-
man need as access to clean,
plenteous water can be thwarted
by the very institutions that were
entrusted with its procurement.
KATE FOSS-MOLLAN holds a
Ph.D. in urban studies from the
University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee. She has taught his-
tory at the University of Wis-
consin-Whitewater and was pre-
viously employed as a water
chemist for four years at the
Milwaukee Water Works. Her
research focuses on the history
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A BRIEF LOOK AT URBAN WATER SUPPLY
Water is essential to life—the life of a city
as well as the life of a human being. With-
out water, a man dies. Without water, a com-
munity suffers the same fate.—Leonard
Scheele, U.S. Surgeon General, Report to
Congress, 1952
Access to water is necessary to the modern way of life. The interrup-
tion of a city’s water supply would have immediate consequences. Wa-
ter rationing would be instituted to provide minimal supplies for drink-
ing and cooking until sources from outside the affected area could be
obtained. In the interim, manufacturing would have to shut down, bath-
ing would cease, dishes would not be washed, toilets could not be
flushed. If the supply were not quickly reestablished, foodstuffs requir-
ing water for preparation, such as coffee, tea, juice and locally bottled
soda and beer would become unavailable. Disease would soon appear
as sewage remained unprocessed and pathogens were spread through
insect or rodent vectors. Electricity and heat would cease to be avail-
able as power plants would be unable to function without water cool-
ing systems. Media coverage of recent episodes such as the Mississippi
2 Chapter 1
Valley floods of 1993, the Milwaukee cryptosporidium episode, and the
siege of Sarejevo have brought before the public the concept that a city’s
water supply can be its most vulnerable point.
Considering the severity of the situation above it is somewhat sur-
prising that until the last three decades urban water supply was a sub-
ject in which there was little public interest, although scholars wrote
largely unread works on the subject. In the last fifteen years, publicity
regarding chemical and biological contamination of drinking water
sources forced the issue to public notice, yet it can be argued that the
issues involved in urban water supply policy are still not fully under-
stood, even at the political decision-making ranks of local and national
government.
The ways in which urban water supply is regarded by those in con-
trol of its purification and distribution can reveal much about local atti-
tudes toward a city’s individuals, companies, and manufacturers. Ad-
ditionally, decision-making processes about water supply can have
repercussions for public opinion and confidence in local government.
Water supply can affect the growth of a city, particularly when it is avail-
able in a central city and not in surrounding communities. Finally, the
response of water professionals to manufacturing, commercial, and resi-
dent concerns over quality and quantity of water available can affect the
stability of a city’s industrial and financial base. Throughout history,
availability of water in urban areas has been shown to affect all these
areas, yet it is rarely considered as a major reason for relocation of any
person or company to an area. Imagine, however, the repercussions if
something should go wrong with a city’s water supply.
This work seeks to examine the history and practice of one city’s
water supply and to interpret from that history how and why policy de-
cisions regarding water supply were made. It is hoped that comparing
this history to that of other cities at similar stages in their development
will lead to a greater understanding of the process involved in design-
ing and implementing urban water supply. Additionally, in areas where
there are common difficulties, the evaluation of various solutions to these
difficulties may provide insight for those cities involved in planning new
water systems or altering existing ones.
The establishment of a permanent communal water supply is gen-
erally considered to be one of the two defining characteristics of a
Neolithic culture.1 In most areas, systemic agriculture requires a steady
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source of irrigation water to ensure minimal crop loss during periods of
infrequent or erratic rainfall. Therefore it is not surprising that the ear-
liest records of water supply refer to irrigation rather than drinking sup-
plies. While a single well might supply the domestic needs of a village,
the larger quantities required for production of grain and fruit crops
would necessitate the invention of irrigation canals, reservoirs, and
water-lifting devices. Depending on the reliability of these sources, vil-
lages might produce enough surplus crops to allow for an expansion of
the division of labor, leading to increases in population. Natural agri-
cultural cycles, including climatic variation, insect migration and chan-
nel migration in river beds might cause these newly expanded villages
to revert to their earlier states or to be abandoned altogether. It is there-
fore reasonable to expect that the villages that eventually survived to be-
come cities, and later city-states, were those blessed with water supplies
subject to minimal variation. Thus we find clusters of cities on the banks
of the Euphrates and the Nile2 or, less commonly, where copious sup-
ply could be obtained from local springs. Jericho, one of the first
Neolithic cities to obtain that designation, flourished due to an artesian
well.
J. G. Landels’s classic work on early technology, Engineering in the
Ancient World,3 describes the pattern that most cities took in the devel-
opment of water supply. As cities expanded, the technology invented to
ensure adequate irrigation for crops became utilized for domestic pur-
poses within cities. Continuous-flow privies have been found in palaces
and houses of the wealthy from as early as the third millennium B.C.E.,4
indicating a realization of the potential for pollution of the water table
of household wells. By the second millennium B.C.E., technology had
advanced to the point where aqueduct systems could be employed, lead-
ing to an expansion of domestic water use that included bathing, clean-
ing, and ornamental uses such as fountains, at least for the wealthy.5 The
palace at Knossos was supplied by an aqueduct that brought spring water
from seven miles away, carried under the palace floor by jointed terra-
cotta pipes. El Amarna in Egypt (ca. 1400 B.C.E.) had individual house-
hold wells for drinking water, and aqueduct supply for bathing, sewage
disposal, and cleaning uses. Biblical citations include the aqueduct and
reservoir of Jerusalem, built around 1100 B.C.E. and primarily con-
structed to provide drinking water for humans and livestock in times of
drought or war.6 These systems were primarily gravity fed, since the ex-
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isting devices for raising water were cumbersome, slow, and required
a large input of human or animal labor.
Landels describes the water-lifting technology that became possible
in the first millennium B.C.E. as “absolutely necessary for the continued
progress of mankind.” These devices, primarily forms of pumps, made
it possible for hundreds of liters of water to be lifted per minute, as op-
posed to the two to three liter per minute limitation of most Neolithic
devices. The placement of several of these devices, whether in series or
parallel, allowed the construction of aqueduct systems capable of sup-
plying, at least in part, for the domestic needs of all the cities’ inhabit-
ants. Athens, Sparta, and Babylon all had documented water systems,
most likely paid for from booty captured in warfare.7
The recent work of Dora Crouch reveals that the Greeks, at least, had
sufficient knowledge of climatic changes in the water cycle to adapt their
water systems to the seasons.8 Athens had sufficient supply in the wet-
ter months to allow users to store the excess in cisterns and use it dur-
ing the times when the piped supply, which was spring water, was only
sufficient for drinking and cooking purposes. Drainage water from roofs
and pavements was funneled to sewers, and fountains were equipped
with shutoff valves allowing the city to cease their operations when sup-
plies were at their lowest. Her work cites much of the other classical sources
on ancient water supply, notably Hill and Robinson’s study of Corinth and
Camp’s work on Athens. These sources, particularly those which focus on
planned cities such as Syracuse and Pergammon, indicate that the Greeks
took account of water needs in the planning stages, placing commercial sites
and other large-scale users on lower ground to make most efficient use of
gravity. This multiple source and multiple use of water in Greek cities per-
mitted a more complete use of a limited resource.
It would take the Romans, however, to develop the large-scale ur-
ban water system to its fullest extent in the ancient Western world. The
development of Rome’s water system is well documented. In provid-
ing water for a city population of nearly one million, Rome would
presage and solve many problems of water supply that would plague
cities of the future. Rome would set the three-stage pattern that all other
cities would follow in establishing water supply, namely: establishing
an initial source of supply and setting up distribution; expanding sources
when demand grew too great for the initial stage; and searching for ways
to maintain purity of both source and supply.
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Romans initially obtained their water from wells and springs and
later from the Tiber. Since the Tiber was also the outflow for sewage and
runoff, by the fourth century B.C.E., four hundred years after the found-
ing of the city, this source had become inadequate both for quantity (the
Tiber is heavily dependent on seasonal rainfall) and from pollution re-
sulting from human and industrial waste. In a city that was becoming
increasingly reliant on its slave population, and that was becoming a city
of landless proles, it was necessary for the controlling senatorial classes
to provide water in order to keep peace. Additionally, the expanding
business of the entrepreneurial equestrian classes often required water
supply far in excess of what was available from the Tiber, even during
the rainy season. As these classes rose in rank and power and entered
the Senate, they began to press for increased water supply.
In 312 B.C.E., Appius Claudius Caecus, censor of Rome and inde-
pendently wealthy, even by the standards of the day, sought to remedy
this inadequacy by constructing the first of Rome’s aqueducts, the Aqua
Appia. Using a gravity feed system, spring water was conveyed almost
seventeen miles through underground tunnels and pipes into the city. It
emptied into a large basin, from which all citizens could obtain daily sup-
plies. Appius paid for the initial construction, but donated the work to
Rome on the understanding that maintenance expenses would be paid
for by the sale of water to baths and other commercial users, and from
other public sources. Six additional aqueducts had been added by the
reign of Augustus to supply the rapidly growing population, estimated
to be approximately one million at the end of Augustus’s reign. By this
time, a major problem with the water supply was not its quantity, but
rather its lack of quality. Settling basins were added at the points where
the water from the aqueducts entered the city, and the settled water was
then lifted by pumps to distribution towers, from whence it could flow
into the city. For public use, much of the water was directed to a public
fountain, from which it could be drawn by any individual. For those who
lived at a greater distance from the fountains, the aquarius, or water
carrier, could be hired to deliver a daily or weekly supply, even to those
on the upper stories of Rome’s many apartment buildings. Baths and
other commercial customers received a separate supply directly from the
distribution tower, usually piped through terra-cotta or lead pipes.
Wealthy or powerful individuals could obtain permission to tap into the
distribution line to procure household water. These pipes were probably
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lead.9 When the settling of the water failed to solve the purity problem,
it became necessary to locate new sources that were of greater purity.10
Seven more aqueducts were constructed to improve the supply, and their
water was mixed with that of the others in an effort to gain maximum
purity without sacrificing the quantity.
Water usage was supposedly strictly regulated by senatorial, and
later imperial, decree as to type of use and size of building. The fee
schedule reflected the difference. By the time of the emperor Nerva (ca.
92 C.E.) fraud was rampant in this area. Julius Sextus Frontinus, water
commissioner of Rome and the author of the classic source De aquis
urbae Romae,11 found that many households and businesses had paid for
the smallest size private pipe but had later replaced it with larger pipes
and were drawing water far in excess of what was permitted. In addi-
tion, the freemen administrators at the water office had changed the
valves at the settling tanks and distribution towers, allowing baths and
commercial customers to receive a larger percentage of the total sup-
ply than was permitted. These valves were constructed so that in times
of fire or drought use by commercial sources could be discontinued until
the emergency ended; Frontinus directed that the valves be returned to
their original state, the administrators responsible for the fraud be sold
back into slavery, and the customers responsible heavily fined.
Theodore Ashby and  E. B. Van Deman discuss the construction of
the Roman aqueducts.12 Van Deman estimates that by the time the last
one was constructed, the system could deliver over 35 million gallons
per day, some of which was recycled. Baths were required to vent their
used water into the Roman sewage system in order that waste products
from Rome’s many public latrines could be flushed well down the Tiber.
Water for fire fighting was partially obtained from rainwater cisterns that
all households were, by law, supposed to maintain. Since rainwater was
preferred for laundering and other cloth processing, these cisterns were
often unable to fulfill their purpose. Water from the public fountains was
rarely used because of the difficulty of raising it to the upper stories of
apartments, which were the most frequent locations for fires. Mostly, the
Romans tried to prevent the fire from spreading, but beyond that, they
simply let it burn out.13
The Romans exported their technology wherever they built cities.
During the early Middle Ages much of their water supply technology
would be lost, but rediscovery of both Vitruvius’s work on the construc-
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tion of water systems14 and the remains of the Roman distribution sys-
tem in London and York would help these and other cities meet their
water needs as they began to expand in the High Middle Ages.
London is perhaps the best-known example of a medieval city that
tried to deal with its water problems in a reasoned and practical fash-
ion. In The Story of Water Supply, F. W. Robins shows that by the twelfth
century, the wells located within the city walls were heavily contami-
nated. In some cases these wells had been drilled on the site of Roman
cesspits, but the major source of contamination probably arose from the
dual habits of dumping animal and human waste in the streets and bury-
ing the dead in churchyards, even when that churchyard also contained
a well site.15 By 1200, the population had become aware of the lack of
purity of the intracity wells and was heavily patronizing those in the
wards just outside the wall. Despite the existence of the Fleet, Wal-
brooke, and Oldbourne Rivers within the city, the practice of utilizing
these potential water sources as sewers and as disposal sites for butch-
ering and tannery wastes had made them even more unpalatable than the
wells. As the population of London rose sharply in the thirteenth cen-
tury, the supply from the extramural wells became inadequate to meet
demand.
Water from the Thames was available, although deemed of lesser
quality than the well water, and it was marketed in the city by water
carriers reminiscent of the Roman aquarii. During the early years of the
thirteenth century, the London mayor and council made several attempts
to attain a pure source of drinking water, but the necessity of dealing with
the attendant political upheaval of the day was such that little effort, and
less money, could be spared to address the issue. A wealthy merchant
finally saved the day in 1264 and granted freely to the city his wells at
Tyburn, three miles to the northwest of the city walls, to provide a clean
source of supply.16
The source secured, money suddenly became available, and the
council constructed a conduit to bring the water into the city, where it
would empty into a basin and be available for everyone to take. Brew-
ers, cooks, fishmongers, and other commercial users were assessed fees
for use of the water and were prohibited from using it during periods of
short supply; these fees were collected by the warden of the conduit and
used for maintenance of the system.
By the fifteenth century, the additional water provided by the con-
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duit proved insufficient, and over the next two centuries, fifteen addi-
tional aqueducts were constructed.17 As the population continued to
grow, it became more difficult to secure a pure supply, as previously
unsettled areas attracted industry, farmers, and residents, thus polluting
potential sources. The population within the city consumed greater quan-
tities per capita than in earlier years; in 1438 the city granted residents
the right to make individual hookups to a conduit and receive water di-
rectly in the residence or place of business. As in Rome, this proved to
be a constant headache to the warden of the conduits, as he was required
to hold daily hearings to address complaints regarding customers who
were overdrawing their allotments. A particular culprit was the brew-
ers, who, despite having individual hookups, would send apprentices to
the conduit heads to collect additional water, thus depriving households
and individuals of their share. Brewers were banned from drawing wa-
ter from the common basins in 1457, but the recurrence of the complaint
in the records indicates that the ban was an insufficient response to the
problem.18
Henry Dickinson, in The Water Supply of Greater London, describes
how London met the challenge of its water needs. By the late sixteenth
century, demand had increased to the point where there were regular
shortages of water every summer. At this time the city began to look at
the Thames as a possible solution to London’s water problems. Advances
in pump technology now made it possible to use the river as a major
source because the pumps could push the water uphill to the city,
whereas previously, gravity-fed systems had demanded it be fed down-
wards from a greater height. In 1582, the city contracted with Peter Mor-
ris to install a water-wheel powered pumping station under London
Bridge to supply water to the city. Morris received fees for his expenses19
and was to receive 25 percent of the fees paid for water delivered to
private customers. In return, he was to furnish to the city all the water
necessary for firefighting, as well as maintain the basins where the poor
and indigent could obtain their water for free.
In 1592, the city, finding that Morris’s works were still insufficient
to meet demand, even after the addition of a second pump at the bridge,
contracted with Bevis Bulmer to construct and operate a second pump-
ing station at Broken Wharf, about two miles upstream from London
Bridge. With both stations operating, water was delivered to more sec-
tions of the city, and at greater pressure, than had ever been done be-
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fore. Despite these successes, the expansion of the population beyond
all previous boundaries stimulated demand for yet more water. The
Thames, dumping ground for sewage runoff and industrial wastes, was
deemed less than acceptable as a source, and the choice was made to
look for alternative sources to the north of the city.
In 1609, Hugh Middleton, contracting with the city for New River
Company, completed a thirty-eight-mile canal linking London with the
River Lea to the north. A second private company, the Chelsea Water
Company, began operations in 1721 and was joined by the Lambeth
Waterworks in 1783. All of these companies were able to greatly in-
crease the volume of water they delivered after the introduction of the
steam engine in 1794. While more costly than a water pump, the steam
engine could be operated night and day and did not depend on water
levels or tidal flows. By 1822, five more private companies would con-
tract with the city to supply water to various parts of the metropolitan
area, not all using such presumably pure sources as the River Lea. In
1822, London received about 28 million gallons per day from these eight
companies; about 13 million were from the northern sources and the rest
came from either the Thames or the underground stretch of the Fleet
River as it flowed under the city.20 The problems of dealing with urban
water supply would be carried across the Atlantic as colonial and, later,
American cities had to struggle with the same issues that had faced
London and Rome.
Both London and Rome were able to provide water due in large part
to the generosity of particular members of the propertied and monied
classes. The capital expenditure for the construction of a water distri-
bution system far outstripped the financial capacity of most medieval
and early modern cites; it would take the development of the private
company, generating funds through the sale of stock, to enable cities in
the modern era to provide the services that had been available in the ear-
lier cities. As shown above, this was necessary for London to meet the
water needs of its expanding population in the seventeenth century. Such
a system would also dominate the early years of water supply in Ameri-
can cities.
The history of water supply in American cities is excellently told by
Nelson Blake in Water for the Cities. American cities began to realize
that they had problems regarding water supply in the latter half of the
eighteenth century. Population growth had greatly increased demand for
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water, but the corresponding pollution from sewage, decaying human
and animal bodies, and retardation of run-off replenishment of the
ground water table meant that even the existing sources were of dubi-
ous, if not plainly dangerous, character.
The relationship between disease and water supply was poorly un-
derstood; physicians were aware that bad-tasting or smelly water was
unhealthy to the body but were unaware of bacterial and microbial wa-
ter-borne disease. The development of germ theory and the identifica-
tion of the typhoid and cholera bacilli were nearly a century in the fu-
ture. The most reasonable theory, according to these colonial physicians,
to explain the periodic outbreaks of yellow fever that plagued the east-
ern seaboard in the 1790s was a miasma of bad air, resulting either from
hygienic conditions or brought along on ships from the West Indies.
Medical debate arose on the specific cause; the remedy proposed by both
sides required the flushing of street filth and the encouragement of bath-
ing and other hygienic rituals.21
Like London in the early Middle Ages, most American cities were
served by wells. Some had better reputations than others, and water
carriers would deliver this “pure” water directly to households for a
modest fee. Small towns had often been able to finance and construct
water distribution systems, usually on a cooperative system,22 but these
small-town patterns would not be sufficient to supply the needs of the
urban areas. Once it was determined by the governments of New York
City, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore that an improved water sup-
ply was a necessity, the remaining debate centered on whether these
water systems should be municipally or privately funded.
London’s recent success with private companies was more famil-
iar to the American cities, yet that success was due in large part to the
early municipally funded system that had flourished during the medi-
eval period. Rome’s system, apparently municipally funded, had been
possible only because of the generosity of wealthy Romans who had
borne the heavy costs of construction and only then turned the infrastruc-
ture over to republican and, later, imperial management. Lacking citi-
zens of great wealth, the cities could only follow the example of Rome
if they were able to concede that the construction of water works was
imperative to the degree that money could be found from the usually
straitened municipal coffers. Failing this, private enterprise would have
to be relied upon to provide the necessary services.
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In Boston, New York, and Baltimore, private enterprise won the day.
In part because the councils of those cities were unable to commit to mu-
nicipal funding of water works, whether from lack of political clout or be-
cause these cities were near to or at their allowable debt limits, investors
and entrepreneurs were the first to introduce water supply in these cities.
Boston’s example is perhaps the simplest. In 1794 a group of inves-
tors petitioned the city council for permission to incorporate, the func-
tion of which was to provide a piped water supply from Jamaica Pond,
about four miles to the southwest of Boston. These investors hoped that
many householders would subscribe for shares, thus guaranteeing them-
selves a lifetime of free water. Given the costs for home delivery of clean
well water, this assumption was not unreasonable. The further hope that
dividends would be paid to stockholders once the construction was com-
pleted and other customers subscribed took a little longer to realize. The
investors in what was now known as the Aqueduct Corporation deliv-
ered their first water to customers in 1798, but it was not until 1807 that
dividends were paid, and then at a rate of only 1.5 percent.
Over the next thirty years the price of stock would slowly rise, along
with the dividends paid, reaching a cost of $1,300 per share and a 4
percent annual return. The major reasons for the early lack of return were
that the initial investors had seriously underestimated both the costs of
maintenance on the system and the cost of providing water free to the
city for hygienic and fire-fighting purposes. Further, Bostonians discov-
ered that even with a large source such as Jamaica Pond, both the pumps
used for pushing the water into Boston and the pipes through which the
water was conveyed were limited in size. This in turn limited the size
of the area that could be served from the source and further limited the
number of new customers who could sign up for the service.
Baltimore’s experience was somewhat more complex. In 1798 the
mayor and council authorized a committee to examine possible sources
from which water could be conveyed into the city. Upon receiving the
committee’s recommendations, the mayor then pushed through a sec-
ond committee, consisting of himself and seven leading citizens, to con-
tract for rights, construct a pumping plant and distribution system, and
contract the necessary funds or secure debt limits to allow for the con-
struction of the works. While the private citizens on the council were
expected to lend their financial and business expertise, the works were
to be municipally owned.
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Problems arose from the beginning. Ignoring the earlier committee’s
site recommendations, the implementation committee settled on yet
another site and began to contract for plant construction and pump en-
gine manufacture before they had obtained written consent of intent to
sell from the landowner on whose property the selected spring was lo-
cated. When the owner revoked his oral consent, the city was unable to
continue with its plan, as any other access to the land was blocked by
the right-of-way guaranteed to the turnpike road to the north of the city.
The mayor and committee, having authorized expenditures, were forced
to pay out of their own pockets the costs which they had incurred. Realiz-
ing that a successful future outcome would depend upon the city obtaining
the rights to seize property under eminent domain and to finance the works
through city funds, Baltimore applied to the Maryland legislature for power
to both condemn property and raise the debt limit. In the delaying fashion
to be shown in New York and Philadelphia, the state politicians failed
to act until the shock of the 1800 yellow-fever epidemic moved them
to grant the city the powers that had been requested.
It was then the turn of the city to procrastinate. Although a board
of commissioners was appointed to look into the water situation, it was
more than three years before the board reported that, sadly, the problem
of obtaining necessary water rights was too complex to be dealt with,
even with the extended powers granted by the legislature. Back where
it had begun in 1798, the city advertised for venture capitalists to finance
and construct a water system. The Baltimore Water Company was
founded in a similar fashion to the Boston Aqueduct Company. Shares
could be subscribed to, the estimated dividends of which would pay the
expected water charges. From the beginning, insurance companies
bought large amounts of shares, not only in hopes that the establishment
of a water system would reduce their fire liability, but in the hopes of a
good return on the initial investment.
Even after all the shares were subscribed, there was a delay before
construction could begin. Fearing a diminution in its recently granted
powers, the city delayed granting the necessary approval for the com-
pany for almost four years. During this time, the special authority to raise
the debt ceiling and condemn property that had been granted by the leg-
islature lapsed, and it was necessary for the company to directly ap-
proach the state in its attempt to carry out its stated function. After wran-
gling over the allowable level of stock subscription and the manner in
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which directors of the company were to be selected, final approval was
granted in December 1808.23 Water actually began to flow in May 1809,
almost ten years to the day after the city had first undertaken the task of
providing water supply.
The story of New York is more closely tied up with politics than in
the other eastern seaboard cities. Because of its rapid growth, water
quality was more of a problem in New York than elsewhere. Even be-
fore the Revolution, the need for a larger supply, and one that was higher
in quality, had been recognized. The war and its attendant expenses left
a tax burden on the citizens too high for funding a municipal water sup-
ply into the 1790s. Prejudice against a private-enterprise system ran
high, most residents preferring to believe that such a system would ben-
efit only the corporation, and not the city inhabitants for whom the wa-
ter was ostensibly being supplied. Several proposals were placed before
the mayor and council in the last decade of the eighteenth century; to
one24 the council replied: “considering the immense Importance of the
Subject to the Comfort & health of their fellow citizens, that it will not
be undertaken by a Company unless upon the Prospect of considerable
Gain: and that such a Gain must be acquired at the Expense of the City,
your Committee have at length agreed that the Undertaking ought to be
pursued by and under the Controul of the [municipal] Corporation as the
immediate Representatives of the Citizens in General.”25 Yet within six
months, water supply for New York would be in the hands of perhaps
the strangest private utility ever devised.
In January 1799, about two weeks after delivering the above com-
ment, the city petitioned the state legislature for permission to condemn
property, raise the debt limits, and to be granted the auction duties for the
district in which the city was located as the means to fund a municipal wa-
ter works. State Assemblyman Aaron Burr, chairing the special committee
which was to oversee the request, enlisted the help of Alexander Hamilton
and four other leading citizens. Informing the city that there was doubt
in the minds of many legislators of the city’s ability to manage the pro-
posed system on a long-term basis, he suggested that they allow the leg-
islature to determine what the best course of action would be for the city
to follow. Burr’s committee answered the council’s request for a writ-
ten statement with an unsigned memorandum, later found to have been
authored by Hamilton. In response, the council redrafted its proposal as
requested, and the committee returned to Albany.
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By delaying action on the request until the last two days of the ses-
sion, Burr was able to pass his version of the waterworks bill. Instead
of a municipally funded works,26 a charter for an institution to be known
as the Manhattan Company was approved. The company was to be lim-
ited to two million dollars in initial capital stock, had broad powers to
seize and condemn land for the purpose of creating a water works, and
had a ten-year time limit in which to deliver the water. Most remarkable
was the section near the end of the charter that permitted the directors
of the company to “use such surplus capital . . . in the purchase of pub-
lic and other stock, or in any other monied transactions . . . for the sole
benefit of the company.”27 Burr and his colleagues had just commis-
sioned what would become the Chase Manhattan Bank, the only bank
at the time not under Federalist control.
The company did, however, provide water. Rejecting the plan that
the city had submitted to pump water from the Bronx River to a filtra-
tion plant, then to a reservoir, and thence to customers, the company
found it more expedient, and cheaper, to use the old Colles well as a
source and construct a reservoir about one-eighth the size proposed. Fees
were set on the basis of the number of fireplaces a building contained; sepa-
rate rates were assessed for business and commercial properties. The com-
pany confidently assumed that these fees would reimburse it for construc-
tion costs and generate dividends on the initial stock purchases.
It was doomed to disappointment. The use of bored wooden mains
required constant repair, and the mains leaked profusely. Those con-
nected to the system generously allowed their neighbors free water, and
people in areas near old well pumps preferred to continue to draw their
water from those sources free of charge.
Customers also had complaints. As the water table supplying Colles
well was drawn down, those in higher areas of the city could get no
water. Additionally, the city had contracted for water to flush the streets,
but this too was unavailable. As early as 1804, the city realized that the
Manhattan Company’s water supply was inadequate to meet the needs
of the city, but effective steps could not be taken to ensure other sources
of supply because of the stipulation of the company charter. The com-
pany interpreted the ten-year limit clause as the primary foundation upon
which its banking charter was based. Allowing competition, they felt,
would remove this support and lead to the revocation of the most lib-
eral banking charter in the country. Predictably, the company vocifer-
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ously fought any attempts of other companies to provide water. While
the water business was expensive and offered a very low rate of return,
it was the foundation on which the very profitable banking portion of
the business rested. The company managed to not only defeat attempts
to charter additional companies; it managed to get its charter renewed
for a further thirty years.
Philadelphia suffered as greatly from yellow fever as did the other
cities on the eastern seaboard. In 1798, the city resolved to solve its water
problems but ran into difficulties with a private company. The Delaware
and Schuylkill Canal Company had been granted a charter to construct
a canal between the two rivers for the purposes of navigation. It was deep
in debt in 1798, unable to attract new investors or to force the investors
that it had to contribute further to construction costs. Originally sched-
uled to have been completed in the spring of 1798, the canal was far
behind in construction. The city, after rejecting the Delaware River as
a water source, resolved to use the waters of the Schuylkill. The com-
pany asserted that the best plan was for the city to invest in the canal,
which, when completed, could deliver all the necessary water. Latrobe,
the engineer hired by the city to oversee the construction of water works,
pointed out that it would take two years for the canal to be finished, leav-
ing the city open to the threat of yellow fever. Further, the canal would
be unusable as a source for several months a year from ice blockage.
The city agreed with Latrobe and authorized the sale of bonds for
construction of a waterworks. Several times during the construction,
financial problems almost stopped the process. The bonds were under-
subscribed, costs were greater than expected, and the authorization of
a special tax that allowed construction to continue brought ridicule on
the city. It became necessary for the city to issue two more bond sub-
scriptions and to sell a bridge and a ferry to private investors to raise the
necessary money. Yet the project survived and was formally opened in
January 1801.
Financial problems would continue to plague the system. Subscrib-
ers to bonds were guaranteed water for three years at no charge, and
other paying customers were slow to enroll. As a humanitarian gesture,
the works had been designed to provide the poor with the water at the
ends of street mains; anyone could simply fill their bucket for free. The
existing pumps and wells in the city had not been removed, and many
preferred to continue getting their water from a familiar source, which
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was colder, if much less pure, than the tepid waters of the Schuylkill.
Repair bills for pipe replacement and road repair remained high, as the
use of iron mains was rejected on the grounds that a supply would be
hard to obtain. Finally, the steam engines themselves incurred a much
greater expense than had been estimated. Grossly inefficient, the engines
consumed huge amounts of coal and frequently broke down.
Difficulties were gradually resolved. New engines were obtained
that were more efficient and reliable. Water rates were raised, and a
system for collection was installed that made sure bills were paid. A new
system of administration was devised that eliminated bureaucratic con-
flicts between the superintendent of the works, the engineer, and the
pump house operators. New hydrants were installed that prevented
passers-by from draining usable fire-fighting supplies. Despite all its
problems, Philadelphia had shown that it was possible for a city to pro-
vide water to its inhabitants. In the next half century, it would be recog-
nized that this was in fact a responsibility of a municipality, rather than
of a private company. Philadelphia’s experience would set the pattern
that other American cities would follow, leaving behind the reliance on
private enterprise for large-scale public works.
In the next half century, New York, Boston, and Baltimore would
cease their reliance on private water supply and convert to municipally
owned and operated systems. New York, with perhaps the most severe
problems due both to its rapid population growth and the dangerously
poor quality and amount of water supplied by the Manhattan Company,
was the first to make the change, although it was a thirty-year process.
The specific history of New York’s water system is told in Charles
Weidner’s Water for a City28 and details the political, financial, and en-
gineering details of the change. The major difficulty for the city lay in
the troublesome charter of the Manhattan Company. Granted the right
to use the waters, both surface and underground, of Manhattan Island,
the company’s monopoly meant that any potential competitor had to
search much farther away to secure a source of supply. Even when this
was done by a number of potential investors, the company argued that
as long as it was indeed supplying water, other charters to augment sup-
ply would violate its rights to exclusivity. Arguments back and forth in-
volving the company, the city, and potential new water companies oc-
cupied a significant amount of the legislature’s time in the years between
1807 and 1832. Attempts by the city to purchase the waterworks divi-
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sion from the company were challenged by both the company, which
held out for a much higher price than the city was willing to pay, and
by citizens, who felt that the company had already received more of their
money than was necessary. Customer complaints abounded in the early
years of the century in the areas of quantity and quality. Even when water
was available (which, due to leaking or broken mains, drying wells, en-
gine repair, or other reasons, it frequently was not), the purity was less
than desirable. Numerous doctors and physicians testified as to the high
mineral and filth content of the water and reminded the city that the
purpose of the charter had been to find a pure source of supply outside
of the city.29
If the wells in the city had been recognized as polluted thirty years
before, then how much more dubious was the supply in 1820? Increased
sewage, runoff from privies, cesspits and graveyards, and little recharge
to the water table from rainfall had all contributed to the degradation of
the supply. Clearly something had to be done.30
In 1831, the city established a board of water commissioners to
examine the problem of New York’s water supply. Its report contained
a way out of the problem with the Manhattan Company, pointing out that
the company’s charter required them to furnish “pure and Wholesome”
water, and the water that was supplied was anything but pure. The board
then further recommended that the city raise the sum of two million
dollars and construct an aqueduct from the Croton River for the purpose
of water distribution. The company challenged, still fearful that revok-
ing the water monopoly would lead to a total revocation of its banking
charter.
The New York Supreme Court finally ruled in the case in 1832. It
overruled the contention that the company had failed to supply water as
stipulated in the charter because the petition named no individuals who
had been so deprived. Further, it pronounced that several acts of the leg-
islature had confirmed the company as a bank. While upholding the
validity of the charter, however, the court ruled that there was nothing
in it which granted the company a monopoly in providing water to the
city.31 The city could build its aqueduct.
Boston underwent a similar transition. The Aqueduct Corporation
was providing water, but here it was the quantity rather than the quality
which was questionable. There was insufficient head on the water to
allow it to flow into higher elevations of the city, leaving from one-third
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to one-half of the dwellings in 1825 unable to secure a piped supply.
Further, even the addition of more pumps to provide greater head to the
supply would not satisfy demand because the water level in Jamaica
Pond was simply too low to meet the demands of the growing city. Sev-
eral proposals were made as to the possible new source, and a new com-
pany, the Boston Hydraulic Company, was founded for the purpose of
bringing water from Framingham to the city via an aqueduct. The mayor
and council were not so sure that another private company was the way
to go. Appointing a board of water commissioners, as had New York,
the city investigated the Hydraulic Company’s proposal alongside other
proposals for municipally funded works. The board reported to the city in
1836 that it favored the support of the Hydraulic Company, feeling that
water supply was an area in which the city should remain uninvolved. This
report was accepted only in part by the council, which upheld keeping
the city out but refused to endorse the company’s proposal.
It became necessary to seek public opinion in order to resolve the
stalemate. In 1837, citizens voting in a referendum approved munici-
pal ownership by 2,107 to 136. Further political wrangling occurred
when the existing Aqueduct Corporation and the Hydraulic Company
threatened to go ahead with their plans anyway, thus requiring city streets
to be dug up three times, at three times the expense. Further referendums
confirmed that support was behind the idea of municipal ownership, but
new disagreements arose as to the choice of supply. It would not be until
1845 that any of the groups could muster enough support to secure a
majority vote in the city council to direct a petition for construction to
be drafted.
Baltimore’s situation was much like Boston’s, but it took even longer
to resolve the questions of private versus public control. In this case, the
willingness of the private company both to expand its supply and to
improve its distribution system delayed significant frustration with the
status quo until 1857. It was evident as early as 1835 that the water pro-
vided by the Baltimore Water Company was insufficient for the entire
city and that it would become even more inadequate with the growth in
population that was expected. Debate focused on two points. Should the
city build an entirely new system and then compete with the company,
or should it buy out the company and simply expand the existing struc-
tures? A referendum in 1852 showed overwhelming support for munici-
pal works, and the engineers’ report indicated that competition with the
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company was impractical, as it would entail digging up the streets and
inserting mains beneath the existing company mains, leading to com-
plaints and probable litigation. The city finally agreed to purchase the
company’s works in 1854 and then began debate on the best source of
additional supply. Luckily for the council, it decided to initiate a city water
department at once to oversee the transfer of the private works to public
control. In the seven years it would take for Baltimore to decide upon and
then construct an aqueduct and reservoir system, the work of the water
department in improving mains and expanding the distribution system
meant that the new supply could be delivered immediately to the custom-
ers. Baltimore would need to secure additional supplies in the closing
years of the century, but its relatively smooth transition to public con-
trol was to be a great benefit to the city.
Philadelphia already had a municipal system, but it too would ex-
perience conflict in the area of public versus private ownership. The
waterworks in operation were inefficient and costly to operate, while at
the same time not supplying all the needs of the growing city. The con-
struction of additional works further upstream on the Schuylkill did al-
leviate the concern over quantity for the immediate future, but far-
sighted city engineers pointed out that this was merely a stop-gap
measure. While the new pumps and reservoirs were capable of deliver-
ing over three million gallons a day, the limited distribution system, in
particular the mains leading from the works, could carry only about one
million gallons per day. Further, the new engines were even more costly
to operate than the old ones had been, resulting in a deficit of over a quar-
ter million dollars a year. A better solution meant finding a larger source,
correcting the limitations of the distribution system, and designing
pumps that could operate more cheaply.
The Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company had become largely
moribund in the 1810s. Lack of investors had almost halted construc-
tion, but the canal had been completed to a point just above the falls to
the northwest of the city. Discouraged, the company applied for a char-
ter from the legislature to reorganize as the Schuylkill Navigation Com-
pany and to straighten out the course of the river itself by means of locks
and dams. Receiving this authority, the company began cautious nego-
tiations with the city on the proposal of using water power to operate
the water pumps. The company, needing funds, granted the city the right
to construct a dam and locks at some falls. The company would have
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the right to all the water necessary for navigation; the city could use the
rest for its engines.
It was not difficult for the water committee to convince the council
that this was the way to go. Operating costs would be cut by more than
half, and supply would be increased fivefold. The savings resulting from
lessened operational costs could be expended in improving the distri-
bution system. Since the available supply was so much greater than cur-
rent need, excess could be sold to the suburbs, generating even greater
income. The council approved the committee’s recommendation, and
initiation of the Fairmount Works ushered in a “golden age” of water
supply in Philadelphia.
The situation, however, would not last long. The company, which
had conceded water rights so graciously in 1824, was now much more
powerful. By 1832, trade was crowding the river, and the company in-
formed the city that it planned to construct additional locks just upstream
of the dam. The city was appalled and pointed to the contract, which al-
lowed the company only the water necessary for its existing locks. The
company informed the city that it discharged itself of that stipulation and
went ahead with construction. Negotiations continued over the next fif-
teen years, with the company contending that navigation was the primary
use of the river and that it therefore had the prerogative to do as it wished
with the river, according to its charter. The city argued that water sup-
ply was a more fundamental use of the river and that navigation should
take a subordinate role. Finally, in 1847, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ruled that all uses of the river were equally valuable, and that there
was sufficient flow in the Schuylkill to provide for both navigation and
water supply. This decision as to common use would have far greater
ramifications on the question of water use than the justices ever sus-
pected. Based on this ruling, decisions about harbor improvements, lo-
cations of sewerage plants, diversions of rivers, and agricultural allo-
cation of irrigation water in the San Joaquin valley would be made. This
decision would form the basis of all later legal opinion regarding Ameri-
can water use.
The example of the four eastern seaboard cities in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries shows that establishing private water companies
was not the only solution to urban water supply. By 1846, there were
eight water companies in London, which avoided competition by divid-
ing up the city into eight districts where each had exclusive rights. The
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majority of the companies used the filthy water of the Thames as their
source, leading to outbreaks of cholera and typhoid in the middle years
of the century. These exclusive rights meant that actions taken in one
area to improve water quality would have no effect in other areas of the
city, allowing disease to spread in spite of action taken to prevent it. The
municipal ownership of water works would prove to be the most effec-
tive means of ensuring a plenteous and pure water supply for American
cities.
New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore were not the only
cities to construct waterworks. New Orleans had begun providing a
water supply in 1822, Pittsburgh in 1826, Richmond in 1830, St. Louis
in 1831, Cincinnati in 1839, and Chicago in 1842. By 1860, the sixteen
largest cities of the nation had waterworks of some kind, as did many
smaller towns. Of the 136 systems in existence, 58 percent were pri-
vately owned, but these were mostly in the smaller towns. Only four of
the large cities had privately owned systems in that year.
Between 1860 and 1900, water systems would become common in
many smaller cities as well as large ones. There were 243 by 1870, 598
by 1880, 1,878 by 1890, and 3,196 by 1897. The trend toward munici-
pal ownership also increased; in 1800 only 6 percent of systems were
publicly owned, and by 1897 the percentage was 53.2.32 Letty Ander-
son discusses the trend in “Fire and Disease: The Development of Wa-
ter Supply Systems in New England, 1870–1900.”33
The cities of the American East Coast had a history that was unlike
that of cities in the interior, a fact which is evident in urban historiogra-
phy. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century cities (the term “city” refers
to a population of 5,000 or greater) were largely founded as colonial
trading sites. Their purpose was to provide for the transshipment of raw
materials back to England (or in the case of New Orleans, France or
Spain) and to serve as distribution sites for the dissemination of finished
products to those in the American hinterland. Manufacturing or indus-
trial production for export was never intended to be a function of these
cities, and the ruling classes were largely those who had power either
from their relationship with the British political hierarchy or who had
amassed fortunes through commercial transaction and middleman ac-
tivities. Further, these cities were not autonomous but merely a part of
the colony or state in which they were located, and their function was
to provide for the good of that colony and, ultimately, England. The
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political functioning of these colonial cities was in the hands of this same
elite, which was concerned with the population and infrastructure of the
city only insofar as it enhanced or retarded its commercial function. It
was not until the Revolution, when there was a need to supply finished
products that were unavailable after hostilities began, that the politicians
in the city began to consider the needs of the city itself. Manufacturing
and, shortly, industrial production required not only new facilities and
amenities but also a new class of workers. Accommodating these needs
meant that the city had to place a greater emphasis on its responsibili-
ties to its urban residents rather than act as a “junior level” of adminis-
tration for the colonial or state government.34
Midwestern cities had the advantage over East Coast cities in be-
ginning projects of public works because they had hindsight to show
what was feasible and affordable for a city. Also, the companies that had
been founded to construct the infrastructure in the eastern cities were
now in operation, so it was much easier to obtain items such as pumps,
mains, and pipes than it had been. However, the rapid expansion of these
cities left a shorter time for consideration of the need for public works
than the earlier cities had enjoyed. New York, for example, took about
170 years to reach a population of 100,000, but Chicago accomplished
the same feat in less than 40 years. These Midwestern cities had a cor-
respondingly shorter “youth” to permit the administration to develop
methods of dealing with city problems; as a result, the solutions offered
differed in many ways from those of earlier cities. Further, changing
social and political conditions in all American cities made for particu-
lar difficulties in attaining solutions that were acceptable to residents,
who enjoyed in the latter half of the nineteenth century a greater voice
in city government than had previously been the case.
Eric Monkonnen, in America Becomes Urban, defines four periods
of urban history: the original city foundation, when commercial elites
were the city government functionaries; the democratic period, when
new immigrants became involved in the government (this is also the boss
or machine period); the reform period, when the middle and professional
classes reclaimed the government; and the modern period, whe the city
was, and is, run by trained bureaucrats. For most cities not on the East
Coast, the nineteenth century roughly corresponds to the two earlier
periods, with the age of reform beginning around the turn of the twen-
tieth century.35 In the nineteenth century, cities began to gain more con-
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trol over their own business, although state legislatures still exercised
control over the granting of charters and maintained oversight on large
capital expenditures (for an example, see the story of New York’s
struggle for water, above). Cities founded in the nineteenth century,
however, began their existence on a very different level than had their
predecessors. Although the cities were still founded as commercial sites,
city founders recognized the need for ample locations for manufactur-
ing as well as for the residential needs of a working and noncommer-
cial class. Taking advantage of geographic locations, new cities were not
confined in function in the way the cities of the seaboard had been and
were freer to adapt in ways that suited their own needs rather than the
needs of a state government. Cities began to reflect a new culture, dis-
tinct from the rural culture that had permeated the early years of
America, and not surprisingly, the literature of American urban history
focuses on this culture. Unfortunately, it has, until the past decade, ig-
nored the political counterpart to the development of that urban culture.
The origins of a systematic evaluation of the role of cities first ap-
peared in James Bryce’s The American Commonwealth, appearing in
1888. Bryce contends that urban governments were characterized by
machine politics and riddled with corruption and were “the one con-
spicuous failure of the United States.”36 This pattern remained almost
unchanged until the 1940 publication of Arthur Schlesinger’s “The City
in American History.”37 Schlesinger’s work, often considered to be the
modern origin of the field of urban history, does not, in fact, define what
urban history is. In the two decades following Schlesinger, urban po-
litical history appeared as virtual marginalia in the works of urban bi-
ographers or of those writers seeking to impart local color in a booster-
style local history. These were characterized in works examining ethnic
or class groups in particular cities or in the biographies of more notori-
ous political bosses. At the same time, writers on the national political
scene found it impossible to explain trends in national events without
including movements and political trends within cities. Chief among
these works is Oscar Handlin’s The Uprooted, an examination of the
effect of immigration on new Americans.38 Handlin theorized that the
bosses were a representation of the democratic nature of the city, and
that they defended the rights of the lower and working classes, which
did not wish the city to be operated as a business. The reformers who
replaced them were from the upper and professional classes, which rec-
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ognized the need to counter the power of machine politics by replacing
it with a more centralized form of government that neutralized the power
base of the bosses. The reformer’s very isolation from the classes in
whose interest they purported to be working, however, meant that the
“social range and radical drive” of the reforms were limited.
Meanwhile, the area of urban history continued to be defined in the
terms of social history. In 1961, Eric Lampard suggested that the two
valid approaches to urban history were “the study of urbanization as a
social process” and a “comparative study of communities in a frame-
work of human ecology.”39 Even those who were beginning to exam-
ine the role of municipal government chose to interpret their findings
in these terms. Samuel Hays, writing extensively in the early 1960s, ar-
gued that political history, particularly of the urban variety, should be
analyzed “on the basis of human interrelationships inherent in these in-
stitutions.”40 In a later study on urban politics in the Progressive Era,
Hays concluded that the rise of the reform era in municipal government
was the result of a class struggle and that the reformers replaced the de-
centralized, freewheeling power base of the bosses with a centralized
structure that minimized the role of the lower classes. This was neces-
sary, he argues, to ensure that political power would be concentrated in
the hands of those who were more able to use it for the benefit of all the
citizens rather than just those who had participated in the machine.41 This
argument leads, however, to some unanswered questions. If the ward
system of machine politics, in which councilmen were “particularly
receptive” to the wishes of their constituents, actually worked, why did
the citizens vote to get rid of it? Further, if the desire of the reformers
was to replace this system with a centralized structure in order to “ad-
vance their own conception of desirable public policy” and if this move-
ment was a product of the upper and professional classes (and therefore
a minority of the population), how did it manage to succeed in the
polls?42 Hays’s work is valuable in that he identified a major change in
the structure of the urban polity, but his explanation raised many more
questions than it answered. A major result of Hays’s work was that schol-
ars tried to find answers to the problem of urban political systems by
examining the city in a structural functionalist framework.
This group of scholars became known as the “new urban historians.”
While they have discovered much about the nature of social and eco-
nomic processes and interactions within the nineteenth-century Ameri-
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can city, the question of power and the political manipulation of that
power has remained largely unexamined by this group. Instead, the
placement of social relationships has been analyzed on the assumption
that cities were the best example of the democratic exercise of power—
without, however, checking to see whether power was indeed distrib-
uted in a democratic fashion in that century.
Cities in the early nineteenth century resembled in many ways their
medieval predecessors. Political power was concentrated in the hands
of those with economic power—the merchants and the commercial
class. Cities were, after all, established and allowed to grow because they
made the movement of goods and capital easier and because the con-
centration of commercial activity in a relatively compact area allowed
for a concentration of political control in the hands of those responsible
for economic control. American cities, with very rare exceptions, were
founded as commercial sites, not as industrial producers. It would not
be until the mid-nineteenth century that the rise of industrialism would
affect the American city, forcing a change in the power base.
In the early 1800s cities were run very much in the form of a busi-
ness. Things that were good for the survival and continued health of a
city were approved of and paid for in various ways. The above discus-
sion of the implementation of water works in the eastern seaboard cit-
ies is an example of this. The manner in which each city chose to adopt
water supply—through public or private means—was a function of the
relative control of the capitalists within the city. If the question of wa-
ter supply implementation had not been seen as absolutely vital to the
continued existence of both the city and its chief function—that of al-
lowing a place for economic and commercial transactions to occur—it
would not have taken place.
As the cities of the eastern seaboard expanded and new cities were
founded in the Midwest, a different structure arose. In addition to act-
ing as centers for transport, wholesale and retail trade, and finance, the
new cities were also producers of goods, manufactured and industrial.
Unlike Boston, where goods were imported from outlying towns such
as Lawrence and merely marketed or transshipped to other points, cit-
ies such as Chicago, St. Louis, and Milwaukee found it more expedient
to manufacture their own goods, for domestic use as well as export,
rather than to import them from the east. These cities were not wholly
industrial in character, of course, but the strength of their commercial
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enterprise was enhanced because they could offer goods for export as
well as import, in addition to serving as transshipment points for the ag-
ricultural products of the expanding plains states.
As the new cities differed in character from their older counterparts,
they differed too in population. With much greater emphasis on manu-
facturing, there was a concomitant greater portion of the population that
was working-class. These people, either transplanted from eastern states
or direct immigrants from Europe, added a new flavor to the mix of
people that had previously been part of urban populations. They settled
in the new cities; founded neighborhoods, churches, and schools; and
established themselves and their culture upon the pattern of urban life.
As they entered into the arena of American urban life, they began to
make their presence known in the political arena by electing one of their
own as ward or council representative. In fact, wards or council districts
were often drawn to represent the ethnic or cultural characteristics of a
particular neighborhood.
On the surface, this appears to uphold the assumption of the new
urban historians that the nineteenth-century city was, in fact, democratic.
Did not these new types of urban dwellers have the opportunity to seek
one of their own as a political representative, and therefore did these
representatives not exercise political power on behalf of their constitu-
ents? In the cases of cities where a machine arose, the boss often as-
sumed the position of representing the new ethnic groups at a level above
that of their own elected representative. This idea appears in much that
has been written in the past two decades by scholars of this type. Three
works in particular, Amy Bridges’s A City in the Republic, Stephen Erie’s
Rainbow’s End, and John Allswang’s Bosses, Machines and Urban Vot-
ers, contend that the bosses and machine politics were just what they had
insisted that they were all along—the poor man’s friend.43
The problem with the work of the new urban historians lies in the
focus on the individual. With the advent of computers—and graduate
students willing to manipulate data using them—the picture of every-
day life for the common urban inhabitant in the nineteenth century be-
came clearer. It is true, however, that focusing on the individual tree
makes it more difficult to appreciate the functioning of the forest; simi-
larly, the emphasis on the role of the individual in urban society obscures
the true relationships of power in municipal government. Since machine
politics and bosses appeared to play a role in making the voice of the
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individual heard (at least if that individual was of a group in the boss’s
power base), the city appears to be more democratic than it really was.
Yet the functioning of nineteenth-century cities did not reflect the
democratic surface that they presented. Prohibited by state charters from
making political decisions regarding finance and taxation, cities often
designated these functions as “administration” and therefore confined
them to a much less democratic decision-making process. Political
power might now be in the hands of the people, at least for appearance’
sake, but financial power remained in the hands of those who were the
most affected by it, the commercial and financial figures of the city.44
These individuals were often the members of appointive committees and
acted as trustees or commissioners of public works or of other special
tasks that cities had undertaken but wished to administer in a nonpoliti-
cal fashion. In theory the appointment of nonpoliticians removed the
consideration of the role of any machine in the implementation and
management of said projects; in practice it simply allowed the priori-
ties of the appointees to take precedence over those of the boss and his
followers. Ultimately, the participation in the political arena by influ-
ential private citizens would give rise to the reform movement of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the attempt to regain the form
of power as well as its operation.
Writing about the same period as the new urban historians, a sec-
ond group of historians examined another facet of urban life. Recogniz-
ing the influence of public works expenditures on the functioning of gov-
ernment, these scholars, called “post-new” historians, examined records
from health and public works departments to determine how government
responded to the problems of infrastructure. They found that the record
of cities in devising responses was highly successful, yet implementa-
tion of these solutions was often blocked by special interests seeking either
to secure the solution for private capital or to block the reform altogether
on the grounds that public expenditures to increase property values of those
unable to pay for the improvements violated the fiscal role of the city. Sam
Bass Warner called this pattern of retarding city action “privatism,” and he
concluded that it was essential to the development and functioning of nine-
teenth-century American cities.45 Works in this group are Nelson Blake’s
Water For the Cities; Eugene Moehring’s Public Works and Urban His-
tory; Christine Meisner Rosen’s The Limits of Power; Terrence
McDonald’s The Parameters of Urban Fiscal Policy; Jon Teaford’s The
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Municipal Revolution in America, and The Unheralded Triumph; Joel
Tarr and Gabriel Dupuy’s Technology and the Rise of the Networked
City; Joanne Abel Goodman’s Building New York’s Sewers; and Robin
Einhorn’s Property Rules.46 These authors conclude that American cit-
ies worked on the principle that those who owned taxable real estate
should control the services for which they were taxed. Those with less
or no property could only influence decisions about services to the ex-
tent that they contributed to the expense of providing them. However,
the varying motives of these groups, particularly commercial versus
residential desires, occasionally meant that the only solution to urban
public works problems came in the creation of an extraurban structure,
including metropolitan and regional boards of professionals to oversee
major projects. This conclusion only partly contradicts that of the “new
urban” historians that the disadvantaged groups had a voice in urban
government. The voice may have been there, but it was not heard. Even
though bosses and machine politics had surface control of the political
structure of the city, the fact that administration, and not politics, deter-
mined the ordering of services prevented the bosses’ clients from receiv-
ing services financed by taxation or the general fund. Einhorn refers to
this as the “segmented system” and postulates that it arose as a preven-
tive to the redistribution of wealth in a downward fashion. Taxing the
rich so that services might be provided to the poor was not the intent of
nineteenth-century cities. In the same fashion, the poor were not ex-
pected to subsidize the provision of services to the rich, either domes-
tic or commercial. Each segment of society was to control its own as-
sets and their disposition.47
This situation was not permanent. Most successful in the provision
of such services as street paving, police and fire protection, and the pro-
vision of sidewalks, the segmented system collapsed with the rise of
large-scale public works projects such as citywide water supply and
sewerage and especially transportation systems. The period at which
different cities made this change varies and is seemingly most depen-
dent on when a city decided that such services were a “common good”
to the entire city. In many cities, this change in ideology came about at
the same time as the rise of reform government. Through lobbying state
legislatures, city officials were able to amend charters to allow for gen-
eral fund expenditures to finance projects that had previously been paid
for through special assessments. This was particularly useful in cases
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where public works projects required interconnecting infrastructure, as
in the cases of water mains, connecting sewers, and horse-drawn rail
cars. As the nature of these works prohibited piecemeal adoption, allow-
ing individual property owners on a specific block to prevent the im-
provement meant that the entire project would have failed. Only by the
adoption of a new ethic—that some things were so beneficial to the com-
mon good of all the individuals in the city that they deserved to paid for
by the city at large—was the nineteenth-century city able to construct
the amenities that would take it into the twentieth century.
New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston had discovered this
through their early experiments in water supply and were well on the
way to general funding of public works expenditures by the 1850s. For
the newer cities of the Midwest and the Plains, this transformation would
require varying periods of trial and error before they gained the experi-
ence with which to proceed along the path of modernization. Interfer-
ence from conflicting economic needs, differing political factions, and
inadequate bureaucratic oversight would have an enormous impact on
the implementation of public works in these newer cities. For the city
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, these factors would plague the operation of
the water department for more than 125 years.
The story of Milwaukee’s history is best told in Bayrd Still’s Mil-
waukee: History of a City. Published in 1948, this work describes in
great detail the founding of Milwaukee and its eventual rise as one of
the great manufacturing centers of the United States. Still’s position as
director of the Wisconsin State Historical Society ensured his access to
necessary documents and sources that illustrate the complex history
of the city and the role that its competition with Chicago played in its
development.
Two works tell the history of Milwaukee’s water supply; the first, A
History of Water Supply in the Milwaukee Area, by Charles Beveridge,48
was prepared for the Metropolitan Study Commission in 1958, the sec-
ond, A Century of Milwaukee Water, by Elmer Becker,49 was commis-
sioned by the water department in 1971 to celebrate its centennial.
Another work which mentions water supply is Judith Leavitt’s The
Healthiest City. Leavitt’s book is concerned with the origins of the Mil-
waukee Health Department and the changes that occurred in the years
from 1870 to 1930 that enabled the city to evolve from an epidemic-
prone urban area to the multiple winner of the United States Health
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Commissioner’s Healthiest City Award. Along the way, she discusses
the struggle that took place between the city health commissioners and the
entrenched city hall politicians who felt that the expenditure of public money
for so “ephemeral” a good as improved health was beyond the scope of city
government. How that attitude changed with time and with the persever-
ance of several prominent physicians shows the changes in publ c opin-
ion as well as political opinion occurring at the same time.50
A major work examining Milwaukee in the late nineteenth century
is Roger D. Simon’s Milwaukee: Expansion of an Industrial City.
Simon’s work is more of the nature of social, rather than political, his-
tory. The author focuses on three neighborhoods (four wards) that were
on the periphery of the city between 1880 and 1910. Unlike those of old-
line cities, Milwaukee’s new immigrants in the late nineteenth century
occupied land on the city periphery, rather than replacing more estab-
lished groups, which would, with upward mobility, have moved out to-
ward the suburbs. Simon’s look at these peripheral neighborhoods is
therefore a unique glance at a city whose development did not occur ac-
cording to normal patterns. For these neighborhoods, he examines popu-
lations and housing stocks through the use of an immense and complex
data base prepared by combining census records with building permits
and public works records. His investigation and evaluations of the rate
of service provision to these peripheral neighborhoods make it possible
to analyze much of the history of water policy management in Milwau-
kee from 1880 to 1910. Simon’s work evaluates the residents of his three
neighborhoods in the wake of the physical infrastructure which they
created and analyzes their attitudes towards urban life as a result of their
environment.51
Scholarship regarding urban water supply in the past quarter cen-
tury has expanded greatly with the development of the field of environ-
mental history. Much recent scholarship on water supply has dealt with
the issue on a regional, national, or international scale rather than on a
localized one. For particulars, see the article by Jeffrey Stine and Joel
Tarr entitled “At the Intersection of Histories: Technology and the En-
vironment”;52 as well as Abraham Hoffman’s Vision or Villainy;53 Rob-
ert Sander’s The Lost Frontier;54 Groundwater Exploitation in the Great
Plains, edited by David Kromm and Steven White;55 William Ash-
worthy’s The Late, Great Lakes;56 and EPA yearly reports of the effect
of the Clean Water Act.57
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Other valuable sources are the multiple publications of the Ameri-
can Water Works Association, including the Journal of the American
Water Works Association, Water World, and several books, especially
Mark Baker’s The Quest for Pure Water.58 Most urban water departments
issue annual reports, which may be consulted for specifics about indi-
vidual cities. Finally, in the area of textbooks for civil and environmen-
tal engineers, two examples stand out from the rest. These are John Wil-
liam Clark and Walter Viessman’s Pollution and Water Supply59 and the
New York State Manual of Instruction for Water Works Operators.60
These classics, now both in multiple editions, remain the standard by
which the science and engineering of water treatment is judged.
In this work I examine the Milwaukee Water Works at four times
in its history. In chapter 2, the foundation of the water works and its early
years are examined, and the pattern in which the supply of water was
provided leads to some interesting questions as to the motivation of those
responsible for that provision. This chapter covers the years from 1867
to 1910. Chapter 3 discusses the effect of new political control on wa-
ter works development and operations. Milwaukee shocked the nation
in 1910 by electing socialists to the positions of mayor and a majority
of the council seats. Despite the socialists’ platform, which demanded
the construction of a water treatment facility, this facility was not built
until the 1930s and then only because of the input of a large amount of
federal dollars. This chapter examines how the political agendas of the
socialists and their opposition affected the drive for a cleaner water sup-
ply, and covers the years from 1910 to 1940. Chapter 4, which covers
the years from 1945 to 1965, is also concerned with the effects of poli-
tics on the operation of the water department. Shortly after World War
II, the city realized that it needed expanded water treatment facilities.
Despite studies recommending against it, the new facility was placed on
the south side of the city, with its intake directly in the outflow from the
sewage treatment plant. How did the political makeup of the city gov-
ernment, the state, and the surrounding communities permit this deci-
sion to be made? Chapter 5, the last highlighted period, covers the work-
ings of the water department and its relationship to city government since
1975. It examines the changes in the structure of the city’s administra-
tion and has as its major focus the cryptosporidium outbreak of April
1993. The steps taken at that time by the department and by the city and
the aftermath of the case are also analyzed. Chapter 6 summarizes the
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pertinent points of the four preceding chapters and offers some com-
ments as to alternate scenarios for each case. It will also offer some
comparisons between the problems of the Milwaukee Water Works and
other examples of government technological policy.
I first became interested in the history of the Milwaukee Water
Department in the years 1980 to 1984, while employed by that depart-
ment as a water chemist. In 1983, an old closet, long thought empty, was
pried open and discovered to be full of photographs and journals related
to the construction of the Linnwood Plant. Later, as a graduate student,
I read Roger Simon’s report on the disparity in service provision to the
south side Polish wards and decided to investigate the topic using in-
ternal water department records. I was able to show that the disparity
in service not only existed but that it was rectified immediately after the
accession of the socialists to a position of political power, and thought
that there might be more to the story.
When I chose to do research on the Milwaukee Water Works, I did
not know what I would find. Much of the material was new to me, and
I was struck by the seeming dichotomy between the motives of the lo-
cal politicians and the presumed motivation of the waterworks, to pro-
vide clean, plenteous water to the residents and businesses of the city.
My experience as a chemist at the Linnwood Treatment Plant gave me
an advantage others did not have, in that I was aware of, and able to
correctly interpret, many available sources from among department
records. Additionally, my husband, Michael Mollan, continues to be
employed as an operator in charge by the department. This has kept me
aware of the many issues and changes which have occurred since I left
its employ in 1984. The records cited herein were obtained through the
permission of the water department, with gracious assistance from Jesse
Cooks, superintendent, and Carrie Lewis, quality control manager.
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CHAPTER 2
THE WATER THAT  MADE
MILWAUKEE ’S BEER FAMOUS
“Our next landing was at Chicago . . . no
business was going on; many were leaving
the place on account of the pestilence . . .
from 20 to 30 dying daily. . . . The thick
greasy water that stands in the streets looks
as if it were full of pestilence. . . . After
leaving we reached the young and flour-
ishing city of Milwaukee. . . . Its future des-
tiny is not problematical. It is bound to be-
come one of the largest and most delightful
cities in the whole country.”—Chicago
Democrat, Sept. 3, 1850
The village of Milwaukee was granted a charter by the territorial gov-
ernment of Wisconsin in 1836. Originally three settlements—Juneau’s
village on the east banks of the Milwaukee River; Kilbourn’s settle-
ment on the west bank of the same river; and Walker’s trading post on
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the north bank of the Kinnickinnic River—the unification did little
to reconcile the three founders to each other or to convince them to
operate as a team. While the powers of the new village heads were
severely limited, infighting and rivalry as to which section of town
was to be become the location of the central business district led to
serious rivalry between Kilbourn and Juneau. The most famous
result of the rivalry was Kilbourn’s refusal to lay streets in his sec-
tion that lined up with those in Juneau’s village; the result was that
even today, bridges spanning the Milwaukee River in the down-
town area run at an angle. Additionally, each section was attempt-
ing to compete with Chicago to the detriment of the others. Kilbourn,
assisted by speculators’ money, built a bridge across the Menominee
River in 1841 to divert traffic from Chicago that had previously
terminated at Walker’s Point and then traveled by ferry to the east
side.1 In order for Milwaukee to succeed in becoming the premier
city of the Midwest, as city boosters hoped it would, greater pow-
ers to assume a centralized government were necessary.
By 1845 it was clear to many that Milwaukee needed to take steps
toward cityhood to allow for growth. In that year, the editor of the
Milwaukie Daily Sentinel [sic] called for waterworks, public wharves
and docks, street improvements, sewers, and the cleaning of small water
courses.2 All of these required more governmental power than was
permitted under the village charter; and indeed, prominent townsmen
had tried to draft a city charter granting those powers the previous
year. This earlier attempt had foundered in its limitation of suffrage to
American citizens, depriving almost one half of the adult male popu-
lation of a vote.3 A compromise was reached in 1845 which required
alien residents to state their intentions of becoming citizens and lim-
ited suffrage to those who had fulfilled their obligation of paying taxes,
serving as firemen, or working on the public roads. The charter even-
tually passed muster in Milwaukee and was approved by the territorial
legislature on January 31, 1846. Milwaukee was a city and could com-
pete with other cities for the premier honors in the Midwest.
The framers of the charter, however, had not managed to eliminate
the sectionalism that had plagued Milwaukee since its founding. While
the new city government possessed powers very similar to those granted
Chicago in its charter of 1837, this government resembled a confed-
eration more than a real union. Each ward remained autonomous, re-
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sponsible for its own debts and only responsible for general expendi-
tures if a majority of its own aldermen so voted. Aldermen for each
ward were authorized to levy special taxes for public works expendi-
tures and to borrow money and issue bonds for such improvements.
Individual wards could sue or be sued, and petition the legislature to
make improvements on its own behalf. Since these improvements were
contracted for, and supervised by, the aldermen of those wards, the
potential for graft and corruption was high.4
Commerce is the foundation of any city; for Milwaukee, hoping to
overtake Chicago, it was of premier importance. It became clear to
many during the village period that urban development depended upon
the farmlands to the west and north becoming cultivated and profit-
able. By 1850 this development had largely occurred, and the area
surrounding the city was far more settled than it had been in the days
when it was a village.5
In 1850 Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was already in competition with
her neighbor to the south, Chicago. Chicago’s population by 1850 was
larger than Milwaukee’s, but Chicago’s lesser growth rate gave hope
to Milwaukee boosters that they might surpass the southern city in
population.6 While Chicago had the benefit of being located at the tip
of Lake Michigan7 and was thus able to serve as a commercial center
for the northern areas of Indiana and Ohio as well as for southern Michi-
gan, Milwaukee supporters recognized that its position ninety miles to
the north was a benefit to those in the northern plains states. Not only
did this ninety miles mean less transport time to take goods to market
for goods being transshipped to the east via the Great Lakes, it meant a
shorter, hence cheaper, water voyage. City boosters, hoping to make
Milwaukee the center of industry, trade, and commerce that Chicago
was beginning to be at this time, sought by many methods to improve
the amenities and the image of their town. Business owners, in particu-
lar, were eager to expand physically and economically, serving a wider
base of customers as well as increasing their own profits. During this
same period, Chicago was not idle. Granted a city charter in 1837, just
four years after the area had been purchased from the Potawatamis,
Chicago boosters had a step up on those in Milwaukee in that they
were promoting a unified settlement. Unhampered by sectionalism,
businessmen and boosters concentrated on forming commercial and
political ties with their peers in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia.
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Despite the major drawbacks which plagued Chicago—such as its low-
lying central business district, which resulted in much of the settle-
ment being knee-deep in mud throughout the year; the annual silting
up of the harbor and the lack of deep-water access at the shoreline; and
the failure to receive federal funding for harbor dredging and the canal
to connect the Illinois and Chicago Rivers—the unity of the city’s boost-
ers allowed Chicago to get a major head start on city formation and
enhanced its name recognition in the markets of the East. The personal
relationships that were established with the elite of the eastern sea-
board meant that when Chicago was ready to take the steps to enhance
its viability as a central marketplace, there would be not only money
available from eastern speculators, but customers as well.8
Chicago as well was trying to attract customers and businesses. In
the late 1830s, Chicago politicians and businessmen had solicited funds
to build a canal that would connect the harbor, which was the outflow
of the Chicago River, with the Illinois River, thus making it possible to
transship goods to the Mississippi by water.9 Additionally, funds were
sought to dredge and expand the harbor, which had the unfortunate
habit of silting up yearly as the result of deposits brought in by the
Chicago River. This silting required lake vessels to anchor one mile off
shore and transport cargo and passengers in small boats, a hazardous
undertaking in inclement weather. Businessmen and politicians coop-
erated in this effort, in part because the businessmen relied on the politi-
cians to secure federal aid in order to increase their client base. The Chi-
cago boosters placed a great deal of hope on the passage of the National
Harbor and River Bill, which would provide federal money for the pur-
poses of waterway improvements. President Polk’s veto of the bill in 1846,
on the grounds that federal dollars should not be expended on purely local
improvements, was a severe blow to the boosters.
The rise of railroads as goods carriers had greatly expanded by the
1840s. After the setback of Polk’s veto, Chicago boosters as well as
Milwaukee supporters began to examine the possibilities of a unified
transportation system, combining water and rail. Beginning in the 1850s
and continuing throughout the next decade and a half, a major effort in
both cities was made by city officials, businessmen, and entrepreneurs
to attract railroads.10 To support this effort the cities made several deals
in which they agreed to partially finance the construction of these rail-
roads. In Milwaukee this resulted in the city lending, in some cases, up
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to half a million dollars to the speculators in return for promises that
would ensure subsidized freight service to city industries.
But Chicago had something extra. While Juneau, Kilbourn, and
Walker were still squabbling over street and bridge alignment in 1836,
Chicago broke land in that year for the construction of the long-pro-
posed Illinois-Michigan Canal. Despite many setbacks in construc-
tion, including a financial panic and a concomitant collapse in the real
estate market in which lay the collateral for the loans with which the
project was financed, the canal was eventually completed in 1848.
Also in the 1840s, Chicago businessmen began to investigate the pos-
sibilities of running a rail line up to the ore-rich mines around Galena,
in southwestern Wisconsin. Due to the collapse of the real estate mar-
ket and the loss of funds to East Coast investors in the canal scheme,
eastern money was largely unavailable for this proposal. By the end of
1848, only ten miles of track had been laid, but over those ten miles,
farmers were transporting into the city thirty carloads of wheat a week,
more than had been brought in by wagon in a month. Chicago now had
the advantage over any other Midwestern city, in that it could provide
water transport to the east via the lakes (a plus it shared with Milwau-
kee) but could also use water transport to transship eastern goods to
the Mississippi, and the Chicago and Galena railroad meant that farm-
ers could more easily bring their grain to Chicago than any other city
in the Midwest.11
Milwaukee did not, however, give up. Convinced that the ninety
miles of difference in location would be a bonus to grain buyers on the
east coast, Milwaukeeans began to agitate for railroads of their own.
Lacking the ties to east coast financiers enjoyed by Chicago, city boost-
ers and politicians, beginning to think of Milwaukee rather only than
of parts of it, began to negotiate with railroad promoters to bring the
railroad to town. To counter the advantage of Chicago’s canal, boost-
ers focused on the condition of the harbor. To ensure that the railroads
would choose Milwaukee as their primary terminus, it was necessary
to improve the harbor facilities to allow the western grain to be trans-
ported eastward. Dismayed by President Polk’s veto of the 1846 Har-
bor and River Bill, which would have provided federal money to cities
to improve facilities along inland waterways, Milwaukee joined with
other lake and river cities to form a political coalition to further push
the issue. Primary responsibility, however, remained in the hands of
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the individual city, and Milwaukee eventually ended up spending al-
most half a million dollars to develop the port facilities. By 1857 the
improvements to the harbor and the rail linkage to the Mississippi were
complete. By 1862 the flow of western grain through Milwaukee over-
took that of Chicago, and Milwaukee became the world’s primary grain
export port.12
Such success was not without its costs. To encourage the railroads
to develop, many businessmen and politicians had pledged support to
the railroads, and the city had granted credit on the hopes that their
particular lines would win construction approval. To the city’s chagrin
and financial upheaval, most of these deals failed to materialize. The
city found itself overextended by several million dollars. Further, the
city’s debt had risen to such a degree that it was unable to meet some
of the normal and necessary obligations that it faced. In despair the
city turned to the state legislature for relief. In 1861 the legislature
responded with the Readjustment Act, allowing the city to refinance
its debt and stretch out payments, and forbade the issuing of bonds
until the debt load should be reduced below $500,000. This effectively
prevented any expenditures on improvements such as waterworks or
sewerage for several years; the outbreak of the Civil War put a further
stop to any capital planning.
It was during this period that Milwaukee’s rivalry with Chicago
reached maturity. In 1850 Milwaukee was two-thirds the size of the
city to the south; by 1870 it was only a quarter as large and felt the loss
keenly. Chicagoans claimed that Milwaukeeans had distributed hand-
bills to eastern immigrants implying that cholera was endemic in that
city (see the quotation at the beginning of this chapter); Milwaukeeans
responded that comparisons were “odorous” [sic] and that they were
only doing to Chicago what Chicagoans had previously done to them.
Despite losing the battle for Midwestern preeminence, most city
officials and many residents retained the feeling of competition with
Chicago. If Milwaukee could not be the larger city, then it would be
the better city, with the amenities of Chicago without the size, noise,
and congestion. But the fragmented foundations of the city would pre-
vent the introduction of those “amenities” on a citywide basis, and the
pattern of individual ward power that would characterize Milwaukee’s
neighborhoods in the 1850s and 1860s would hinder the ability of the
city to establish city services. Further, a major shift in political parties
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would foster the feeling that Milwaukee really had no business being
involved in supplying services, and it would be this final development
that would overshadow the century and a quarter of Milwaukee’s wa-
ter supply story.
To keep their businesses expanding, manufacturers and business-
men in both cities relied on a steady supply of immigrant workers
from the east and from Europe. In the 1860s and 1870s, the largely
German-born population of Milwaukee gave it a European flavor quite
unlike that of Chicago or St. Louis, its major Midwestern rivals. This
dominance of the population by a single ethnic group meant that the
German-born and -speaking citizens represented a significant economic
and political power base in city affairs. The role of the skilled German
worker in maintaining and expanding the industries of the city meant
that employers had to be sensitive to issues which affected their work-
ers, including political views that were often diametrically opposed to
those of business owners. Many of the German immigrants, as refugee
“forty-eighters,” had a liberal background that predisposed them to
support the Democratic Party. That party, recognizing a potential power
base, in turn took steps to secure the loyalty of the German immigrants
by arguing for liberal suffrage rights for new immigrants.13 Addition-
ally, their predominance in the skilled occupations established a work-
ing base for trade and industrial unions, groups which were tradition-
ally linked with the Democrats. As these immigrants achieved the
franchise, the Democratic Party rose to predominance in Milwaukee
politics—at least temporarily. To ensure the continued support of this
ethnic power base, the Democrats in turn unofficially supported the
cultural and artistic organizations sponsored by the German commu-
nity. These organizations, emphasizing drama, music, and parks, in-
creased the European feel of the city and in turn attracted even more
immigrants. The city and its business community were thus able to
expand even further in production and in customer base to the point
where many prominent residents felt they had the opportunity to usurp
Chicago’s place in the hierarchy of Midwestern cities.
In the 1860s in Milwaukee, as in many other cities, services were
funded mainly by subscription. As with musical and dramatic societ-
ies, which were funded by individuals wishing to see these opportuni-
ties continue, services such as paved roads, sidewalks, policing, and
fire protection were largely operated by voluntary contributions. When
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conditions became a public nuisance, the city might step in and correct
the fault, but improvements would be charged to the land owners af-
fected through special assessment. In general, each home or business
made its own arrangements for fire protection, policing, water supply,
sidewalks, and waste removal.14 The coming of the Civil War and the
reduction in the number of men available to perform these services
gradually forced the city to take action in some of these areas. For a
city wishing to attract new residents, safety from fire and crime; the
availability of parks, schools, and clean streets; and a healthy popula-
tion all became necessary components to the city’s image.
Milwaukee’s divisive ward system, in which each individual ward
was responsible for services, led to the enriching of ward officials and
sometimes substandard work performed at a premium.15 Each alder-
man was responsible for overseeing the work done in his district and
usually delegated it to the ward supervisor. These men, in turn, col-
lected the fees for the improvements and contracted for the materials
and labor necessary. Large numbers of complaints over the quality of
the work done suggest that it was common practice for the ward super-
visors to secretly arrange with the contractor for a cheaper quality of
materials, the difference in price to be divided between the contractor,
ward supervisor, and alderman.16 This divisiveness made it difficult
for private capitalists to secure contracts to provide citywide services;
any proposal was likely to meet with a counterproposal from another
area, supported by another politician from a different party who claimed
that he could not only perform the service more cheaply, but that the
first alderman had engaged in fraud and corruption in making the ini-
tial proposal.17
Although annual elections of ward officials18 and surprisingly broad
powers for those officials meant that aldermen and ward supervisors
had a great deal of independent power, it also meant that they were
much more responsive to the needs and desires of their constituents
than was common in nineteenth-century cities.19 These officials, de-
spite party affiliation, tended to concentrate heavily on the needs of
their own districts as opposed to the general welfare of the city. Be-
cause expenditures for each ward were controlled by the aldermen for
that ward rather than by the city as a whole, there was little attempt to
agitate for citywide services, which would be under the stern fiscal
eye of the city comptroller rather than the alderman, who might be
THE WATER THAT MADE MILWAUKEE’S BEER FAMOUS 45
able to make a little on the deal. The interests of the city, which fo-
cused on increasing new business, and city prestige differed from those
of the ward residents, who wanted good living conditions.
With the rapid increase in the proportion of German-born and eth-
nic German citizens in the 1850s, party politics became more impor-
tant. Even after the birth of the Republican Party in 1856, with its
emphasis on preserving the union, Germans in Milwaukee continued
to vote heavily Democratic.20 National boom years in the middle of the
decade were attributed to the sound fiscal policies of the Democrats
then in national office, and the resulting prosperity meant that most
Germans were content with the status quo. The gathering storm in the
years immediately before the civil war was a further impetus to sup-
port their party—war was not good for business unless one happened
to be in the profiteering game. This all helped to ensure that Milwau-
kee enjoyed a steady reign of Democrats in City Hall, even if the Yan-
kees on the east side stubbornly persisted in voting for Whigs or Re-
publicans. Of the sixteen mayors who served the city between 1846
and 1870, only one was elected on anything other than a Democratic
ticket. Some, admittedly, whose adherence to traditional Democracy
had lessened with the acquisition of property, were elected on a coali-
tion People’s Ticket with the aid of moderate Whigs—or, later, Re-
publicans. These more conservative officials tried to initiate reins on
the independence of the alderman and a curtailing of municipal expen-
diture in general. That they rarely remained in office long was a reflec-
tion that most voters preferred things the way they were.21
Milwaukee’s political behavior was democratic as well as Demo-
cratic. Mass meetings and heated arguments in debates and in letters to the
press kept public sentiment expressive and vigorous. Annual elections
kept politics continually before the voters, and officials who were un-
responsive to their constituents found themselves out of office rapidly.
From 1848 to 1870, an average of only two alderman per year suc-
ceeded themselves in office; while this was in part due to rotation of duties
in city management, it also had the potential for making officials more
responsive to the wishes of the voters. Officials who failed to respond
to the wishes of their constituents quickly found themselves out of of-
fice. Although major political office was usually held by commercial
and professional leaders, small businessmen made frequent appear-
ances on the council, and by the 1860s tradesmen and representatives
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of service industries also made an appearance. Given the high propor-
tion of brewers and related industries among the German population,
the Democrat’s rejection of a temperance stand probably did more to
ensure the loyalty of their vote than anything else. The Germans were
rewarded by having the position of city treasurer “reserved” for one of
them whenever a Democratic mayor was in office.
Time, war, and financial difficulties began to have an effect on the
liberal attitudes of the Germans, as well as on the rest of Milwaukee.
While the financial panic of 1857 had little effect on Milwaukee di-
rectly, decreased orders from other cities had a dampening effect on
the city economy. The onset of the Civil War provided a boom as the
closure of the Mississippi River meant that much larger amounts of
grain and other foodstuffs were shipped through Milwaukee and other
Great Lakes ports.22 The debacle of the railroad loans, however, would
provide the stimulus that would encourage Milwaukee to embrace a
more conservative fiscal policy. Despite the continued victories of the
Democrats in their control of city politics, businessmen trying to main-
tain their customers with a lessened workforce had found themselves
unable to contribute as greatly to the tax coffers. The combination of
railroad debt and the carryover of ward indebtedness from aldermen
whose zeal for local improvements had in many cases exceeded the
ward levies allotted made the financial position of the city precari-
ous.23 The Readjustment Act precluded the traditional graft of the ward
politicians by moving the power to finance improvements from their
hands into that of the city comptroller. New improvements had to be
approved by a council majority and were subject to the strict limita-
tions of the budget, which was itself set by the state legislature. De-
spite their continued loyalty to the Democratic Party, and unhappiness
with the national Republicans, Germans began to become disillusioned
with their local politicians.24 The former responsiveness was a thing of
the past as fiscal curbs made the financing of neighborhood amenities
impossible.
Although the Democrats would remain in office through the elec-
tion of 1870, this was to be the end of their “regime.” Despite the
accusations of corruption, fiscal irresponsibility, and nonresponsiveness
to business needs made against them, the decade of the 1860s showed
that the Democrats were able to manage the city effectively. From a
debt of $2,825,850 in 1861, with empty city coffers, by 1869 the debt
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had been reduced to $200,000 in railroad bonds.25 An area not addressed,
however, was the power of the ward councilors, supervisors, and al-
derman in regulating public works expenditures. A proposed elective
board of street commissioners had remained in office for only a year,26
but the Public Debt Commission had been very successful in its efforts
to reduce the debt facing Milwaukee. A proposed charter revision in
1867 would have eliminated the councilors and replaced the supervi-
sion of public works expenditures presently in the hands of ward offi-
cials with a Board of Public Works; this proposal was soundly defeated.
The idea of a board continued, however, and in 1869, after continued
public demand that something be done about the state of public works
in the city, the proposal finally passed. The realization that the public’s
ability to vote the ward aldermen and councilors out of office if such a
board were not established was likely the reason for this change.
Chicago, on the other hand, had a much more diverse ethnic and
cultural mix in the 1860s and 1870s. While different groups occupied
distinct neighborhoods, the multiplicity of ethnicities in Chicago pre-
vented any one group from dominating politics in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The tradition of Irish Democratic politics in the Chicago City
Hall was largely a product of the postreform era in the twentieth cen-
tury and depended in large part on the personal magnetism of Richard
Daley, Sr.27
It was in the context of the Chicago-Milwaukee rivalry that the
Milwaukee water system was finally developed, but the debt problems
that Milwaukee faced would lead to at least a decade of delay in the
ability of the city to finance such a system. Milwaukee’s indebtedness
had arisen in large part because of the refusal of different political
groups and classes to work together for the betterment of the city;
instead, each group or individual believed that, with luck, it could gain
pre-eminent status among the financial and business elite of the city
or, alternatively, secure political power. The failure of these groups to
cooperate, a holdover from the age of the three villages, would ulti-
mately delay the provision of services in Milwaukee.
Milwaukee was similar in many ways to Boston, New York, and
Baltimore in the establishment of its water system. Agitation for water-
works began decades before there was any concerted effort on the part
of the city to supply such an amenity. Various private schemes were
proposed, with dismal results. Unlike Chicago, in which a municipally
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owned works was established in 1852 as the only practical solution,28
Milwaukee’s sectionalism would deprive the population of a citywide
system for thirty more years. Chicago had attempted to resolve its wa-
ter problems by licensing a private company to provide service, as had
the cities of the east coast. In the ten years after the founding of the
Chicago Hydraulic Company in 1842, troubles with fish-clogged wa-
ter intakes, ice storms, and high water turbidities prevented the firm
from turning a profit; the city purchased it in 1852. Chicago took an
aggressive approach to supplying the city with water. Within nine years
the city had a system that included 600 feet of intake pipes, an el-
evated standpipe, a 95-mile-long distribution system, and a total of 1.5
million gallons of reservoirs. The average daily pumpage in 1861 for
Chicago was 4,842,000 gallons, which supplied 120,000 residents.29
Water in Milwaukee was available from a private vendor as early
as 1840. In that year, James Rogers, who built the United States Hotel
at the corner of Huron and East Water Street noticed that an abundant
spring was located on his property. Rogers built a spring head and had
wooden mains constructed that led water into his hotel. He also served
businesses along Michigan Street. Rogers’s spring waterworks re-
mained in operation until the hotel burned down in 1849.30
The first call for a municipally owned works came with the above-
mentioned Sentinel editorial. Agitation on a larger scale began in the
1850s, as city boosters were sure that a city waterworks would be nec-
essary in order to compete with Chicago. In 1852, a private company
headed by John Lockwood proposed to build a waterworks using his
company’s funds as well as $75,000 borrowed from the city. Lockwood
was to have a fifteen-year monopoly on the water, after which the city
was to have the option of either buying the works or continuing to
allow Lockwood to operate them for a further ten years. When no
action was taken by Lockwood to construct any works, the common
council authorized city bonds and a grant of seven acres to the Mil-
waukee Hydraulic Company in 1857. The financial panic of that year
prevented anything definite arising from this action, but the company
remained in business. Frustration with the inaction continued, and in
1859 Hubbard and Converse of Boston proposed to construct a water-
works for the city, including distribution system, for $450,000. Just as
it appeared that action would finally be taken, the Civil War broke out.
By 1867 Milwaukee’s water supply was in the forefront of debate.
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High levels of filth in the city, particularly human and animal wastes,
were allowed to remain on the streets, from which they were eventu-
ally washed into the water table. Most houses had unlined privies, fur-
ther contributing to the pollution of the supply, and the practice of
obtaining water from a neighborhood pump, even when it was located
in the midst of domestic and industrial wastes, was common.31 In 1866
the Milwaukee Sentinel noted that it was necessary to walk more than
half a mile from the business district to find a pump to supply water
that was “pure and wholesome to the taste and smell.”32 High rates of
diarrheal diseases were endemic in Milwaukee, and while the link be-
tween water supply and disease had not yet been clearly demonstrated,
many health practitioners recognized the relationship between pure
water and health in a general fashion.33
Lockwood had again petitioned the city in 1867 to renew his ear-
lier grant of a monopoly; the city refused. By this time, the quality of
Milwaukee water was so bad that liquid filth was coming out of the
pumps on Grand Avenue. The use of backyard privies and the failure
of citizens to restrain their animals from dropping wastes in the main
streets contributed to massive pollution of the ground water. The Mil-
waukee, Menominee, and Kinnickinnic Rivers were also heavily pol-
luted by tannery and slaughterhouse wastes. Any proposal for water in
Milwaukee would have to draw water from Lake Michigan or from
inland lakes.
There were other pressing reasons for implementing a water sup-
ply. Fire protection, despite the presence of several fire-fighting units,
was minimal. The pump trucks, owned first by volunteer units and
later by the city, had a limited capacity, and their tanks could not sup-
ply enough water to stop even a moderate house fire, much less a full-
scale conflagration in the business district. City ordinances requiring
house and business owners to maintain rainwater cisterns on the roofs of
buildings were largely unsuccessful because the cisterns rusted and broke,
or the water was utilized for drinking and bathing purposes in hot weather
or periods of drought.34 Bucket brigades bringing water to the pump
trucks from public pumps could not deliver a sufficient quantity of
water to augment the trucks’ supply and ensure successful firefighting.
Other needs for water were for washing and cleaning streets, for metal
finishing and other industrial uses,35 and the aesthetic use of water for
fountains in parks. For all these reasons, city boosters, businessmen,
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and the city hall hierarchy deplored the lack of a citywide water supply
and encouraged the adoption of some system that would improve the
city’s image among potential immigrants.
In the meantime, Chicago had been experiencing water problems
of its own. When sewers had been introduced in the 1850s, they had
been designed to empty into the Chicago River, which flowed into Lake
Michigan. This river also received massive amounts of industrial dis-
charge, including slaughterhouse and brewery waste, from businesses
located along its banks. During rainy seasons, the river’s load of filth
was carried into Lake Michigan, where it contaminated the drinking
water source. Cholera and typhoid death rates skyrocketed, and resi-
dents besieged the city government in 1866 with demands that some-
thing be done to remedy the situation.
By 1871 a massive engineering program had been largely com-
pleted. Under the direction of E. S. Chesbrough, a two-mile-long un-
derground tunnel had been extended into the lake to provide a clean
source of drinking water. Chesbrough also attempted to reverse the
course of the Chicago River, causing it to flow westwards to the Mis-
sissippi, but this would not be entirely successful until 1900. The Chi-
cago Pumping Station and Water Tower were also completed in 1871,
permitting the city not only to pump more water out of the lake but also
to send it to areas of the city at higher elevations, and with greater
pressure. This permitted industrialists needing an ample water supply
to locate themselves further away from the center of the city, reducing
the effects of air and water pollution on the downtown area.36
Back in Milwaukee, the common council in 1868 petitioned the
legislature for permission to raise taxes to provide five thousand dol-
lars for a survey and estimate of possible solutions to their water prob-
lems.37 The consultant chosen was E. S. Chesbrough, chief engineer of
Chicago, who had been overseen the waterworks improvements there.
After all, if Milwaukee was to compete with Chicago, it made sense to
use the same engineer who had done so much to improve its rival to the
south. Late in 1868 he submitted five proposals for consideration. Two
used either Lake Michigan or the Milwaukee River as sources or sup-
ply, the other three proposed the use of inland water from Pewaukee
Lake, Big Muskego Lake, or Lake Denoon. All five proposals were
debated both in the common council and in the newspapers, with the
middle classes living in the western wards of the city favoring the in-
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land lake system as it allowed for a gravity fed supply, lessening initial
reliance on pumps to lift the water up the steep lakeside bluffs.
Chesbrough’s preferred recommendation, that of installing a seven-
hundred-foot intake into Lake Michigan then lifting the water to a res-
ervoir located in the sixth ward, required high construction and opera-
tion costs. Given the geography of Milwaukee, with its steep bluffs at
the lakeshore, it would require a great deal of power to lift water up the
bluffs and from there to the reservoir. While the wards on the east side
and downtown could be assured of a plentiful supply, being downhill
from the reservoir, those on the west side would require additional
booster pumps to ensure sufficient pressure to lift the water to those
greater heights.38 The cost of running these extra pumps would increase
the cost of water, possibly beyond the ability of less economically well-
off citizens to pay.
The inland alternative, proposed by William Wehr of the Holly
Pump Company, recommended that water be obtained from Pewaukee,
Denoon, or Big Muskego Lakes and gravity-fed into the city. The cost
of extra pipe to bring the water fifteen miles into the city would still be
about the same as that of constructing an underwater intake pipe, and
the greatly decreased costs for initial pumping, as well as the elimina-
tion of the need for booster pumps and a reservoir, would mean lower
capital and maintenance expenditures.
Debate was heated and often acrimonious. Letters extolling the
virtues of one plan over the other appeared several times a week in the
Sentinel, and members of the council who served on the Watering Com-
mittee were under constant barrage from both sides as the time for
decision-making approached. Although neither plan could be under-
taken until the city’s debt was reduced to the levels stipulated in the
Readjustment Act, public outcry that something be done about the wa-
ter problem forced the committee to decide on an option to be under-
taken as soon as it was financially feasible. Remembering the example
of the 1850s, when local groups had been able to obstruct efforts to-
wards a waterworks, the councilmen decided a quick decision was in
their own best interests. After all, the sooner a decision was made, the
sooner public support could be directed towards the plan selected. In
1870 the council decided to adopt Chesbrough’s Lake Michigan sys-
tem and recommended that construction begin as soon as it was finan-
cially possible.39 While the debate continued, action could not be taken
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until more of Milwaukee’s debt was retired. It was not until 1871 that
enough of the money owed was paid so that a decision could be made
on a water system.
A lingering problem from the railroad fiascoes of the 1850s had
been fraud and corruption on the part of city officials hoping to make
a quick return on minimal investments. Further scandals relating to
procurement of supplies and materials for road paving and improve-
ments came to light in the 1860s. While the procurement system had
been restructured so that contracts were let citywide from a single mu-
nicipal office, public opinion on the trustworthiness of any municipal
official was very low. As a consequence, when the city was finally
ready to begin construction of its waterworks, it made sure that the
ability of city officials to receive graft and kickbacks would be eradi-
cated and requested that a board of water commissioners be empow-
ered to oversee the works and, further, that these commissioners be
private citizens.
A major stumbling block with earlier proposals had been the abil-
ity of citizen groups to obstruct efforts to get construction underway
by petitioning the common council for delays or injunctions. To insure
maximum trust and reliability, the council and mayor recommended to
the legislature that the seven leading citizens of the city comprise the
board. Alexander Mitchell, financially the foremost citizen, was to chair
the board and was to be joined by John Plankinton, Frederick Pabst,
Edward O’Neill, Guido Pfister, Edward Brodhead, and George
Burnham. The commissioners would have the power to draft plans,
award contracts, condemn property, and authorize expenditures, but
the common council had the power to amend any of the above actions,
subject to the approval of the board. The works were to be funded by
the sale of water bonds, taxes levied for construction, water rates, and
any other revenues that might derive from the system.40 The legisla-
ture authorized the board on March 12, 1871.41 When the initial con-
struction of the works was complete, authority was to be handed over
to a board of public works, whose commissioners would serve at the
pleasure of the mayor and be under the jurisdictional control of the
common council.
Chesbrough had recommended that the initial system should con-
sist of a pump station at North Avenue, a 700-foot intake into the lake,
a high service pumping station, a reservoir, and a 135-foot-tall
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standpipe. The capacity of the system was to be 16 million gallons per
day. By 1888 this would be insufficient to meet the needs of the city.
Milwaukee in 1870 was a city divided socially and ethnically, con-
tinuing its original pattern of division. The separate settlements origi-
nally comprising the city had developed differently; Solomon Juneau’s
east of the river settlement on bluff land above the lake was largely
inhabited by the English or native-born privileged business owners.
The west side originally founded by Bryan Kilbourn in the later nine-
teenth century was the home of middle class German immigrants and
their families. The south side, formerly Walker’s Point, sited on marsh
land south of the Menominee River, was the least pleasant district in
Milwaukee. Unskilled workers, largely of Polish, Russian-Polish, and
Bohemian extraction, would soon find refuge here and on the lime-
stone bluffs beyond, as this less-desirable land provided lots and hous-
ing that they could afford. Despite the lack of East Coast–style tene-
ment housing, the south side would be characterized by many of the
physical symptoms of slum housing, including poor sanitation, crowd-
ing, and high infant and epidemic mortality figures.42
But in 1870 these areas were mostly vacant, or in some cases farm-
land. In 1870 Milwaukee was a city with an expanding industrial and
manufacturing base and relied heavily on the influx of skilled and un-
skilled labor that arrived from the east and from Europe. Since indus-
trial expansion depended upon attracting and maintaining this supply
of workers (at least the skilled workers; unskilled workers were, after
all, available from anywhere), water supply to provide not only for
industrial use but also for domestic needs of these workers was a ne-
cessity. Initially, water would be regarded not as a right but as a privi-
lege, and one that individual property owners would have to pay for.
The Board of Water Commissioners held its first meeting in the
mayor’s office on April 18, 1871, to determine the terms of service of
each of the members. O’Neill was elected president of the board, to
serve a term of seven years; the terms of the remaining members were
drawn by lot.43 The second and third meetings were largely concerned
with the adoption of rules and by-laws for the operation of the board;
on June 5 the commissioners informed the common council that they
were ready to function and requested the allocation of $2,500 to hire
an engineer.
By July the board had determined how the waterworks financing
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was to be handled. Water bonds were issued by the city with a rate of
three percent per annum; citywide taxes were to be assessed for opera-
tions and maintenance costs; water rates were to be assessed on all sub-
scribing customers; and other fees, such as fines for the wasting of water,
could be charged if deemed necessary.44 All monies were to be held by
the waterworks treasurer, who was to be hired by the board, and no
payments could be made except at the order of the city comptroller.
Work proceeded slowly. The only other actions of the board be-
tween July and November were to hire an engineer to oversee con-
struction and to vote $10,000 in water bonds as a thank-you to Guido
Pfister for his work as secretary pro tem. The common council had
approved the issuance of water bonds to the limit of $500,000.45 In
February, after receiving a recommendation from Moses Lane, the
newly hired engineer, that the reservoir be 20 million gallons in capac-
ity, the board authorized the city attorney to purchase the land neces-
sary to accommodate the reservoir site. The land chosen was a six-
acre plot willed to the city by the late Byron Kilbourn; other sites
considered included land owned by Pabst, Pfister, and O’Neill. A sec-
retary and a treasurer were hired in February 1872, and bids were placed
for the manufacture of distribution pipe. Edward Allis’s foundry won
the bid for the pipe casting after making a last-minute bid just slightly
lower than the next cheapest offer.46
Map 1 shows the Milwaukee landscape, with the location of the
pumping station and reservoir. Also noted are the location of the resi-
dences of the Board of Water Commissioners, all of whom were among
the earliest citizens to receive piped water. Although there were many
high bluffs available on the east side of Milwaukee that were appropri-
ate for a reservoir, it is interesting to speculate whether the board would
have been quite so enthusiastic about an alternate site that would not
have led to their homes’ receiving an early water supply.
During the rest of 1872, the board reviewed bids for the construc-
tion of hydrants and other valves and for the construction of the reser-
voir. The board, despite public complaint that it had as yet made no
effort to build a pumping station, intake, or otherwise begin water sup-
ply, issued a statement on April 8 that it was to the advantage of the
city that they proceed in the fashion that they had undertaken. “Surely,”
the statement read, “it is more sensible to have the system in place, so
that when the water is ready for delivery, there will be no appreciable
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delays in its availability to the public.”47 By this well-reasoned method,
the board hoped to avoid complaints common in New York, Boston,
and Philadelphia that water, even when delivered to a pump house or
waterworks, was not available to the public because other necessary
components of the distribution system were not completed.
Once the necessary materials had been contracted for and deliv-
ered, the board determined the order in which wards were to be fitted
with distribution pipes. While the sale of water bonds had been suc-
cessful, providing the funds essential for the procurement of capital
expenditures, the fees for main and individual distribution systems had
to be collected to pay for the labor of installing them. Downtown busi-
ness properties, in large part responsible for the adoption of a water-
works, were the first to signal readiness to pay for watering. Addition-
ally, the physical location of the business district downhill from the
pumping station meant that water could be delivered downtown with-
out resorting to additional pressure pumps.48 Since water pipes, unlike
street paving, cannot be installed piecemeal, the initial distribution sys-
tem was laid out in a pattern west from the North Avenue pump station
to the reservoir and thence southeasterly to the downtown area. As
these large mains were installed, neighborhoods adjoining the mains
were “encouraged” to subscribe to the water supply.49 From this first
pipelaying, distribution was to be extended to other wards in an order
determined by the board.50
After the initial piping of the business districts, the order of piping
was not, in fact, determined by the number of willing subscribers in a
ward but by the board’s own determination. In 1873 the board ordered
a survey of all streets in Milwaukee and determined that, for financial
reasons, distribution pipe would be installed in streets that were either
unpaved or scheduled for paving in the near future. This would elimi-
nate the need for opening already paved streets to install the pipe, as
well as the expense of repairing the excavations. The order of distribu-
tion was: first ward, followed by third, seventh, fourth, second, ninth,
and tenth. (See map 2 for city wards.) This break in the earlier pattern
of ward improvements—that of a individual block or group of blocks
petitioning the ward supervisor or alderman for the improvement and
then raising the funds to pay for the improvement—marked the end
of the pure subscription phase in Milwaukee’s history, at least for a
time. It would reappear in a manner that allowed city officials to deny
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services to areas where less desirable immigrants lived before the cen-
tury was out.
Since many property owners in these wards had not requested or
subscribed for water, the board issued special assessments against the
property owners that abutted on the streets where mains were laid to
absorb the charges. While these assessments were in the process of
being collected, the city obtained from the legislature the power to pay
these charges from the city general fund, thus providing the necessary
money up front.51 This action of the board was an indication that the
city had moved out of the “subscription” stage defined by Einhorn,
and recognized the concept of public good and the necessity of pro-
viding services whether or not the parties receiving those services were
willing to pay for them. This plan of financing was largely followed
by the successor to the Board of Water Commissioners, the Board of
Public Works, which began its operations in 1875.52
The basic question that the city had to answer in regard to its wa-
terworks was whether it should be managed in a governmental fashion
or in a proprietary one. In the first, a city provides a service to its
residents, usually paid for out of tax dollars, for the convenience and
common good of those residents. In the second form, a service is pro-
vided to a known group of customers who are expected to pay for the
service. In the first type of service provision, profits are not to be ex-
pected, and any that actually materialize are rolled back into the sys-
tem to reduce the taxes necessary to keep the system functioning. In a
proprietary service, profits can be made and may be used for whatever
purpose desired by the managers of the service. Although the Milwau-
kee Water Works may have appeared to be a governmental service and
may indeed have been intended to be such a service, during all of the
years of its existence it has been regarded by the common council as a
proprietary service. This dichotomy between those actively managing
the waterworks and those in a position of political control over it would
result in several instances where necessary steps in service provision
were ignored in order to provide a profit to the city as a whole. In cases
when epidemics were rampant, this would result in fatalities.
From 1870 to 1910 Republicans and Democrats experienced an
equality of power in city politics. One reason for the rise of Republi-
canism was that national politics began to have an effect on Milwau-
kee. No longer the isolated community it had been, interested prima-
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rily in the affairs of its own geographic region, Milwaukee began to
realize that national economic and political affairs played an increas-
ing role in the well-being of the city. Another reason was completely
local in nature. As new immigrants, often of limited means, the Ger-
mans had supported the Democrats, who promised them the benefits of
modern city life, such as street paving and sewerage. With the institu-
tion of special assessment replacing the earlier subscription, now middle-
class Germans began to resent having to pay for others to receive ser-
vices that they had in their turn to pay for on their own.53 This helped to
spur a call for more conservative fiscal policies regarding municipal
expenditures, long a hallmark plank in the Republican platform.
In some ways, this period in Milwaukee would echo the experi-
ence of Chicago. From an initial era when improvements to infrastruc-
ture and public works were charged in a uniform fashion across the
city, the new phase, which I call the “benefit” phase, meant that only
those wishing a service should have to pay for it. While individual
block residents no longer had the sole power to determine whether
they would receive a service, they were at least spared having to pay
for anyone else’s receipt of service. In return for their initial invest-
ment, these same owners would receive the added property value from
the improvements, whether street repair, sewerage, gas lighting, or,
eventually, water supply.54 This system gradually became the special
assessment, whereby the individual owners lost the choice of whether
they were to receive a service but were still directly assessed the costs.
Further, individual wards and their officials could prioritize or stall a
given service, depending upon the wishes of the ward’s residents.
The subscription idea did not, however, totally disappear from
Milwaukee government. Over the thirty-year span from 1880 to 1910,
city Board of Public Works (which received the responsibility for op-
erating the waterworks and distribution service from the Board of Wa-
ter Commissioners in 1875) extended water service to existing areas
of the city, to new city districts, and even outside the city limits to
areas that the city hoped would eventually become annexed land. Some
areas, however, would remain without water for far longer than others.
This lag was not because of low population; in fact some of the
nonwatered blocks had high populations at the same time that other
blocks with no population at all were being piped. These waterless
wards were concentrated on the south side of Milwaukee, which were
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mostly settled by new immigrants arriving from Poland after 1880.
With the exception of streetcar service, these blocks, comprising much
of the fourteenth ward (also the eleventh and twelfth wards), experi-
enced a lag in the supply of city services that was up to thirty years
behind that of other city wards. Several historians have noted and ex-
plained this gap; it is my hope to reexamine the data and these explana-
tions in the face of the city’s proprietary attitude toward water supply
to determine which most accurately reflects the true circumstances.
Roger Simon’s work in The City Building Process and Milwaukee:
Expansion of an Industrial City looks at the eighteenth ward on the
east side, the twentieth and twenty-second on the west, and the four-
teenth on the south. All were largely subdivided and settled in the years
from 1888 to 1910. These wards reflected the characteristics of their
general areas in ethnicity, type of housing, and population density and
are therefore excellent representations of the diverse neighborhoods of
Milwaukee. Simon concluded that conditions in the south-side ward
were substantially below those in other areas of the city. Low wages,
crowding, and a lack of urban services would contribute to a prolonged
substandard level of health, leading to an excess mortality among its
residents.55
It is Simon’s contention that the poor economic status of these south-
side Poles explains the gap in service provision. Since water supply
had to be requested and the installation costs paid up front, he argues
that the Poles deliberately delayed requesting this service because of
its costs, despite the effect on health. The dollars expended on water
service could be better spent, in the opinion of the Poles, on paying off
their mortgages more rapidly. Because many of the south-side resi-
dences were duplexes that were made into triplexes by the renting out
of basements as flats, housing was at a premium in the Polish neigh-
borhoods.56
Judith Leavitt offers an alternative theory in The Healthiest City.
Her work, which examines the infancy of the Public Health Service in
Milwaukee, contends that until the advent of the Socialist government
after 1910, there was not much support for the use of city funds to
improve sanitary and health conditions in individual neighborhoods.
Even after the Socialists established themselves in City Hall, there was
constant debate about and struggle to implement necessary improve-
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ments, such as citywide garbage removal, introduction of sewage
treatment, and neighborhood health clinics offering well-baby ex-
ams and immunizations. In the case of the Poles, these innovations
were also seen as invasions of privacy and accepted only reluc-
tantly and over time.57
It is my contention that it was the lack of political power held by
the Polish community, combined with the proprietary attitude on the
part of the city government, that was responsible for the delay in water
service. A discussion of the research that led to this argument follows.
Milwaukee’s new immigrants differed from the older, established
community in occupation, national origin, and language. Coming largely
from Poland, these individuals were displaced agricultural workers with
little or no industrial skills. Staunchly Catholic and reluctant to relin-
quish the use of their native tongue, they tended to concentrate in ex-
clusive urban communities when they found a new home in America.
In Milwaukee, this community was concentrated on the (then) south-
western boundary of the city, where property values were low. These
neighborhoods were characterized by fairly dense housing (25 to 40
houses to the block, as opposed to 16 or 18 in other areas). Many of the
houses were duplexes, and a particular habit in the immigrant neigh-
borhoods was to rent out the basement as an apartment for new immi-
grants. This arrangement allowed the house owner to pay off the mort-
gage more quickly and allowed the newest immigrants to find cheap, if
dismal, living quarters at a time when their financial condition was at
its most precarious.58
The center of every neighborhood was the Catholic church. From
the church came most of the interaction between the community and
the larger city. The priest was often the most literate man in the neigh-
borhood, able to speak English as well as Polish. The role of the priest
was to act as intermediary between the immigrants and the outside
world. He advised them where to find work and to shop, recommended
the local parochial school as the best educational choice, and informed
the parishioners how to vote. Given the strong ties of the Democratic
Party in Milwaukee, and elsewhere, to the Catholic Church, this rec-
ommendation in Milwaukee was uniformly to vote Democratic. Al-
though the centrality of the church provided a close-knit community
for the immigrants, this exclusivity also delayed the assimilation of the
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Polish community into the larger American culture. With the avail-
ability of members of religious orders of teaching nuns to teach the
children in their native tongue, children in parochial schools did
not learn English as rapidly as did other immigrants, who attended
public schools. This aura of exclusivity also made other urban eth-
nic groups less likely to associate with the Poles, and delayed their
assimilation into the political and commercial arenas of the city. A
culture of suspicion on the part of the immigrants also arose, and
initially, at least, this prevented the amelioration of some of the
harsher conditions under which the immigrants suffered.59
The isolation and exclusivity were not all on the part of the Polish.
Because Poles had long been regarded as inferior to true Teutonic stock,
many of the German residents of the city, immigrants or children of
immigrants themselves, shunned the newcomers. Politically, despite
the strong support of the Polish for the Democratic Party, there was
little or no attempt to use any of the party’s power to accommodate the
Poles or to take steps to improve their conditions.60 Suspicion on the
part of the Yankee business owners was perhaps highest. Accustomed
to professional guilds because of the large German skilled population,
the owners were not as accepting of the unions that arose among the
unskilled workers of the south side. In the turbulent decade of the 1880s,
repeated strikes in other cities, including the famed Haymarket Riot in
Chicago in 1886, led police to respond to working-class strikes in Mil-
waukee by firing on the crowd in an effort to force dispersal and to
vigorously pursue the ringleaders. When caught, these men were charged
with inciting to riot, imprisoned, and black-listed among employers.
Within a year, many of the Polish workers, fearful of job security and
warned sharply by their priests about the evils of associating with so-
cialism, had left the unions.61
Just as the Poles chose not to embrace socialism, socialism, to a
large extent, at least in Milwaukee, also left out the Poles. The influ-
ence of Victor Berger and other traditional Germans in party leader-
ship meant that the social hierarchy to which they subscribed, in which
the Slav and Jew occupied a lower rung on the ladder of humanity,
became the operating standard for the Milwaukee Social Democratic
Party.62 The departure of the Polish workers from the Trades Union
Council after 1886 was seen as a rejection of the principles of social-
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ism by a party whose platform was growing increasingly close to the
goals of the unions. However, the divisions in priorities between those
who wished to focus on political action and those who wished to ad-
dress the state of the workplace would delay a true unity between these
groups until the early twentieth century. Sally Miller’s work, Victor
Berger and the Rise of the Milwaukee Socialists, 1910–1920, acknowl-
edges that the failure of the Socialists to embrace the Polish population’s
largely unappreciated political power was a major delaying factor in
the Poles acquiring political clout. The Socialists would, however, make
up for their omission in the early years of the twentieth century.
By 1890 the European flavor of the city of Milwaukee was becom-
ing evident to even casual outside observers examining the political
structure of the city. In this year, the proposed Bennett Law, threaten-
ing the parochial school, would mark the entrance of the Polish com-
munity into political participation beyond the voting booth. Republi-
cans, backing the issue, emphasized the need for its passage to ensure
that future generations would be educated in the language of their coun-
try, and endorsed the “right of the state to make and enforce suitable
legislation to secure compulsory education.”63 The Democrats, remem-
bering their power base, came out against the law and urged its repeal;
hoping to make sure of the Polish vote, they nominated a prominent
Polish merchant, Roman Czerwinski, for comptroller. They also en-
couraged other Poles to run for alderman, resulting in the repeal of the
Bennett Law, election of the Democratic candidates, and the installa-
tion of five Poles on the common council. Despite this lesson, the Demo-
cratic Party continued to largely ignore the needs of the Polish popula-
tion. Mayor Franklin Somers, elected to office in the Democratic victory
of 1892, ignored the Poles in appointing offices, especially Martin
Schubert, the eminently qualified Warsaw engineer who desired to be
made a commissioner of public works.64 At a mass meeting at St.
Hyacinth’s Hall, Polish leaders aired their objections to being regarded
“as so many cattle, useful only for piling up Democratic majorities.”65
They determined to teach the Democrats a lesson by staying away from
the polls; the result was a strong Republican victory in 1893.
The passage in April 1895 of a nonpartisan civil service commis-
sion applicable to all Wisconsin cities had a sharp effect on partisan-
ship and the power of politicians to make appointments.66 By 1897,
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1,300 positions had been removed from political control, and municipal
government was without question more efficient. In the 1894 election,
all three parties had made reform a major plank in their platforms.
Dissension among Poles over whether to vote for the Democratic or
the Labor candidate led to another Republican victory, and that party
was also able to capture a majority of council seats.
In 1896 the provision of services was a major campaign issue.
The Republicans, in their usual support of free enterprise, called for
“improvement by private enterprise and competition in street railways,
telephone services, gas and electric lighting.”67 The Democrats, Popu-
lists, and Socialists countered that these services should be provided
by city-owned plants and asserted that the Republican candidate had
interests in the major competitor for the streetcar franchise. The re-
sulting Republican victory was a result of a three-way split in the lib-
eral vote, but that campaign marked the emergence of a labor party
that was capable of attracting enough interest to make for effective
political action. Few Poles supported the Socialists or Populists, but
their increasing frustration with the Democratic Party’s continuing to
ignore their desires resulted in a large number again staying away from
the polls. While the issue of streetcar provision was of critical impor-
tance to the Poles, who needed the transportation to reach their places
of employment, the pattern that all the parties had established of not
providing the eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth wards with services
made the Polish population suspicious of supporting any party.68 The
Democrats, who heretofore had expected to receive the Polish vote
without really having to campaign for it or by rewarding the Polish
community with any substantial service, responded by cutting the com-
munity largely off from any benefits from City Hall.
During all this time, the city was gradually being piped for water
distribution. The procedure was for a block that did not have water to
petition to the Board of Public Works Commissioners to receive it.
The board would then, as required by state law, verify the names and
property-owning status of the petitioners and pass the petition on to
the Common Council Water Committee with a recommendation that
it be approved. The committee would then present the petition to the
common council, which would hold the petition for three meetings,
during which time it would be read at each meeting. At the third meet-
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ing a vote to approve or deny the petition would be taken, and if it was
approved, an ordinance would be enacted, directing the Milwaukee
Water Works to install water supply to the petitioning block. This pro-
cess took an average of five months from petition to ordinance, and
from 1882 to 1910, the common council never went against the rec-
ommendation of the board regarding approval of petitions.69
For the Polish areas of the eleventh, twelfth, and fourteen wards,
however, a different procedure was followed. From the years 1890 to
1910, a total of 452 watering petitions were submitted, with 189 being
from the three Polish wards. From 1890 to 1900, 90 Polish petitions
were filed, only 3 of which were approved by the board and sent on to
the common council for official action. The others were simply stamped
as received by the board and filed. In contrast, the petitions filed by
the non-Polish wards during the same decade were almost unanimously
approved (144 out of 147 cases).70 This indicates a distinct disparity in
the way water distribution was carried out for the different wards. Table
1 shows a summary of these petitions. The number in parentheses
indicates the number of petitions granted for each time period.
1890–94 1895–99 1900–1904 1905–10
Polish 18 (0) 72 (3) 43 (11) 46 (19)
Non-Polish 86 (84) 61 (60) 79 (79) 37 (37)
Table 1: Water Petitions Filed and Approved in Milwaukee, 1890–1910. Source:
Minutes and Proceedings of Aldermen’s Committees, 1890–1910, City of Mil-
waukee Archives, Boxes 1–80.
Why did this disparity exist? An engineering explanation accounted
for the lack of distribution on the south side prior to 1889. Because the
water mains had to be installed under the Menominee River, and then
carried uphill to the southern wards, a booster pump station was neces-
sary to raise the pressure in the mains to a sufficient level to ensure that
the water would flow. This was addressed in 1889 by the construction
of a booster station in the Menominee valley that carried out this func-
tion.71 With the construction of this facility, distribution piping of the
south side could have occurred but did not.
Also at this time there was considerable doubt as to the quality of
the water being provided. The intake mouth was located well within
the band of turbid water along the lakeshore and was suspected of
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being contaminated by sewage and shore currents. In 1889 a commis-
sion of engineers decided that water quantity was of much greater
concern than quality but attempted to address both issues by recom-
mending that a new intake be constructed off North Point. The intake
was over 3,000 feet long, and its maximum capacity was 95 million
gallons per day. Its construction took five years and cost the lives of
fourteen men.
The financial attitude in which the city held the water department
was also a subject of some controversy at this time. When the Board
of Water Commissioners had been established, it had held the opinion
that money received from the sale of water were to be used to pay off
the bills of the department and to retire the bonds that had been used
for initial construction. If surpluses were obtained in some years, this
should be used either to finance new construction or to reduce the
water rates for the following years.
This was not, however, how the system ended up functioning. Be-
tween 1871—when the water department was founded—and 1893,
the financial relationship with the city was all one-sided. But by the
end of 1893, the city had raised $1,880,000 in taxes to finance the
construction of the waterworks and had issued bonds in the amount of
$1,430,000, for a total contribution of $3,310,000.72 When the works
produced enough revenue in 1893 to become self-supporting, the nasty
little question of what to do with the money arose.73 The Board of
Public Works, which had oversight over the waterworks, recommended
in its 1893 annual report that self-sufficiency was all that could ever
be desired from the service. The report stated: “The department should
never be operated as a money-making investment. It is sufficient when
all legitimate expenditures chargeable to the department are met by its
receipts.”74
The controversy over what to do with the surplus revenues re-
mained low-key until 1900; in the interim two other fiscal issues be-
came important. The first of these was what kind of rate schedule (flat
or stepped) should be imposed, and the second was the question of
whether other city departments should have to pay for the water they
used. The board favored charging the departments, the city engineer
favored free water for the city departments, and the battle raged until
1896. In that year a compromise was reached in which all charges
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made against other departments for water prior to January 1, 1895,
and remaining unpaid at the end of that year were canceled.75 In return
the city authorized payment for water used in public buildings and for
such services as sprinkling streets, flushing sewers, or for fountains or
bubblers in parks. These services were to be paid to the water fund out
of the city general fund.76 This ordinance did not work in the way it
was intended, for in 1896 the waterworks received no credit for the
provision of its services to the other city departments. The Board of
Public Works Commissioners decided it would not, in this case, then
turn over the surplus to the general fund, as they had been doing since
1893. The identical situation occurred in 1897, but with Democratic
mayor David Rose’s election in 1898, the city departments began to
pay their water bills. The mayor was thus able to announce that he had
saved other water customers over $70,000.77 Clearly, the proprietary
attitude of the city toward its water department had begun to make its
mark publicly.
Rose implemented another change in the waterworks’ fiscal policy.
Previously, rates for water had been a two-step scale, with the first
step 1¢ per hundred gallons (13.1 cubic feet) for the first million gal-
lons and the second step ½¢ per hundred gallons for over one million
gallons’ annual usage. That initial rate had been replaced in 1882 with
a five-step scale ranging from 15¢ per hundred cubic feet for the first
25,000 cubic feet to 3½¢ per hundred cubic feet for users over 500,000
cubic feet. Rose replaced this with a rate of 4½¢ per hundred cubic
feet for all users, making water for the small consumer much more
affordable.78
This reduction in rates reduced the amount of revenue coming
into the water department beginning in 1899, but this was partially
offset by the fact that the city continued to reimburse the waterworks
for its own use. This cost was passed along to the consumer in taxes, a
less evident form of paying for the rate reduction.
In 1900 Mayor Rose appointed a Polish engineer, Frank Niezorawski,
to the Board of Water Commissioners. This appointment, for a four-
year term, which was followed by that of another Pole, Stanley
Czerwinski, for a three-year term, did little to change the provision of
services to the Polish wards. As Rose was elected to his second term,
he began to agitate for the transfer of the $300,000 surplus in the water
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fund to the general fund. Throughout his career as mayor, Rose would
continue to argue that the surplus water revenue should be used to
provide other city services and that further extension of water service
was unnecessary within the city.
But he did not take a similar stand on supplying water outside the
city. Beginning in 1894, the Milwaukee Water Works had begun to
provide water service to areas outside the city limits on a wholesale
basis. In these cases water was delivered to the suburbs through the
nearest large main and then carted to a central distribution point, where
suburban residents could purchase it by the barrel.79 The most exten-
sive case was that of the Village of East Milwaukee (now Shorewood)
which contracted with the waterworks to provide it with water ser-
vice. The village would in 1905 extend its contract with the city to
provide it with retail service, where water would be piped directly to
residents’ homes. Shorewood reimbursed the works for the cost of
laying mains and feeder lines and, by a provision of Rose’s rate de-
crease of 1899, paid for its water at 1.25 times the cost to customers
within the city.80 Because it required no more cost to make the water
for outlying areas than for those within the city, the provision of water
to extramural areas meant more profit. Rose proposed that if the city
were to extend its water services to areas such as Wauwatosa, Cudahy,
and West Milwaukee, many new projects, some admittedly proposed
solely for vote-getting purposes, could be built at no expense to the
city.81 If this water had been used to supply the Poles, there would
have been city expense for extending mains, construction expense for
the excavation of the lines and street repair, and a lesser fee for the
water used than if it were sold on a wholesale basis to suburbs.
The surplus water funds were spent in many ways. Aldermen allo-
cated some for the construction of a pavilion in the second ward
Haymarket, funded band concerts in Kilbourn Park, took over from
the ward funds the payment for ash removal, and had schools freshly
painted. Not everyone was happy with this state of affairs. Alderman
Heath, the council’s representative on the Board of Public Works Com-
missioners, argued that the waterworks was not designed to make profits
“but to render the people an acceptable municipal service. The surplus
revenue should be used to extend and install this worthy municipal
convenience in the interest of public health and convenience.”82 He
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proposed that the revenues be used to subsidize loans to poorer citi-
zens to install indoor plumbing and that public urinals be provided in
the business districts to prevent the spread of disease from privies or
urination or defecation in the street, as was still occurring. The com-
mon council substituted for his proposal a resolution that the surplus
be utilized for the remission of water rates for all city departments and
that any excess be used for the erection of school buildings and for no
other purposes.83 This became Chapter 469, Wisconsin Laws of 1905,
which provided that Milwaukee might so distribute its surplus funds
as long as there remained on hand enough to pay two years’ principal
and interest on any bonded debt of the department. The amount of the
surplus could not exceed the amount charged in any one year from
taxes and had to be used for the payment of any new waterworks con-
struction before it could be used for remission of city department wa-
ter fees. The water bills of the parks department were thus canceled
from 1905 to 1910, ward funds were exempted in 1906, and most city
departments, excepting schools, were exempted in 1909.84
Rose further contended that the water bonds still outstanding be
refunded rather than paid, as they retired. He argued that since 1883
the waterworks had paid almost $3 million of its debt, and he found
this a “deplorable state of affairs. It is not fair or equitable that the
entire burden of paying for our waterworks be laid on the shoulders of
one generation. I believe that the next generation should bear its just
share of this expense and that the whole amount should not be borne
by the people of this city within the short period of 25 years.”85 As
politically expedient as this policy proved to be in the short run, it
ignored the problems of depreciation and new construction and as-
sumed that the status quo as regards quality and technology would
continue. In the long run, Rose’s actions would cause delays in the
construction of a new intake to deliver higher quality water, delay the
construction of a necessary filtration plant, and cause needless suffer-
ing among the immigrant Polish community on Milwaukee’s south
side, as surplus funds were spent on items other than the extension of
water service to that area, despite action on the part of its residents to
obtain it.
The Milwaukee Water Works Office of Water Engineering main-
tains a record called Report of Pipe Laid, Hydrants, and Gates Intalled
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for all distribution pipes laid in the city. Using this record, along with
official city maps and census reports for the time period, it is possible
to determine the exact number of feet of distribution mains laid in the
wards of the city from 1871 to 1910. Since much of the south side
underwent street paving in the last decade of the nineteenth century or
in the first decade of the twentieth,86 water supply should have been
introduced at that time, just as it had been in the northern wards. Fur-
ther, the cost issue becomes less significant when it is remembered
that the waterworks had been generating surpluses since 1893.
One reason for this lack of action by the board, even with Polish
representation, was that it oversaw other functions as well. After 1900
the implementation of streetcar service was a major focus of city poli-
tics and had a decided impact on the attitudes of citizens towards gov-
ernment. Heated arguments regarding the siting of car lines, the method
in which these should be paid for, and the ultimate public or private
ownership of the service dominated common council discussions, board
meetings, and the media. Ultimately, the board forced streetcar ser-
vice through the Polish wards at an early stage of development, at a
time far earlier than those wards received other services. While the
board may have been motivated by a genuine desire to provide the
service out of political altruism, the fact that many board members
owned stock in the company and, realizing the high potential rider-
ship, decided to maximize returns in an early stage of implementation
probably contributed to their decision. The result was that south-side
residents could at least travel more swiftly to their places of work,
even though at home they were denied the amenities other parts of the
city enjoyed. It is interesting that although streets had to be paved in
order that streetcar lines could be introduced, water service was still
not introduced in these areas. It would have been far less expensive to
lay the water mains before street paving; the policy of City Hall to
distribute water where it could generate more revenue, that is, to the
suburbs, was in the long run fiscally foolish.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show this more clearly. Table 2 shows the popula-
tion of the fourteenth and eighteenth wards from 1890 to 1910 and indi-
cates the rapid population growth and density of the south-side ward. Table
3 shows characteristics of these two wards, including nativity, health sta-
tistics, and threshold populations for services. Table 4 shows the feet of
distribution pipe laid in each ward for the years from 1873 to 1910.
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Table 2: Populations of 14th and 18th Wards. Source: Roger D. Simon, The
City-Building Process, 1880–1910.
Item 14th Ward 18th Ward
% Polish Born 98 1
% Unskilled Labor 92 21.7
% Skilled Labor 2 43.5
Index Disproportion: Children 132 120
Cholera Death Rate* 0.6 -0.005
Threshold Pop. for Water 46.6 3.4
Threshold Pop. for Sewer 47.4 2.3
Threshold Pop. for Street Pave 45.9 4
Threshold Pop. for Streetcar 10 2.1
Table 3: Characteristics of the 14th and 18th wards, 1905 (* as varying from
the average). For the eighteenth ward, fewer than 25 percent of the blocks had
threshold populations above zero for any services. Source: Roger D. Simon,
The City-Building Process, 1880–1910.
As can be seen in table 4, the number of feet of pipe laid in the eigh-
teenth ward by 1910 exceeds the feet laid in the fourteenth ward by ap-
proximately 3 to 1, despite the fourteenth ward’s population being 60
percent greater in that year. The years from 1875 to 1885, when little pipe
was laid in either ward, was when the great industrial plants in and around
the Menominee River valley were being supplied. As mentioned in the
note to table 2, fewer than 25 percent of the streets in the eighteenth ward
had threshold population greater than zero for receiving services, mean-
ing that most of this area was supplied with water mains, sewers, paved
streets, and access to transportation before there was anyone living on the
street and often before any lots were even sold. The large figure noted for
the eighteenth ward in 1905 indicates the piping necessary to connect
Shorewood to the Milwaukee water system. Since many feet of major
street mains had to be laid to complete this task, a majority of blocks in
the area adjacent to these major mains were also piped in that year.
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Year 14th Ward 18th Ward
1909 660 17,776
1910 11,330 15,066
Feet of pipe 1910 133,198 398,070
% of ward piped 1910 48.6 99.8
Miles of pipe 1910 26.01 77.74
Table 4: Feet of Distribution Pipe Laid in 14th and 18th Wards, 1873–1910.
Source: Record of Pipe Laid, Hydrants and Gates Installed, Milwaukee Water
Department, 1871–1915.
Roger Simon argued that the high threshold population for water
supply on the south side was because the residents of the fourteenth
ward delayed receiving service in an effort to pay off their mortgages
more quickly. If his analysis is correct, we would expect to see many
feet of distribution pipe laid prior to the paving of the streets and the
introduction of streetcars, just as in other city wards. Instead, we see
an almost total lack of distribution pipe laid at all, indicating that the
service was never offered. The lack of distribution pipe also meant that
the fourteenth ward was largely without water supply from hydrants
for fire protection, despite the largely frame construction of buildings.
An examination of fire insurance maps for the two areas shows that in
both 1895 and 1910 fire insurance hazard categories were significantly
higher on the south side, possibly indicating that the money Simon
speculates was being saved by not subscribing to services was instead
being paid out in higher insurance premiums.87 Further, as shown above,
there were petitions for service.
As early as 1877, water supply to prevent cholera and typhoid was
urged by the city health commissioner.88 Leavitt’s discussion of this
issue stipulates that the delay in the provision of services was because
of a lack of commitment on the part of the city government as a whole
to consider the needs of the poorer residents of the city. While this
explains the political response of City Hall to the largely Polish com-
munity, it does not account for the provision of services such as street-
car transportation.
Only by considering the economic benefit to the city of selling
water to suburbs (to the detriment of the Polish community) can a true
picture of the attitude of city hall officials be gained. The rush to pro-
vide water to the suburbs instead of to city residents was not only shock-
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ing, in that it prevented a large segment of the population access to an
amenity enjoyed by almost all of the rest of the city, but was also short-
sighted in that increased firefighting expenses in the nonwatered areas
could be expected to eat up part of the profits gained from the extramu-
ral sales. The political shortsightedness would, however, prove to be
more profound a shock to Rose’s government.
By 1908 the debt of the waterworks had been reduced to a level
where Rose thought it judicious to seek another rate decrease, this time
to four cents per hundred cubic feet. He also sought remission of the
meter fee of twenty-five cents per quarter; this action came in response
to calls from south-side residents who were complaining about the
high cost of the service. When he made his proposal to the council,
however, he found that such decreases were impossible because the
aldermen had already applied the expected surplus from the rates as
they were to specific “pork-barrel” projects in their own districts. Since
Rose had treated the waterworks as a proprietary service, where profit-
making was the ultimate good, he could not reverse his position and
treat it as a government service by reducing the rates, no matter how
popular this might be politically. Rose’s actions left him hoist on his
own petard, and his failure to address the needs of the south side Pol-
ish constituency would ultimately cost him the mayoral seat in the
next election.
Milwaukee’s story of water supply is similar to that of many other
cities. The lapse in time from the recognition of the need for a piped
supply to the delivery of such a supply echoed the situations of New
York, Baltimore, Detroit, and Boston.89 Only in Chicago, Cleveland,
and Minneapolis, among major cities founded by the mid-nineteenth
century, were comprehensive, citywide water systems implemented at
an early time in the cities’ histories.90 The failure to adequately pro-
vide water to the poorer residents, those whose health might most ben-
efit from it, was also not unusual. New York, Philadelphia, and Detroit
experienced similar lags in the provision of service to newer areas; the
financial benefits of providing services to extramural customers were
more enticing and financially advantageous than extending service to
areas where it might be only minimally utilized. However, many of
these new areas in these old-line cities were inhabited by the middle
class and wealthy, who could afford to live farther away from their
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places of occupation. Particularly in New York, new immigrant popu-
lations tended to concentrate in the older areas of the city, from which
they would join the suburban migration as they assimilated and rose in
economic status. Despite these lags, none of the above cities failed to
provide service to areas that were mainly populated by those of a spe-
cific ethnic group, as did Milwaukee.91 Immigrant tenements might
have only a single water pump for each building, with non–sewer con-
nected sanitation located in a common courtyard, but the water was
available. What is most surprising about Milwaukee’s case is that in a
city renowned for its democratic government, given the rapid assimi-
lation of residents in the mid-nineteenth century, withholding of basic
and necessary services could have continued for the length of time that
it did. The practice of political control by the mayor and council over
the operations of the Boards of Water and Public Works Commission-
ers, and the disunity of that control because of the divisive ward sys-
tem, allowed the Polish residents to fall through the cracks.
The example of Chicago, which began its waterworks almost thirty
years prior to Milwaukee and which prided itself on the extensiveness
of its distribution system, reflected the differing political structure of
that city. As rich in ethnically diverse neighborhoods as Milwaukee,
Chicago’s unified political system allowed the more rapid political as-
similation of new immigrants, and rewarded their political loyalty with
services in a manner which Milwaukee was unable to duplicate. Ju-
neau, Kilbourn, and Walker’s legacy was reflected not only in crooked
bridges but also in their city’s failure to unify quickly enough to allow
the city to achieve its true potential.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TYPHOID  COCKTAIL  HOUR
“The filtration of the water supply, with dis-
infection when necessary, is the most effi-
cient and economic means of assuring its
purity and that sewage purification should
be carried out only so far as to prevent un-
due contamination of the rivers and the
bay.”—Harrison Eddy, Sewerage Commis-
sion Report, 1911
The era of Rose government and the Democratic machine came to an
end in Milwaukee with the 1910 elections. Slowly gaining in votes
during the years from 1902 to 1908, in 1910 the Socialists managed to
capture not only the mayor’s office but the positions of city attorney
and comptroller as well as a majority of the seats on the common coun-
cil. This victory was in large part possible because the Socialists had
finally overcome their perceptions of inferiority regarding the south-
side Poles and campaigned heavily in that district. The distribution of
campaign literature in Polish helped to push the Socialist message, and
the Poles’ frustration with a Democratic regime that had relied on their
votes but done little to earn them led to a mass exodus of Polish voters
80
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from the Democratic Party. Emil Seidel, the new mayor, had in his
newly elected government established the first and only Socialist gov-
ernment in a major American city. Fearing that the Socialists would
win the election, the Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives had
combined their parties into a single “Nonpartisan” group. Although the
new party retained more of its Republican origin than its Democratic
one, its eventual legacy would be that all municipal elections in Mil-
waukee would be officially nonpartisan. The formation of the new coa-
lition, however, was unable to stop the Socialists from gaining power
in 1910.
With the victory of the Socialists in Milwaukee government in 1910,
a major new era in the waterworks began. The provision of pure water
to all city residents had been a plank in the Socialist platform since
1908; given the difficulty of the south-side residents in obtaining wa-
ter, it was not surprising that they gave the Socialists their support on
this and other issues. Water supply and the construction of a water
filtration plant were important policies of Seidel’s administration and
would continue under the 1916–40 administration of Daniel Hoan, the
first multiterm Socialist mayor. Due to the length of Hoan’s term much
more was done to achieve these goals during his tenure; Seidel’s ad-
ministration, however, despite its two-year length, was responsible for
the introduction of reforms that would make substantial changes in city
water operations.
Although the Socialists argued that citywide water service was
necessary, this would not mean that supplying service to the south-side
neighborhoods that had been denied it so long would be allowed to
completely derail the proprietary attitude that the city held toward its
waterworks. The sale of water to suburbs would continue; within a
very few years the Socialists would argue that the supply available
from Lake Michigan should be expanded.
The first reform was the creation in 1910 of the office of the su-
perintendent of waterworks. This officer, appointed by the commis-
sioner of public works under city civil service procedures, took over
the operation of the water works, under the control and supervision of
the commissioner.1 The operation of the department was at last under
the control of a single individual, and the four divisions—collections,
pumping, mains, and meters—were made accountable to the superin-
tendent rather than to the Board of Public Works, although the board
82 Chapter 3
retained oversight. Additional positions created were those of water
waste engineer and water chemists, whose duties were to oversee, re-
spectively, the flushing of mains and disposal of sludge and debris
from the Kilbourn reservoir, and the daily testing of the water for im-
purities. A new central accounting system was also installed in 1910,
eventually replacing the position of water registrar with that of the city
comptroller.2
Other reforms focused on how water should be distributed and
whether any customers should receive free water. During Rose’s ad-
ministration, it had been common practice to remit the water bills of
churches, convents, orphanages, and other charitable institutions, in
part because of the votes the Democrats would gain from the gesture.
Seidel directed the new city attorney, Daniel Hoan, to look into the
matter, and Hoan concluded that remitting the water bills for anyone,
whether residential, commercial, or charitable, was a violation of the
city charter.3 The practice of remitting the water bills of other city de-
partments in return for the water department not being charged tax on
its properties was also deemed to be in violation. Most departments
were quick to pay up, but the Board of Park Commissioners did not
begin to pay their water bills until 1915.4 These interpretations reflected
the goals of the Socialists’ management style, namely that cities should
be operated for the maximum benefit of the residents of the city rather
than for the convenience of those doing the governing and administer-
ing. By remitting the water bill of city departments, the waterworks
generated less revenue that in turn could be applied to the general fund
for the good of the citizens. Despite the charitable nature of the remission
of bills for orphanages and other benevolent institutions, it was Socialist
practice to make everyone contribute to the betterment of all. Thus the
idea of the water department being operated as a proprietary s rvice con-
tinued, even under the aegis of the reform-minded Socialists.
The Seidel administration’s most successful reform was the intro-
duction of universal metering of all water service. An evaluation com-
pleted in 1911 showed that the water department was losing 23 percent
of production due to leakage and wastage, and since the locations of
these losses could best be determined by the installation of meters, the
Board of Public Works recommended the change.5 The city engineer
had first recognized the problem of unmetered service as early as 1898,
when he pointed out that although 70 percent of the customers were
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metered (including all commercial and industrial users) the remaining
30 percent of residential unmetered users accounted for over half of all
the water used.6 While various proposals had been considered to ad-
dress this issue, no action was taken until the Seidel administration’s
proposal was made in 1910, because the costs involved were seen as
too great.
The water department could not, however, simply order installa-
tion of meters on all customers that did not have them. It was necessary
to prove first that wastage or leakage had occurred, and this proof was
obtained by inspection of unmetered dwellings. One hundred ninety-
four of these houses (about 2 percent of the total) were found to be
letting the water run continuously, resulting in what should have been
water bills of from $200 to $500 per year, rather than the $8 to $10 they
were paying for an unmetered tap. The inspections generated orders
for meters to be installed in the private homes that had proved to be
wasting water, and all city departments were required to have meters
installed on all their taps as well. The cost was to be borne by the con-
sumer.7 Final approval of all this action was granted by the Wisconsin
Railroad Commission, as required by Wisconsin law regarding all public
utilities, on May 1, 1913.8 Metering proved extremely effective. In 1913,
the first year that it was required, losses from leakage and wastage
dropped to 11.43 percent from their earlier value of 23 percent. Rev-
enues per million gallons rose concurrently, from $46.76 in 1912 to
$49.84 in 1913.9 The department was not only reducing wastage, it was
making money by doing so.
By making money from selling water and transferring that money
to the general fund, it was possible to keep property tax rates in Mil-
waukee artificially low. While other cities might have to seriously ques-
tion expenditures for parks, new street lighting, fountains, and other
aesthetic improvements, Milwaukee was able to use the water depart-
ment surplus to finance these items directly, giving city residents the
amenities of a better life without the bills for them.
An evaluation was also performed of the waterworks itself. The
city’s Bureau of Economy and Efficiency, which during its brief eigh-
teen months of existence examined many areas of city government, did
three studies on the waterworks. The first recommended the construc-
tion of a new pumping station on the Milwaukee River near Locust
Street, to boost pressure and to replace the old high-service station,10
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and the construction of new feeder mains across the river; the second
recommended an additional booster station on the south side, where
low pressure was failing to deliver water to some areas; and the third
recommended a reservoir be constructed on the south side. All but the
third were done within the next twelve years.11 The bureau also recom-
mended that a new intake be constructed to replace the North Avenue
intake, which had been plagued with several episodes of filthy water.
While the Socialists had campaigned for this in 1910, they faced oppo-
sition from Nonpartisans, who wished instead to construct a sewage
treatment plant. A halt in construction during the First World War would
delay the intake’s completion until 1918. A final recommendation was
that a water treatment plant utilizing filtration be constructed. The
struggle for this plant would be a major political field of contention for
the next quarter century.
In addition to quality issues, controversy over the schedule of wa-
ter rates was marked during Seidel’s administration and would prove
to be a major point of contention in the second Socialist government,
that of former city attorney Daniel Hoan, as well. This battle was be-
tween the city and the state regulatory commissions and concerned not
only what rates could be charged and how the fee schedule could be
arranged but, ultimately, who was to have control over the financial
operations of the city’s waterworks.
Problems with the purity of Milwaukee’s tap water had first be-
come evident in 1892. In that year, a Milwaukee resident named James
Holton, upon arising from bed, turned on his water faucet and received
not the clean tapwater he was expecting but “a very dark colored mate-
rial filled with a number of brown and green globules of gelatin like
substance.”12 Other episodes in following weeks alerted Milwaukee
residents to the fact that the practice of dumping garbage into Lake
Michigan was adversely affecting the water supply. Other sources con-
tributing to the pollution were garbage-littered streets, where manure
and other animal droppings were left to decay, rotting wastes left in
back yards near to privy pits and household wells, where they could
seep into the ground water supply, and the practice of dumping sewage
from the new system directly into the lake.13 Although physicians were
beginning to accept the germ theory of disease, many still recommended
that, for the purpose of improving the general health of citizens, clean
streets and the disposal of wastes would be necessary.14 The story of
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how Milwaukee obtained a garbage disposal plant is told thoroughly
by Leavitt, and it is important in that it shows the difficulty of obtain-
ing resolution of a major health problem through the auspices of the
Milwaukee government.
As long as there was a strong Republican presence on the council
(and there was in the decades of the 1890s and 1900s, even when David
Rose was in office), there was great reluctance to the city’s stepping in
and providing any service for which there appeared to be private inter-
ests ready to provide that service, despite the fact that Milwaukee was
making a tidy profit from running its own waterworks. Garbage was
only one example; others were streetcar service, gas lighting, the pro-
vision of electric power, health services, and testing for tuberculosis in
milk. This reluctance was not unusual in nineteenth-century cities; wit-
ness the difficulties of initiating water supply in East Coast cities, as
mentioned above, as well as in Milwaukee. What was remarkable about
Milwaukee, however, was the length of time that this attitude persisted.
Despite the victories of the Socialist Party in the 1910 election and the
strong representation of the progressive wing of Republicanism in
Wisconsin in general, reforms just seemed to take longer in Milwau-
kee. During Seidel’s administration, and during the following adminis-
tration of Gerhard Bading, the city health commissioner and a nonpar-
tisan, advocates for reform and service provision frequently cited the
examples of Chicago, Detroit, Minneapolis, and St. Louis as cities that
had taken steps in these areas.15 Given the reforming nature of the So-
cialists, it must have been galling to see Milwaukee falling behind other
cities with more “traditional” politics.
Back in 1905, Mayor Rose had attempted to get the common coun-
cil to investigate the purity of the lake water supply after being in-
formed by the health department that it was contaminated.16 No action
was taken until three years later, when city health commissioner Bading
urged that consulting engineers be hired to determine the scope of the
problem.17 Finally, in February 1910, facing a Socialist attack contend-
ing that the council had deliberately avoided dealing with the issue of
pure water, the council appropriated the money and directed that the
report be done under the auspices of the sewerage committee of the
common council. While the report was being prepared, Socialists on
the council in the summer of 1910 drafted a resolution asking the city
engineer to determine whether, in the interests of obtaining a cleaner
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water supply, the present intake should be extended, a new pumping
station constructed, or filtration equipment installed.18 The engineer,
Charles Poetsch, replied that, due to the intake being located so far
from the harbor and the discharge of sewerage, “the probability of de-
livering even slightly contaminated lake water to the city is too remote
to deserve further consideration.”19 Poetsch further recommended
chemical treatment with hypochlorite of lime before the question of
construction be addressed.20
Water purification and sewage treatment are two very different
processes that are often confused. Water purification involves remov-
ing small amounts of impurities from the water, rendering it safe and
potable. Sewage treatment, on the other hand, involves reducing the
quantity and harmful quality of large amounts of liquid and solid wastes
and ideally discharging into the water supply levels of bacteria and
other pollutants that are no greater than the ambient. Since the 1940s
sewage treatment has used an advanced technology known as tertiary
treatment, but this was unforeseen at the time. The goal of sewage treat-
ment at that time was to reduce the odor and bacterial levels to a “toler-
able level”; this meant that about 50 to 75 percent of the solids and
pathogens were removed. Dumping the remainder into the same source
from which water for drinking purposes was obtained meant that un-
treated or chemically treated but unfiltered water would eventually
become contaminated by sewage waste.21
Unhappy with the lack of support they had received from the engi-
neer, the Socialist majority used their position to expand the commis-
sion of the sewerage committee’s consulting engineers, John Alvord,
Harrison P. Eddy, and George C. Whipple. Instead of simply determin-
ing whether the water was polluted, they were, if possible, to deter-
mine the source or sources of that pollution and devise methods to
eliminate it.22 The report was delivered in April 1911 and recommended
That the filtration of the water supply, with disinfection
when necessary, is the most efficient and economical
means of insuring its purity and that sewage purification
should be carried out only so far as to prevent undue
contamination of the rivers and bay.23
Despite this strong recommendation, the council did nothing fur-
ther to implement these steps during Seidel’s term. This did not, how-
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ever, mean that Mayor Seidel took no action. Poetsch having retired at
the end of 1910, Seidel directed the new engineer, John Mesiroff, to
investigate the possibility of improving or replacing the North Point
intake. Mesiroff held a very different view on the purity of Milwaukee’s
water supply than had his predecessor. He informed the council that to
ensure a clean supply depended upon “the urgent necessity of immedi-
ately taking steps towards the construction of a new intake.”24 This was
not only because the water was increasingly dirty in appearance and
had a greasy taste but also because providing service to the western
and southern areas of the city was putting a strain on the amount of
water available.25 At about this same time, the Bureau of Economy and
Efficiency, which the Socialists had established upon taking power in
1910, was beginning to release its reports on the waterworks, and this
provided an additional voice to urge that steps be taken to safeguard a
pure water supply. The council approved a $6,000 grant from the water
fund for preliminary borings and surveys for a new intake, but argu-
ments as to the best way to actually preserve the purity of the source
soon arose between the Nonpartisans and the Socialists. Seidel did get
the new water intake approved. It consisted of a concrete tunnel 12 feet
in diameter, extending 6,565 feet into the lake in a northeasterly direc-
tion measured from the foot of Linnwood Avenue. Sunk 67 feet below
the water surface, it was designed to be less vulnerable to surface con-
tamination caused by adverse weather conditions.26
Seidel and his fellow Socialists were also dealing with the question
of water rates. Controversy had begun in 1909, when the Beaver Manu-
facturing Company, Filer and Stowell Co., and twenty-three individu-
als filed a complaint with the Railroad Commission claiming the city’s
water rates were excessive. No action had been taken on this claim
until 1912, and in the meantime, becoming aware that the Railroad
Commission had recently imposed a stepped fee schedule on another
utility, that of the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s water plant, the
common council hired a consultant to advise them. This consultant,
John R. Commons, was a well-known labor economist, and his task
was to examine the records of the water department, determine the
actual costs of water production, and prepare the city’s defense.27
Two months later the city also authorized the hiring of a water
waste survey engineer, under the direction of the commissioner of public
works, to consult with the city attorney and serve as a witness in any
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litigation involving the waterworks.28 This engineer, Ray Palmer, pre-
sented their evidence to the Railroad Commission in September 1912,
but to no avail. On September 13, 1913, the commission tentatively
ordered a sliding service charge from $.90 to $325.00 per quarter and
an output charge ranging from 1.8 to 1.5¢ per 100 cubic feet, to be-
come effective on January 1, 1914.29 The city raised so much objection
to this rate schedule that the decision was never published.30
By forcing the Railroad Commission to back down, the city had
won the first battle in what was to be an extended war for jurisdiction
with the state. Retaining the existing flat fee schedule did not accu-
rately reflect the costs of production, but it allowed the city to continue
to treat the water department as a source of revenue that could enable
the remission of residents’ taxes. Because many large companies re-
quired only one meter and because the costs of chemical treatment
were negligible, it was more economical to serve larger customers, and
the city made a greater profit from them.31 The question of what was to
be done with the excess money would be a source of contention for the
next twenty-five years.
The dispute between the Socialists and the Nonpartisans over
whether to build a filtration or a sewage plant was also tied up with
another Socialist plank, that of a municipally owned lighting plant. This
disagreement was not as altruistic as it appeared, for it had its base in
politics. Construction of a sewage treatment plant would necessitate a
large bond issue. When combined with the bonds being issued in 1908
for necessary harbor improvements, these sewerage bonds would raise
the city above the allowable debt limit. As long as the city was above
the limit, no other major projects could be funded, and this would pre-
vent the Socialists from pushing through their pet project of a munici-
pal light plant.32 In 1908 a local referendum had approved the immedi-
ate construction of such a plant, by a vote of 11,858 to 5,709. Such a
vote was anathema to the Nonpartisans, who, retaining much of their
Republican character, felt that such improvements should remain in
the private sector. An additional referendum in 1910 had approved the
issuance of $300,000 in mortgage certificates and $250,000 in bonds
to finance the light plant. Despite the Socialist majority in the council,
the presence of Nonpartisans violently opposed to the lighting plant
prevented definitive council action from being taken on its construc-
tion. One of the last actions of Seidel’s administration was to direct the
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city attorney to take “any and all steps he may deem necessary to es-
tablish the right of the City of Milwaukee to construct and maintain an
electric light and power plant for municipal purposes.”33
Seidel was defeated in his 1912 bid for reelection by Doctor Gerhard
Bading, the same former health commissioner who had determined
that the water was impure in 1908 and who had urged for a study of the
pollution of the lake and harbor. With the return of noncorrupt politics
to City Hall (with the unseating of Rose), many of the voters who had
put the Socialists into office just two years earlier felt that they could
now return to their previous party allegiance. Many of these voters
resented the “working-class focus” of the Socialists and felt that the
representation of other classes was being overlooked. With the endorse-
ment of nonpartisanship by such groups as the Westminster City League
and the City Club, and the support of the Milwaukee Journal, voters
reduced their support of Socialism to 40.6 percent of the votes and
gave the Nonpartisans fifteen of the council seats.34 While party posi-
tions on how to address the issue of water purity were well defined at
this time, Bading did recommend that the water be treated to eliminate
germs. Following Poetsch’s 1910 recommendation, the waterworks
installed a device to treat the water supply with hypochlorite of lime in
1913, resulting in a marked decrease in the rate of deaths from ty-
phoid.35 In 1914, with hypochlorite treatment in operation year-round,
the rate dropped even further.36
The Alvord, Eddy, and Whipple report, which had recommended
both water and sewage treatment plants in 1911, failed to generate much
more enthusiasm among the council members after Bading’s election
as to additional steps to ensure water purity. Although the need for a
sewage treatment plant (along with the threat of a city-owned lighting
plant) had largely passed with the defeat of Seidel in 1912 and the
removal of the Socialist majority from the council, the fact that such a
report had been issued finally required the state to step in. In 1913 it
created the Milwaukee Sewerage Commission, much as forty years
earlier it had been forced to create the Board of Water Works Commis-
sioners. The function of the sewerage commission was to be the same
as that of the water commissioners: get in, figure out how to build it,
build it, then hand the plant over to a city department and cease its own
existence.37 That plan, however, would not be accomplished in the way
the legislature had foreseen.
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Bading’s implementation of chemical water treatment, with the
resultant decrease of typhoid in the city, helped him to gain reelection
in 1914. By 1916 the situation had changed, bringing the same ques-
tions of water purity to the forefront of the campaign. On January 14,
1916, the chlorination equipment meant to purify the water stopped
functioning for seven hours when parts of the machinery froze in se-
vere weather conditions. Due to strong winds from the southeast, which
blew heavily polluted waters into the area of the North Point intake,
the water pumped to consumers was untreated and heavily con-
taminated. Within days an estimated 25,000 to 100,000 cases of
diarrhea resulted, accompanied by over 500 cases of typhoid fe-
ver.38 Bading co-opted the issue and blamed the Socialists for the
outbreak, contending that it was their obstruction of the issuance of
bonds to finance the sewerage treatment plant that had been respon-
sible for the outbreak.39 Sixty deaths from typhoid followed, and the
resulting panic led to the approval of a referendum in the April elec-
tions of the bond issue for the sewerage plant, 30,631 to 12,658. Dur-
ing the campaign, Bading argued strongly for the necessity of the sew-
age plant, calling Milwaukee’s water “a typhoid highball.”40 Daniel
Hoan, Bading’s Socialist opponent, mentioned the water issue only
once in pointing out that even had the bonds been issued earlier, the
plant would not have been completed and the episode could not have
been thus prevented.41
Hoan won the 1916 mayoral election but politically was not in a
position to implement much of the Socialist platform. The Socialists
held only eleven of the thirty-seven council seats, and the approval of
the sewerage bond issue had placed the city in a financial situation
where it would be extremely difficult to fund many of the proposed
Socialist programs. Utilizing other options, he wrote to the Wisconsin
Railroad Commission, requesting that they join him in asking the U.S.
Public Health Service to examine the condition of Milwaukee’s water
and ultimately to see if they would recommend a filtration plant. Addi-
tionally, he directed that work be resumed on the Linnwood Avenue
intake, which  had begun in 1912 but had been halted when the Non-
partisans under Bading refused to authorize further funding.
The Public Health Service sent sanitary engineer Henry Letton to
survey Milwaukee’s waterworks and harbor in January 1917. The let-
ter from the surgeon general accompanying the report stated:
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The methods which are presently in use for the purpose of
rendering the water safe for human consumption are en-
tirely of a makeshift nature and it is recommended that
the City of Milwaukee take immediate steps toward the
installation of an adequate filtration plant which will furnish
the city with a palatable and safe water supply. In view,
however, of the fact that this water supply is apparently
always potentially dangerous, orders have this day been
issued to common carriers by lake or rail to discontinue the
use of this water supply for passengers in interstate traffic.42
The report that accompanied the letter came to a similar conclusion:
In order to safeguard the health of the citizens of Milwaukee
by the prevention of the morbidity and mortality from ty-
phoid fever now caused by the polluted water supply, it will
be necessary to construct a modern water filtration plant.43
Hoan had his report supporting his views, but he did not yet have
the power to make these views law. He appointed a committee to evalu-
ate the report consisting of two aldermen, the public works commis-
sioner, the past and present city engineers and health commissioners,
the chief engineer of the sewerage commission, and the superintendent
of the waterworks. This plan may have had an ulterior motive, as
Frederick Olson points out. Until the report was evaluated, work on the
sewage treatment plant was delayed, but work on the new water intake,
also a long-time pet project of the Socialists, continued.44 The commit-
tee served a political purpose as well. Except for Seidel, who was one
of the two aldermen on the committee, all the other members were
Nonpartisan. If Hoan could get a Nonpartisan committee to recom-
mend the Socialist position, many of the accusations that Hoan’s projects
were politically motivated would lose much of their sting. Hoan him-
self described the health service report as a “sledge-hammer” with which
to pound the Nonpartisans in line. According to the Hoan papers, he
met with the committee, showed them the federal reports, and threat-
ened to publicly hold them responsible for any additional typhoid deaths
if they did not ratify the report and recommend a filtration plant.45 Con-
sidering Bading’s finger-pointing in the 1916 campaign, when he had
accused the Socialists of causing the typhoid epidemic because of their
stonewalling the issuance of bonds for the sewage treatment plant, such
a threat would have been sweet political revenge.
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In May 1917, the report committee recommended that William
Copeland, a prominent chemist, be hired to experiment with filtration.46
This recommendation was referred to the committee on waterworks
and sewerage, where it languished until September. On September 10,
the majority report of the committee recommended that the filtration
report be placed on file. A minority report, however, from the two So-
cialists on the committee,47 recommended that $30,000 be immediately
appropriated for the filtration study. Two months of vicious political
wrangling followed, until November 19, when the Socialists managed
to have the minority report substituted for the majority by a vote of
nineteen to eighteen. The federal study supporting a filtration plant
was then adopted by a vote of twenty-four to thirteen.48
On December 31, the money for filtration studies was appropri-
ated, and Socialist alderman John Doerfler introduced a resolution di-
recting the public works commissioner to appoint a seven-person panel
to conduct experiments in water purification and filtration. Doerfler’s
resolution remained unacted on until March 1918, when Hoan opened
his mayoral campaign. He bitterly attacked the council for its inaction,
pointing out that it had been nearly a year since he had appointed his
study committee. He charged that “this branch of statesmen in the com-
mon council have made a football of the matter of pure drinking water
for this city. They have proved by their dilly-dally tactics that they are
the ones who in fact are willing to let the people of this city die of
typhoid, if this is possible, from our water supply.”49 This stinging speech
did the trick; the council unanimously voted to adopt Doerfler’s reso-
lution on March 25.50
The filtration studies took two years to complete. In the interim the
Linnwood Avenue intake was completed, delivering cleaner water to
the city with higher volume and pressure.51 There was a small decrease
in the typhoid death rate in 1919, but the concomitant influenza epi-
demic may well have obscured some of these fatalities. In March 1920,
the results of the filtration studies were finally released, with the chief
experimenter, Joseph Ellms, recommending the immediate construc-
tion of a rapid sand filtration plant at the cost of $4.5 million.52 Re-
leased conveniently close to the election, the report was used by Hoan,
who claimed that the reason the Nonpartisans had preferred the $10-
million sewerage plant was that they wished to prevent monies from
being available for the purchase of the street railways, amending the
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earlier argument that the sewerage plant was a ruse to prevent the fi-
nancing of a lighting plant.53
As plans for the filtration plant advanced, it became evident that
there was not enough money in the waterworks coffers to pay for its
construction. Accordingly, the Board of Public Works announced new
rates that would be effective as of January 1, 1921, raising the cost for
one hundred cubic yards of water to seven cents, with an additional
charge of two dollars per meter. This was immediately challenged by
the Pabst Brewing Corporation on the grounds that the Public Utility
Law of 1907 required all schedules of new rates to be submitted to the
Railroad Commission for approval before they could be implemented.
The corporation filed the suit in Milwaukee County Circuit Court, ask-
ing that the rates be reduced to what they had been in 1907 and further
requesting triple damages as recompense.54
The city’s position was simple. The provisions of the charter gave
it jurisdiction over the operation of its waterworks, which was incon-
sistent with the Public Utility Law of 1907, and thus the city was ex-
empt from submitting to the commission’s jurisdiction. More particu-
larly, the city claimed:
Ever since the passage of Chapter 279, Laws of 1919,
[Milwaukee] has considered itself as far as its water
works is concerned as independent from the jurisdiction
of the railroad commission, because said law, in fact, had
a repealing clause.55
The city, because of this belief in the inconsistency of the two stat-
utes, had “asked for and received additional powers form the legisla-
ture of the State of Wisconsin throughout the years since 1919, which
additional powers were inconsistent with any belief that the Milwau-
kee Water Works was in any way subject to the control of the Railroad
Commission.”56
The cited statute, Chapter 279, Laws of Wisconsin, 1919 gave broad
authority to commissioners of public works in cities of the first class. The
most inclusive definition of these powers is in section 927-9 (2). It states:
In any city of the first class, however incorporated, which
owns its own water works, the commissioner of public
works shall have power, from time to time to make and
enforce by-laws, rules and regulations in relation to the
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said water works, and, before the actual introduction of
water, he shall make by-laws, rules and regulations, fixing
uniform water rates to be paid for the use of water fur-
nished by said water works, and fixing the manner of
distributing and supplying water for use and consump-
tion, and for withholding or turning off the same for
cause, and he shall have power from time to time, to alter,
modify or repeal such by-laws, rules and regulations. No
by-law, rule or regulation, and no alteration, modification
or repeal thereof, shall have any force until approved by
the common council of such city.57
In 1922 the Milwaukee County Circuit Court would rule in the
city’s favor on the Pabst water rate litigation. The rate increase stood,
but pending appeal, Pabst refused to pay. The state supreme court re-
versed the ruling, but not until 1926. It held that “language could not
have been chosen which would have evidenced a clearer legislative
intent to subject the Milwaukee municipal Water Works to the regula-
tion of the Railroad Commission.”58 It further ruled that the Public Utility
Law of 1907 and the city’s charter were not in conflict, and the two could
“stand together.”59 The city had to submit its rate increase to the Railroad
Commission before it could be applied; the city did so in 1926.
Another “misunderstanding” arose from the 1921 rate increase.
According to waterworks superintendent Henry Bohmann, when the
rate increase was discussed before the common council, “it was defi-
nitely understood that there would be no further transfers to the city
general fund, as the new water rate did not contemplate further trans-
fers.”60 Instead of being abolished, these payments would increase to
$225,000 per year in 1921 and to $300,000 in 1925.
After Hoan’s reelection in 1920, the topic of filtration continued to
be politically contentious. In October 1920, the Milwaukee Section of
the American Chemical Society requested that Hoan invite the society
to form a committee to comment on the Ellms report. Hoan did so and
must have sincerely regretted this action when the society’s report was
issued on February 14, 1921.61 The society concluded that while some
type of filtration was desirable, it could “safely be deferred until addi-
tional chemical and experimental work has been done on the problems
of precipitation, filtration, and chlorination, or even until the sewage
plant has demonstrated what influence it will have upon these prob-
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lems.”62 Hoan immediately returned to the federal agencies to counter-
act the uproar over the American Chemical Society’s report. On Febru-
ary 18 he wrote to the surgeon general, requesting an investigation of
municipal water systems to determine whether the public health ser-
vice was still of the opinion that Milwaukee needed a filtration plant; and
if so, whether the plant proposed in the Ellms report would suffice.63
In May Hoan received a reply from the sanitary engineer of the
U.S. Public Health Service, Robert Tarbett, in which it was clearly stated
that a filtration plant was still recommended and would be necessary
even after the completion of the sewerage plant. Tarbett did not dis-
miss the chemical society’s recommendation that further physical chem-
istry studies be performed but countered that if immediate plans were
drawn up for the construction of the filtration plant, these plans could
be altered if necessary, depending upon the results of those studies.64
Hoan also requested comments from Ellms on the American Chemical
Society’s report on his study. Ellms concisely refuted most of the argu-
ments put forth by the society and pointed out that while new innova-
tions in chemistry were rapidly occurring, much time and money would
need to be expended before new scientific discoveries could be made
applicable to water treatment technology. In the interim, a filtration
plant was still the best solution, and he urged that Milwaukee take im-
mediate steps to provide one.65
Hoan also took local steps to mitigate the damage from the society’s
report. Pointing out that the chair of the committee was George Prentiss,
an employee of the Milwaukee Road, Hoan questioned whether the
fact that the railroad would have to pay much larger water bills if a
treatment plant were to be put into operation might be a reason for
Prentiss’s conclusions. Two tanneries—Trostel and Gallun—and the
Pabst brewery, all large water users, also had their chief chemists on
the committee.66 At least one other professional scientific society joined
in condemning the American Chemical Society’s report. In July 1921
The Engineering News Record observed that if the report were accepted
as valid, it would stop work on every filtration plant in the country. It
went on to say:
Such an argument for a halting policy has rarely if ever
been brought forward seriously in an important engineer-
ing matter. Because of its nature and because of its being
brought forward by men without experience in water
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treatment, it must inevitably arouse decided objections on
the part of the sanitary engineers, men who have given
their whole careers to the study of the very subject into
which the chemists lightly leap.67
Hoan’s other line of attack was to revive fear of the water supply’s
being a source of disease. Although typhoid death rates had fallen dra-
matically since 1916 and were now under one per 100,000, the death
rate for children suffering from gastroenteritis was still high, although
it too was declining. Health commissioner George Ruhland had given
several speeches during March 1921 claiming that the city’s infant death
rate was high in comparison to other cities and was directly attributive
to the polluted water supply.68 Prentiss immediately objected to Hoan,
claiming that Ruhland had said no such thing when he had met with the
American Chemical Society’s committee. Ruhland replied to Hoan that
his statements were accurate but provided no specific statistics to sup-
port his statements.69
The mayor then called on Harrison Eddy, who had compiled the
initial report calling for a filtration plant back in 1911, to comment
upon the situation. Eddy, at this time consulting engineer to the sewer-
age commission, replied in June 1921 that firstly, the city should pro-
vide a filtration plant, and that secondly, its construction should not be
delayed to see what effect the sewage treatment plant had upon the
water situation. Eddy pointed out that in conditions of heavy rain the
sewage plant would have to discharge large amounts of untreated waste
into the lake, and because the chlorination of the water supply had
proved not entirely reliable, filtration was a necessity. Additionally,
because there was a marked lag from the time when a water sample
was selected for study and the time when, analysis complete, changes
in the chemical dosage could be made, chlorination alone was unreli-
able, even in normal circumstances. Echoing the federal engineer
Tarbett, he further suggested that while the filtration plant was under
construction the city proceed with experiments on the effects of colloi-
dal chemistry on the water treatment process and alter the filtration
plant design should this become advisable.70
During the summer, opposition to a filtration plant continued, with
the Milwaukee Journal in the forefront. In an August 13, 1921, edito-
rial, the paper strongly urged waiting until the sewerage plant was com-
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pleted to determine whether filtration was really necessary. In a letter
appearing the same day,  Kotecki, the city comptroller , said that due to
cost overruns on the sewage treatment plant, even with the increase in
water rates that had been implemented in January, there would not be
sufficient income to begin construction of a filtration plant for at least
two years.71
A special session of the common council called to deal with the
issue produced nothing but temper tantrums between the Nonpartisans
and the Socialists. In the meantime, meetings of the Committee on Water
Works and Sewerage were well attended, with the very visible presence of
the president of the Milwaukee Government Research Citizen’s Bureau,
John C. Davis. The Milwaukee Government Research Citizen’s Bu-
reau was a private group that purported to research urban issues and
their effect on the taxpayers’ pockets. Founded in the late 1890s, it
arose primarily as an opponent to the reform-minded and vaguely so-
cialistic Municipal League and the Fabian Society.72 In addition to show-
ing up at meetings and taking vociferous positions on issues, they is-
sued bulletins from time to time on subjects in which they had an
interest.
This continued and expanded opposition led Mayor Hoan back for
the third time to the federal agencies. In December 1921 he again ad-
dressed the U.S. Public Health Service, asking for a study and report.
In reply the new surgeon general cited the studies performed in the
previous decade, all of which had concluded that filtration was neces-
sary to ensure a clean water supply, even after sewerage treatment plants
were in operation. His conclusion stated: “Such unanimity of opinion
among various experts during the past ten years shows conclusively
that what is needed for safeguarding the purity of the water supply of
Milwaukee is a water filtration plant.”73 In the same month Ruhland
again attacked the chemists’ committee, using economic arguments
this time rather than unsubstantiated medical ones. He contended that
most of the members, who were employed by the larger businesses in
the city, were against the plant simply because their employers’ water
bills had been increased in an effort to raise funds for the proposed
plant.74
Despite Hoan’s and Ruhland’s actions, the council took no steps
toward addressing the issue until November of the following year. At
that time the Committee on Public Utilities and Health voted in favor
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of a resolution by Socialist alderman John Doerfler that all further con-
siderations regarding a filtration plant be placed on hold until the sew-
age plant was completed and placed into operation. A countering pro-
posal from fellow Socialist Strehlow that the first motion be placed on
file was defeated by a vote of sixteen to nine, and Doerfler’s resolution
was approved by the council by a vote of twenty to five.75
The Jones Island Sewage Treatment Plant went into operation on
June 26, 1925. For over a year after its opening, no further mention
was made in city government of the need for any additional water treat-
ment. In 1925 the waterworks had begun construction on a subsidiary
pumping station to replace the outdated and inadequate pumps at North
Point, and this new station, Riverside, used up the excess water funds
that had been collected from 1921 for the construction of the filtration
plant. In that year, Bohmann had voiced his objection to the transfer of
surplus water funds to the general fund, warning that if it continued,
the new construction necessary to keep up with annexation could only
be financed with bonds, “which would be contrary to the policy of the
Common Council as it is desired that business be done on a cash basis
if possible, in order to avoid interest charges.”76
In fact, no bonds were issued. The last bonds had been issued in
the amount of $300,000 for the construction of the Linnwood Avenue
intake in 1913 and were repaid by 1921. The construction carried out
during the twenties was paid from the cash revenues of the water de-
partment, but because no reserves had been built up prior to or during
World War I, the waterworks was actually operating in the red from
1919 to 1931. That is, the comptroller’s figures, which included all
indebtedness, showed a deficit. The department itself, which ran on a
cash basis, was able to meet all expenses due to the fact that revenues
arrived in time to pay the bills, but they were never enough to pay off
the debt. The comptroller’s figures show a deficit in the waterworks
accounts from 1921 to 1931 of between $220,000 and $890,000.77 This
violated the statute that the city had incorporated into the Wisconsin
laws of 1905 which stated that sufficient income must always be on
hand to cover two year’s payments on indebtedness.
With Prohibition in full swing, the greatly reduced demands from
breweries for water meant that the waterworks could focus on internal
quality improvements, with new metering and loss-prevention tech-
niques. Additionally, the waterworks began treatment of the water in
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Kilbourn Reservoir with copper sulfate to deter and control the growth
of algae that caused bad taste and odor in the summer months. Although
the copper treatments did nothing to improve the actual health of the
water, the improved aesthetics caused a marked decrease in customer
complaints.78 Thus the next health warning about Milwaukee’s water
quality would come as a shock to the government and the citizens.
Because of the state supreme court’s ruling in Pabst, the city sub-
mitted a new proposal for rates to the Railroad Commission on July
19, 1926. Because the surpluses had been depleted in the construction
of the Riverside Pumping Station, it was necessary for Hoan to refill
the coffers if he was ever to get the council into a position where it
might support a filtration plant. Shortly after, in August, four corpora-
tions—Pabst Brewing, Pfister and Vogel Tanning, Trostel Tanning, and
the Palmolive Corporation—filed objections with the commission
because the proposed schedule retained a flat-fee schedule. In their
turn, they proposed a stepped schedule, with reduced charges for large
users.79 The common council filed its own objections to the corpora-
tions’ arguments, contending that a stepped scale would increase
the water rates paid by small consumers for the benefit of the large
corporations.80
In December 1926, a hearing was held by the Railroad Commis-
sion regarding the question of the proposed rate increase, which had
been delayed since 1921 because of the lawsuit. During the hearing an
important jurisdictional point was raised. Through an error, the com-
mission had not actually received a copy of the proposed rate schedule
and therefore had not ruled upon it. The hearing had been planned
since the new rate schedule was proposed in 1921 and was postponed
until the court case was settled. The hearing was then held, despite the
lack of an actual schedule being available to the commission. The city
maintained that it had fulfilled its duties by filing the proposal, and that
in lieu of action, the proposed rates had gone into effect ten days after
the change was filed. The commission overruled this claim, saying that
“even if such a schedule had been filed, it could not become the lawful
schedule until after formal investigation and order by the commission.”81
The city accepted the ruling, but it was not until 1931 that a law was
passed making this so.82 The commission then quietly accepted the city’s
rate schedule without holding a further hearing.
On October 9, 1926, the new health commissioner, John Koehler,
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submitted a letter to the common council concerning the condition of
Milwaukee’s water and the need for a filtration plant. He stated that the
water was undrinkable by medical standards about one-third of the time
and also pointed out that there had been a rise in typhoid cases since
the sewage treatment plant had gone into operation. In 1925 there had
been ten cases of typhoid, with three fatalities; thus far in 1926 there
had been twenty-six cases, with six fatalities.83 This information shocked
the council into action. Two days later, on October 11, Alderman Carney
proposed a resolution that a board of estimators be appointed to alter
the proposed 1927 budget “so that sufficient funds with which to begin
the erection and installation of a water filtration plant might be found.”84
The resolution passed unanimously, but the board was never appointed,
and no commitment to actually begin construction was made.
City business interests took no further action against the rates until
September 1928. At that time the city filed an action against the
Palmolive Company, which had refused to pay the new rates and had
continued to pay the old. The city requested the payment of the differ-
ence between the two rates, $17,790, plus interest and costs.85 The four
original corporate petitioners from the Pabst case then filed suit in Dane
County Circuit Court seeking to vacate the commission’s approval of
the new rate schedule. The court remanded jurisdiction to the commis-
sion, which reaffirmed its order on November 28, 1928. The petition-
ers then appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which handed out
its decision on October 8, 1929. Citing the case of Waukesha Gas and
Electric v. Wisconsin Railroad Commission, 1923 (181 Wisconsin 281),
the court upheld the commission, stating:
Having regard to the statute solely, it is apparent that the
determination of the commission cannot be disturbed
unless it shall be made to appear to the court by clear and
satisfactory evidence that the rate established is either
unreasonably low or unreasonably high. The court is not
called upon to substitute its judgment for that of the com-
mission as to what the rate might be.86
The city was no more thrilled with this decision than were the corpora-
tions. It viewed the reaffirmation of the jurisdiction of the Railroad
Commission as an unreasonable check upon its powers as a city of the
first class and upon the stipulations of its charter. The city attempted to
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remedy the situation by having the legislature pass a bill amending sec-
tion 196.20 (2) of the Statutes, which gave the commission jurisdic-
tion. Milwaukee submitted to the legislature Bill 508S, which provided
That any city of the first class owning its water plant may
determine for itself by ordinance or by its water and light
commission the type or form of the schedule of rates to be
charged by such city, whether such form or type provides
flat rates, metered rates, block or sliding scale rates or any
other type that is not regressive or discriminatory.87
The bill died in committee and was not refiled in the subsequent session.
The issue of water filtration remained quiescent until 1931. Early
in that year, the question of a filtration plant was again taken up, as it
was thought it might provide jobs for workers on relief. With the area
in financial panic, the project now took on the politically motivated
aspects of a community benefit beyond that of providing a clean water
supply. Health Commissioner Koehler took on the job of public rela-
tions, focusing on health and community pride. He pointed out that two
cities that were nationally recognized as having excellent water were
Racine, Wisconsin, and Buffalo, New York, both of which were
equipped with filtration plants, but neither of which had sewage treat-
ment facilities.88 Harrison Eddy, called upon to address the issue with
which he had become very familiar in the past two decades, proved to
be not altogether helpful in Koehler’s opinion. Eddy felt that with so
much effort invested in the sewage plant, it would be more advisable to
spend five million additional dollars to improve that plant, and then
only to construct a filtration plant if it still proved necessary. This would
give time to raise money to build the water plant, which was not likely
to be affordable in the near future anyway.89
Hoan then enlisted the support and participation of civic groups
and established an advisory council with delegates elected by forty-
four different civic and service clubs of the city. This council recom-
mended filtration by a vote of forty-two to two, and Hoan triumphantly
took this sign of support to the common council. He proceeded to
ask for immediate action on the filtration issue and for a government
advisory council consisting of the superintendent of the waterworks,
the commissioner of public works, the commissioner of health, the
president of the common council, two aldermen to be selected by the
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council, and the mayor.90 He did not get his wish. Citing the severe
economic difficulties affecting the city and the nation as a whole, the
council determined that a filtration plant was not in the best economic
interests of the city at that time.91
In 1931 thoughts of a rate increase again surfaced in Milwaukee
government. This time the impetus came from the city attorney’s office
in the wake of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Waukesha
Gas & Electric and Pabst Brewing and also the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Company. These
decisions had clearly established that in figuring the fair market value
of a waterworks due consideration must be given to the costs of new
construction necessary to maintain the system as well as reconstruction
costs for improving existing facilities. This had not been done by the
city’s tax commission in 1911 when it set the fair market value of the
waterworks at $17 million. Since, by the U.S. court’s decision, the city
was entitled to earn 8 percent a year on the fair market value, the city
attorney decided that Milwaukee was losing $240,000 per year, even
on the inadequate figure of $17 million. The common council took no
notice of the attorney’s recommendation that a new valuation be per-
formed and a new rate schedule prepared.92
Over a year passed before any action was taken on the issue of the
filtration plant. On September 6, 1932, Socialist alderman August
Strehlow introduced a resolution to investigate the construction of a
filtration plant, with the proviso that funding be obtained from a loan
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The major purpose
of the project was to be listed not as a method of cleaning the water
but “to offer such immediate relief to the unemployment situation
as is possible by the undelayed construction of a water purification
plant.”93 Strehlow’s resolution was forwarded to committee by a fif-
teen to eleven vote along party lines, with all the Socialists dissent-
ing.94 Why the party that had fought for twenty years to build a water
filtration plant should suddenly abandon its stated platform is unclear.
The most likely reason is that the city did not want to take on any more
debt when faced with severe financial difficulties as a result of the
Depression. There, in the depths of the waterworks and sewerage com-
mittee, it was effectively buried. The committee’s recommendation
was much watered down from Strehlow’s initial proposal, directing
that “the City Engineer be instructed to submit to the common council
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all information and data which he has gathered on water purification
plants to date.”95
In 1932 the water rates finally changed, but they went down, not
up. The Public Service Commission, the Railroad Commission’s suc-
cessor, asked that they be reduced in a voluntary manner as an emer-
gency measure in response to the Depression. On July 25, 1932, the
common council complied, passing a temporary measure, effective for
one year, that lowered water costs by one cent per one hundred cubic
feet. When the year was up, the rate was extended and, with other peri-
odic extensions, remained in effect until 1939.96
Another Depression measure taken by the waterworks was to trans-
fer additional funds from the water fund to the city’s general fund to
help with tax relief. From 1932 to 1935, $880,000 per year was trans-
ferred in this manner. The first year it was done it reduced the city’s tax
rate by 96¢ on each $1,000 of valuated property. From 1932 to 1935,
the monies transferred averaged about 40 percent of the total depart-
ment revenue, and in 1932 and 1933, the amount transferred was greater
than the amount retained by the department for operating expenses. In
1936 the transferred amount was reduced to $750,000, and in 1937 to
$600,000. In 1938 declining industrial water use dropped the pumpage
by seven million gallons per day, and the money transferred rose to
$650,000; in 1939 it was $950,000. In 1937 the Public Service Com-
mission set up a formula for payments in lieu of taxes to be made by
municipal utilities, and in 1939, $600,000 of the transfer was given this
designation.97 The water department was clearly attempting to relieve
Depression-induced poverty, but not everyone saw it that way.
Despite the rate reduction, the citizens of Milwaukee made it clear
that they had had enough of the council’s procrastination regarding a
filtration plant. Since 1931, with Hoan’s establishment of a citizen’s
advisory council, increasing pressure had been brought to bear on the
common council relative to the construction of a filtration plant. On
September 13, 1932, a week after Strehlow had made his proposal, the
advisory council submitted a report and resolution favoring immediate
construction.98 Similar communications followed from several organi-
zations, including those who had previously been strong political
supporters of the Nonpartisans. These included the Engineer’s Society of
Milwaukee, the Teutonia Avenue Advancement Association, the Citizen’s
Unemployed Clubs, the Federated Trades Council, and the Glaziers
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Union Local 1204. The Milwaukee Association of Commerce, how-
ever, remained opposed, urging that construction be delayed.99
The Nonpartisans remained bitterly opposed to the idea of a filtra-
tion plant. The Citizens’ Government Research Bureau and John C.
Davis again came in on the side of the Nonpartisans. Using as a pri-
mary argument that Milwaukee’s water could not possibly be polluted
because the city had in 1929 and 1931 won the Healthiest City award
among cities over 300,000 in the Inter-City Health Competition spon-
sored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Davis and the bureau urged
the council to reject the “machinations” of the Socialists to attack the
pocketbooks of hard-working citizens.100 The engineer’s office wryly
replied that the award had been given because of Milwaukee’s excel-
lent health department and for the many unusual health services pro-
vided by the city, not for the quality of its water.
Davis in turn submitted evidence that the yearly averages for
Milwaukee’s water since 1927 were far superior to the U.S. Treasury
Department Standards.101 The city engineer countered that the impor-
tant figures were not the annual averages but rather those for the months
when the water was polluted or bad tasting, requiring frequent issu-
ance of warnings that all water for drinking, cooking, and bathing pur-
poses be boiled.102 Davis fired back with a bulletin that said 75 percent
of the filtration plants in the country were constructed before or during
the years from 1911 to 1915 when chlorination became widely adopted,
a time when sewage treatment plants only attempted to maintain 30 to
50 percent removal of wastes. Filtration was thus an outmoded tech-
nique, and chlorination, combined with Milwaukee’s advanced sew-
age treatment plant (which removed about 75 percent of wastes), was
sufficient to protect the population’s health. The city engineer’s office
investigated this statement and found that of the eighteen filtration
plants on the Great Lakes, only two had been built before 1915. They
replied to Davis and the bureau that 90 percent of the filtration capac-
ity on the Great Lakes was built after the adoption of chlorination,
therefore recognizing the foolhardiness of a one-line defense that uti-
lized only chlorination.103
In February 1933, Joseph P. Schwada, the new city engineer, pub-
lished the requested data on filtration plants, as he had been asked to do
by the common council. It was accompanied by a warning to the coun-
cil stating: “this report shows that a water purification plant is neces-
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sary to safeguard and improve the city’s water supply and that the city
can finance the building of a plant at this time when such work will aid
in the relief of the unemployed.”104
The council’s response was, as usual, to delay. They requested ad-
ditional information from Schwada, which he supplied on April 17. In
personally delivering the information to the council, Schwada lost his
temper and let the council know exactly what he thought of their delay-
ing tactics, particularly as the previous few months had seen several
episodes of industrial waste contamination of the water supply. When
the water was chlorinated, the combination of the chlorine and waste
produced such a noxious taste and odor that “turbid, impure and dan-
gerous” boil orders had been issued for all drinking, cooking, and bath-
ing uses. Schwada told the council:
Events have again forcibly demonstrated that the advice
and information furnished periodically to your Honorable
Body by various engineers in the past twenty-two years is
sound and constructive, and that the people of this com-
munity will not receive water that is fit for human con-
sumption until the Water Department is equipped with a
modern water purification plant.105
Schwada was not finished. He then delivered a strongly worded mes-
sage concerning the way the council was operating the waterworks
compared with the way in which other utilities were operated.
If other public utilities used equipment and methods that
would not ensure to the utmost good service at all times,
if equipment and methods produced incombustible gas at
any time or failed to produce sufficient electric current to
properly light our homes throughout the city, or if the
telephone company periodically failed throughout the city
for several days, what would be the attitude of the people?
What would be the attitude of the company’s board of
directors? Would not the people severely condemn the
company for not providing adequate equipment and
methods? Would not the company’s board of directors
speedily arrange to borrow money to purchase suitable
equipment to improve their product and service? Why
then should the Milwaukee Water Department be forced
to distribute, at intervals, water that is not fit for human
106 Chapter 3
consumption while the other utilities are required to serve
the people according to reasonable standards of quality?106
During the months when he had gathered information for the coun-
cil, Schwada’s office conducted an educational campaign on filtration.
This campaign was serial, each week releasing information on a differ-
ent aspect of the filtration question, from how it operated to costs in-
volved, to efficiency, to comparisons with other cities that either did or
did not have filtration.107 This campaign, which he continued even af-
ter his outburst before the council, had a marked effect. Public opinion
in favor of a filtration plant was expressed in newspaper letters to the
editor, letters to council members, and pleas from workers’ associa-
tions to build the plant not only as a means of ensuring a clean water
supply but as a means of providing jobs for the unemployed and in-
cluded comments that council members not supporting the plant might
find themselves on the unemployment line. Responding as it always
did to pressure that might affect members’ tenure in office, the council
capitulated at the earliest possible occasion. On May 15, 1933, August
Strehlow, the Socialist alderman who had fought for a filtration plant
for twenty-three years, submitted a resolution to the council that the
filtration plant be built. On June 14 a substitute resolution was adopted
unanimously, with the proviso that the project be partially funded with
federal dollars; 30 percent of the loan was to be paid with a grant from
the National Industrial Recovery Act. The measure passed unanimously.
After a quarter century of political wrangling, the filtration plant was
finally authorized.
Opposition to the project did not end. Instead of directing their
opinions to the common council or one of its committees, the oppo-
nents tried to work through the state’s Public Service Commission
(PSC), which had the year before replaced the Railroad Commis-
sion and which had jurisdiction over all state utilities, and later
through the state court system. Chief opponent of the project was
John Wilson of the American Chemical Society, who was head of the
local ACS section. The PSC approved the construction in January 1934,
and the State Court of Appeals upheld the decision in May of the same
year. Wilson then went to Washington to petition before the Public
Works Authority and tried to convince them to deny the loan.
Milwaukee’s water problems, however, had become too well known
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in Washington, thanks to Hoan’s correspondence with the health ser-
vice, and Wilson’s attempts failed.108
Construction began in 1934. The facility, the Linnwood Avenue
Water Purification Plant, went on-line in 1939, almost thirty years after
agitation had begun for it and twenty-two years after the first U.S. Pub-
lic Health Service report had strongly urged it be built. When com-
pleted, it had the capacity to filter 290 million gallons of water per day,
provide chlorination before and after the filtration process, and add
coagulant chemicals to the water before filtration to aid in the removal
of organic matter. Construction costs finally totaled 5.5 million dollars,
about a quarter of the final cost for constructing the sewage treatment
plant and roughly twice what the estimate for construction had been
when first proposed in 1910.109
Although the general rate reduction of 1932 helped to ease some
of the burden of water bills, it did nothing to pacify those who felt that
the city’s rate structure as a whole was flawed. Beginning in 1933,
several groups began to take action to change the rate schedule. The
first group to take formal action was the 110-member Milwaukee
Sprinkler’s Owners Group (MSOG),110 which filed a complaint in May
with the PSC that the city’s rate for connection of sprinkler systems
was “unjust and unfair and should be abated and abolished.”111 Soon
after, Standard Laundry and others petitioned for an investigation of
the city’s water rates. The complaint stated that the city was misappro-
priating the money that was transferred to the general fund, that the
city paid too little for fire protection, and that water rates were in gen-
eral too high.112 On February 4, 1934, the PSC issued notice of a general
investigation of water rates in Milwaukee and of the practices of the
Milwaukee Water Works. They spent five years on this investigation,
holding twenty-three hearings, and looked into all aspects of the city’s
water production for both city and suburban service.
In its decision, the PSC determined a new rate base for the utility,
the first change since 1911. The 1931 attempt by the city attorney to
increase the rate base had never been submitted, due to lack of action
by the common council, but the PSC was able to use its oversight pow-
ers to change this. The evaluation presented a series of cost apportion-
ments covering public and private fire prevention as well as general
service, but the new rate base did not include the new filtration plant in
its calculations because it had not yet been completed. They determined
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a value of $23 million. When the commission invited the city to submit
a new rate schedule based on this valuation, the council demurred, sug-
gesting that any rates it named would meet with much more opposition
than would suggestions from the commission itself. The city later agreed
to submit a schedule, in which it retained a flat annual service charge
of $3.00 per meter, to cover reading purposes, and flat water rates of 7¢
per 100 cubic feet in the city, with 10¢ in the suburbs.
As it turned out, the careful calculations of the commission in fig-
uring a new rate base were unnecessary, because the city did not re-
quest anything near to the allowable 8 percent return on its investment.
The commission was quite surprised at this, and commented upon it:
The consideration of a rate base dwindles to insignificance
in the face of exhibit 187. In this exhibit, the respondent
finally submitted its recommendations of reasonable rates
for filtered water designed to yield adequate and sufficient
earnings. These recommendations have the approval of the
city commissioner of public works and five members of the
public council. According to this exhibit, the net earnings
believed by the respondent and city officials to be sufficient
are so far below what is ordinarily considered to be a rea-
sonable rate of return for a water utility that the problems of
determining a rate base and rate of return thereon become
matters of merely academic interest.113
The city declared that it would be satisfied with an annual revenue of
$2,734,302.83 for filtered water, figured on a rate base of $23 million.
This allowed for a return of $92,462 per annum, or a 4 percent return. The
commission had figured on settling for a return of 5½ percent, allowing
for $126,500 per annum, considerably more than the city had requested.114
Most of the commission’s decision concerned the allocation of costs
to the various classes of services. Considered first was fire protection.
Under the old rate, the city had paid an annual fee of $10 per hydrant,
for a yearly total of $77,040 in 1934. The commission decided that the
actual cost of this service, based on the return that the city had re-
quested, was $190,310.115 The city argued that return and payment in
lieu of taxes should not be included in the calculation of payment for
hydrant service. The commission argued strongly and over a great length
of time with the city on this issue, eventually settling for $15,000 less
than it had originally calculated.116
THE TYPHOID COCKTAIL HOUR 109
The second area of investigation was that of rates to be charged
large commercial and industrial customers. As they had since the im-
position of flat rates in 1898, these companies felt that the city’s rate
schedule was unfair because it imposed rates solely on the amount of
water used. The schedule did not recognize that peak industrial use
came at a different time of day than did peak residential use and did not
take into account the true costs of supplying large consumers who used
a consistent amount of water for a large number of hours each day. Addi-
tionally, because most companies felt they did not need filtered water, they
argued that the cost of filtering the water be charged only against the small
customers, who needed it for drinking and cooking purposes.117 The com-
mission rejected this last point, although it did exclude cost of filtration
from the cost of water supplied for fire prevention.
Another consideration was the claim by Milwaukee and by White-
fish Bay that the determination of the type of rate schedule was a power
of the municipality, not the commission. The PSC might have the right
to determine the amount of the rates, but the form in which they were
charged was to be determined by the city operating the waterworks.
The PSC disposed of this argument by citing Pabst, in which the
commission’s authority had been declared.118 Because of this, it was
able to use, for the first time since its creation, the power to set forth
and enforce a formula for making rates. The analysis divided the cost
of the utility’s service into three component parts: customer costs, which
was dependent upon the number of customers connected but was inde-
pendent of the amount of water used; demand, depending on the rate of
use of the water; and output costs, which depended on the total volume
of water used. The PSC contended that it was demand that was respon-
sible for the bulk of service costs, since the utility had to a maintain a
system that was capable of providing peak demand, even if that de-
mand occurred only 1 percent of the time. Accordingly, the commis-
sion decided that a stepped rate was appropriate, since the 2,100 large-
scale customers were hitting their peak use at a time other than when
the system as a whole experienced its peak. The PSC determined that
there should be stepped rates depending not only on the amount of
water used but on the size of the meter. The latter was to include both
a demand charge and the cost of servicing the meter. It set rates for
water use at 6¾¢ per 100 cubic feet for the first 500,000 cubic feet, at
6½¢ for the second 500,000 cubic feet, and at 5½¢ per 100 cubic feet
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for all use over 1,000,000 cubic feet per year. The service charges for
meters were also stepped, ranging from $3.00 a year for the standard
residential meter to $600 per year for a large industrial connection.
With this schedule, the commission proved that it had finally won the
battle that it had been waging with the city since the Beaver Company
case of 1909.
In the case of the MSOA (formerly MSOG), the plaintiffs were
unhappy with the commission’s decision. Previous rates for a four-
inch connection had been $25 per year, and for a six-inch connection
$50. The commission raised these to $40 and $80, respectively, and
established a rate of $120 for the newer eight-inch connections. The
rationale used to justify the raise was that ownership of a sprinkler
system lowered fire insurance rates by a considerable amount, and the
commission believed “the rates should not be so low as to place on
other users an unreasonable share of the costs incident to such ser-
vices.”119 The MSOA was furious about the rate increase and filed the
first of twenty-two complaints that were eventually filed against the
schedule. Accordingly, the commission reversed this section, reimpos-
ing the rates that had been in effect in 1911. It did so with the consent
of the city, which simply made up the loss by adding the $12,000 thus
lost to the public fire protection provision of the total water bill, where
it would be paid by the property tax levy. The commission was willing
to have the public pick up this part of the private fire protection bill as
long as it was charged to something in the same general category.
Of the remaining twenty-one complaints against the rate schedule,
nineteen were filed by the city. Of these, seventeen were dismissed
with no discussion, and the remaining two were dismissed with short
explanatory paragraphs. The majority of these had to do with the pro-
vision of water to suburban districts. The rates established were for
filtered water, but the rate base of $23 million did not include any of
the $5.5 million that the city had invested in the filtration plant.120 In-
stead, the commission ruled that within one year following the comple-
tion of the plant and its placement into service the city should submit
evidence “upon the investment in said filtration plant, and the expense
of operation and maintenance thereof” to the commission.121 The PSC
retained jurisdiction and was willing to adjust the water rates upward
to reflect the costs of the city in the filtration plant’s construction. The
city never submitted the evidence, choosing to leave rates as they were,
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providing filtered water at a rate that reflected none of the costs in-
volved in construction of the plant or of operating it. Hoan wanted the
rates kept low so that suburban customers and residents of nonincor-
porated areas would be convinced to annex themselves to Milwaukee
in order to obtain water at cheap prices. The results of that strategy are
discussed in chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
I F YOU CAN’T JOIN ’EM, BEAT ’EM
Somebody in city hall has permitted the
extenuation of water mains and water ser-
vice into numerous industrial plants outside
the city’s boundaries. . . . Milwaukee does
not want to adopt a dog in the manger atti-
tude. . . . But if the withholding of essential
services is the only way to break the anti-
annexation iron ring, then the city will have
to protect itself...Apparently, there must be
annexations, a complete county wide con-
solidation, or a change in income tax distri-
butions if this is not to happen.—Milwau-
kee Journal Editorial, June 25, 1946
By 1940 Milwaukee had managed to extend water service to all resi-
dents currently within the city borders and, with the construction of
the filtration plant, had ensured that the water provided was of high
quality and should no longer be a factor in episodes of waterborne
disease. The fractious relationship between the Socialists and the Non-
partisans had made these two accomplishments take far longer than
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they probably should have, but the political consensus reached in the fight
for the filtration plant would prove to have less positive results in the area
of providing service to extramural customers. The idea of generating extra
water to sell at a profit had begun on a small scale prior to the advent of
socialism in Milwaukee, but the supply of water to suburban industrial
and residential customers would be more fully developed under the So-
cialists than had been foreseen by earlier administrations. This policy had
already produced serious ramifications for the financial and administra-
tive health of the waterworks and for the entire city. It was also responsible
for greatly expanded state regulatory power over the waterworks as well
as for creating a need for the construction of a second water filtration
plant. The inability of the Socialist administrations, particularly that of
Daniel Hoan, to foresee the consequences of their push to provide subur-
ban water, both for profit and as a lure for annexation, would also severely
damage the financial relationship that had been established between the
waterworks and the city general fund. Finally, the need to provide water
for a growing customer base outside the city would help to foster a rela-
tionship of mistrust between the city and its surrounding suburbs.
The supply of water to surrounding communities was first made
possible by an act of the legislature in 1887 that stated:
It shall be lawful for the Board of Public Works of the
City of Milwaukee, subject to the approval of the Com-
mon Council of said city, to issue a permit to the county
of Milwaukee, the National Home for disabled soldiers,
or any other party, to obtain water from the water works
in said city: and for that purpose to connect any pipe that
shall be laid outside the city limits with any water pipe
within said city.1
This law also stated that any person or agency wishing such ser-
vice had to apply for a permit and place on file a bond stating that they
agreed to the rules of the Milwaukee Water Works regarding water use
and that they agreed to pay full costs for the water, which, because they
were outside the city limits, would be 25 percent greater than those for
customers within the city. Further state legislation came in 1897 in an
act authorizing cities of the first class to extend water services beyond
their borders to adjoining towns, villages, and cities.2 In that same year
the legislature also authorized a new system of annexation, replacing
the previous system, which had permitted annexation through legisla-
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tive enactment. The new system permitted cities themselves to annex
adjoining land, although if the land had been previously incorporated,
it was to be annexed only with the consent of the annexees.3
While in the first decades of the century Milwaukee did not appear
to be very interested in annexing the abundant incorporated lands in
the county, given that the city was still expanding at a healthy rate, the
change in the state laws provided the opportunity for ensuring that the
expansion would continue. Although Milwaukee’s first use of the two
newest laws did not involve annexation,4 the stipulation included in the
enabling law provided that when (not if) the areas in which extramural
pipe was laid became part of the City of Milwaukee, the water pipes
would become city property. In 1902 the common council approved
water service for the Village of North Milwaukee, in 1903 for East
Milwaukee, and in 1905 for West Allis and Greenfield. The formula
used for all these service extensions clearly shows that the provision of
water was meant as a carrot to lure each surrounding municipality into
the waiting arms of Milwaukee.5 It did not occur to the members of the
council that providing services prior to annexation might have the ef-
fect of postponing, or even negating, any proposed annexation, per-
haps because the city was making such a tidy profit from these sales.
The city did not require any agreement on annexation prior to the pro-
vision of service; if such agreements existed, they may have been ver-
bal “gentlemen’s agreements,” and thus not binding on any successors
of the original officials involved. (See maps 3 through 9 for location of
Milwaukee suburbs.)
The first community on the North Shore to connect with Milwau-
kee water for retail service was East Milwaukee (now Shorewood) in
1905.6 The contract, signed May 8, 1905, was virtually identical with
that signed by West Allis later in the same year.7 Water was supplied
through a sixteen-inch main laid in North Downer Avenue and was
paid for at the rate of six cents per hundred cubic feet, a figure 1.25
times that charged city residents. Milwaukee also undertook the job of
supplying and installing the water mains for East Milwaukee at cost.8
By 1906 this servicing of surrounding communities was having
repercussions. The aldermen of the three Polish south-side wards pre-
sented a resolution on November 26 to discontinue the provision of
water to areas outside the city borders until such time as all residents of
the city had adequate service.9 This resolution was approved by the
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watering committee, but never came to a vote by the general council,
as the aldermen were quietly dissuaded from attempting to interfere
with a city revenue source. As shown above in chapter 2, the provision
of water service to the wards in question accelerated after this point.
Between 1907 and 1910 other resolutions to discontinue extramural
service were submitted on the grounds that the service was depriving
the city residents of high-pressure service needed in areas of higher
elevation. These resolutions all were tabled or postponed.10 Despite
their obligation to represent the interests of their citizens, the fact that
the aldermen were, in effect, the board of trustees over a proprietary
utility resulted in most of them responding to the bottom line rather
than to customer satisfaction. This attitude would later prove to be a
mistake, as the increasing regulatory power of the state would require
more of the city in regard to service provision than it had ever intended
to give.
In 1910 a new page in the service-annexation debate began. Ar-
ticle 8 of the Socialist platform read:
The City shall annex and incorporate reasonable territory
in addition to its present area—Milwaukee having now
the smallest area in the country for any city of the same
class—the same to be surveyed and plotted by experts in
such manner as to insure healthy and aesthetic conditions.11
This plank was a sharp contrast to the city policy of selling water to
suburbs in order to make a profit. Annexing suburban customers would
eliminate the surcharge and, coupled with the Socialist argument that
all parts of the city should have residential supply, would require capi-
tal expenditure that did not exist with the wholesale supply of water to
certain suburbs. It reinforced, however, the idea of socialism that gov-
ernment existed to serve the people. With the victory of Emil Seidel
and the corresponding majority of seats on the aldermanic council pass-
ing to the Socialists, the city could take immediate steps to achieve its
annexation goals. Recognizing that the provision of service prior to
1910 had not resulted in the annexation of any land, despite the belief
of the common council that it would do so, Seidel and his fellow So-
cialists took steps to halt the supply of water to extramural areas, de-
spite the financial loss that would occur, unless those areas should ap-
ply for annexation. A resolution was passed to this effect on June 9,
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1911, and modified in September to allow for the cutoff of water to the
suburbs on January 1 of the following year if those suburbs had not
applied for annexation. It passed on October 10 by a vote of thirty-one
to one, indicating that in the area of annexing new land, the Socialists
and the Nonpartisans shared a common goal.12
Arguments came at once from industries outside the borders that
were subject to loss of their water supply should the council carry out
its resolution. Faced with the prospect of job loss for Milwaukee work-
ers employed at the suburban plants, the council postponed the shutoff
for a year but urged industrial extramural users to counsel the officials
of their particular town or village to apply for annexation or to apply
for it themselves. No industrial land was annexed, however, and the six
annexations that took place in 1912 were all residential in nature and
unconnected with service provision.
The towns and villages in question took another route to ensure
their continued water supply. They introduced a bill to the 1913 legis-
lature requiring that when a city had been providing water to an adjoin-
ing town or village, the city could not cease to provide service, except
for non-payment, without the consent of that town’s council. Despite
Milwaukee’s protests, the bill was passed by the legislature and en-
acted as Chapter 389, Wisconsin Laws of 1913.
Chapter 389 put a crimp in the annexation goals of the Bading
administration. The date to enact cutoff was indefinitely postponed,
and provision of service outside the city continued, along with the money
the city gained. Additional parts of Greenfield were watered in 1913,
and the City of Wauwatosa was initially connected in 1915. No re-
quirement for annexation was applied in either case, and the enacting
legislation passed the council with only one dissenting vote.13 The only
time annexation was linked with service was in 1915, when Whitefish
Bay requested to receive city water through East Milwaukee. Milwau-
kee agreed to this only on the conditions that every person receiving
water in this fashion would have to not only signify in writing to sup-
port any steps in an annexation process but also to waive their rights
under Chapter 389.14 Milwaukee, however, would make no attempt to
take action on this provision for another 12 years.
Bading was defeated in the 1916 election, and the return of a So-
cialist mayor re-energized the connection of service provision to an-
nexation. In December of 1916, the Council enacted a provision that
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stated: “After January 1, 1917, no persons, firms or corporations owning
property outside the corporate limits of the City of Milwaukee shall be
permitted to connect with said city’s water supply.”15 At the same time,
Milwaukee moved in the state legislature to permit a city to annex adjoin-
ing property by a simple majority vote of the city’s common council.16
While this bill was undergoing debate, the city considered testing
Chapter 389 by cutting off water supply to the sponsors of the legisla-
tion, namely, the City of Wauwatosa, the Towns of Greenfield and Lake,
and the Village of West Milwaukee.17 Discretion proved to be the bet-
ter part of valor, and the council decided against cutting off service,
even repealing their earlier ordinance requiring towns and villages to
submit annexation papers to receive service. Although they eventually
lost their battle to secure a liberal annexation bill in the legislature, the city
did gain a victory of sorts in that the legislature repealed Chapter 389.18
The Socialists’ concern with annexation became more intense when
the results of the 1920 census were released. Showing Milwaukee to
be the nation’s second-most congested city, the results indicated that
attracting new businesses would be unlikely unless the city could man-
age to expand its land base.19 Existing companies were uninterested in
becoming annexed to the city; lower suburban tax rates coupled with,
in many cases, water service provided by Milwaukee made them con-
tent with the status quo. The city’s Board of Public Land Commission-
ers was instructed to circulate annexation petitions, and an engineer
whose sole purpose was to expedite the engineering problems associ-
ated with annexation was appointed to the board. Despite these ac-
tions, only 152 acres were annexed in 1920 and none in 1921. The
board’s 1921 annual report stated that its efforts “were handicapped by
the existence of perpetual water contracts held by property just adja-
cent to the city limits and to the hostility of industrial concerns located
just outside those limits.”20
Hoan went to the common council and argued that Milwaukee’s
survival depended upon annexation of surrounding land, particularly
the area just to the west of the city limits. The council obligingly re-
turned a resolution on July 24, 1922, that permitted the city to use the
full force of water service provision to force annexation. The resolu-
tion said:
All applicants to connect with the water system outside
the corporate limits of the City of Milwaukee shall be
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honored and water service granted by the Common Coun-
cil provided such applications are accompanied by a law-
ful petition for annexation to the City of Milwaukee,
approved by this Common Council, of the lands to which
such service is proposed to be granted.21
Hoan was through with the city relying on future promises to annex or
promises that homeowners and businesses would support any future
annexation petitions. The July 24 resolution would be the foundation
of the city’s water extension policy for the next three decades.
Despite the resolution, the Board of Public Land Commissioners
reported that they were unable to attract significant areas for annex-
ation. In 1923 Hoan pushed through a resolution creating a supervisor
of annexation, appointed by the mayor but responsible to the board,
and assigned him a staff. The first commissioner was Daniel Werba, a
long-time administrative supporter of the Socialist camp. Werba and
his staff showed remarkable success, securing 1,463 acres for annex-
ation by the end of 1923, including some industrial concerns that had
previously rejected annexation.22 By concentrating on unincorporated
land rather than that belonging to other cities, Werba was able to suc-
ceed in the city’s goal of additional space. This also allowed the city to
continue to make money on selling water to already developed extra-
mural areas.
Throughout the decade of the 1920s, the population of Milwaukee
County grew rapidly, and the city’s coupling of water service with an-
nexation allowed it to obtain an additional 16.5 square miles of land,
through fifty separate annexations. This would lead to increasing con-
flict between the city and the surrounding suburbs, as they saw their
size and importance diminish in comparison to the rapidly expanding
Milwaukee. The Pabst case, mentioned in chapter 3, had clearly dem-
onstrated the regulatory authority of the Railroad Commission (later
Public Service Commission) over the Milwaukee Water Department,
and the suburban towns and villages would soon utilize this agency as
an ally in their fight against the city.
In 1926 the city engineer had reported to the common council that
a severe problem with water supply existed. The West Allis lawsuit,
which had been pursued by the city in an attempt to force the suburb to
pay the additional fees that the city charged for extramural service,
had delayed the accumulation of the money necessary to pay for a new
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pumping station. Because the city was near to its debt limit, the station
could not be financed through a bond issue but had to be paid for out
of water department revenues. Since the tradition of transferring sur-
pluses to the general fund had continued since the 1890s, using these
departmental revenues meant that the city’s main pocketbook, and the
tax rate, would also be affected by any construction. In the meantime,
the expansion of service through both annexation and continued extra-
mural provision was causing a shortage of water, particularly in higher
elevations on the west and south sides. To ensure that the city had
sufficient water to supply its own needs at an adequate pressure, the
engineer recommended that all suburban contracts be terminated within
a three-year period. “Should this not be done,” he stated, “a water
shortage will be created with its menace to public health and its result-
ing fire hazard.”23
Also in 1926, an event occurred which would have long-term re-
percussions for Milwaukee’s waterworks, although the short-term out-
come was in the city’s favor. The Town of Milwaukee and the Town of
Lake petitioned the Railroad Commission to force the City of Milwau-
kee to supply water to both towns in their entirety.24 Each withdrew its
petitions after a month, in part because of each town’s inability to fi-
nance the laying of water mains. In the midst of uncertainty over the
city’s annexation fever, however, it appears likely that the towns were
also afraid that water supply might be linked to the loss of their inde-
pendence. Although the petitions were withdrawn, the Railroad Com-
mission ruled that the city could not be forced to extend or continue
water service to any municipality to which it was not already supply-
ing water.25
The city responded with a resolution threatening to cut off water
to West Allis, North Milwaukee, and Shorewood (formerly East Mil-
waukee) as of January 1, 1930, unless those cities negotiated new con-
tracts at a significantly higher water rate.26 The suburbs responded by
proposing that a committee of city and suburban commissioners be
formed, with some of the commissioners being appointed by Hoan, to
discuss alternate ways in which the water department might be gov-
erned and also to negotiate a contract that would be acceptable to all
parties. Hoan, seeing this proposal as an attempt to seize control of the
city’s profitable water department and make it subject to regional au-
thority, refused to participate in any committee in which suburban of-
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ficials would have jurisdiction over “his” water department. He counter-
proposed that the city engineers of the respective municipalities in-
volved meet to discuss the question of future water needs and subur-
ban supply.27 This clearly shows that Milwaukee, and Hoan in particu-
lar, were interested in providing service to the suburbs as long as the
profit generated was sufficient to supply for the necessary costs of
water provision within the city and as long as there was hope that the
suburbs receiving the service might be convinced to annex themselves
to the city. However, Hoan had no intention of letting any outsiders
have a voice in the policy decisions of the Milwaukee Water Works
unless those outsiders were desirous of becoming part of Milwaukee.
In Whitefish Bay the threat of water shutoff was felt most severely.
The suburb had increased its population fivefold in the years since water
had been first obtained in 1914; the availability of a piped water supply
was an absolute necessity to the maintenance of that population. Un-
like Shorewood and West Allis, Whitefish Bay did not receive its water
directly from Milwaukee but rather purchased it secondhand from
Shorewood, and only after it had passed through a lengthy Shorewood
main. This resulted in perpetual low water pressure, which the city
tried to alleviate by passing sprinkling restrictions during hours of high
use and later (in 1927) banning lawn sprinkling altogether. Faced with
the loss of its supply because of Milwaukee’s threatened cutoff of
Shorewood, the village made attempts to negotiate directly with Mil-
waukee to secure a supply.28
Due to the annexation frenzy of Hoan and his supporters, negotia-
tions proceeded slowly, with the city pressuring the village for consoli-
dation with the city. Whitefish Bay mayor Frank Klode was actually in
favor of such a move if it would guarantee continued water service; the
village councilors were less happy with such a move. They counter-
proposed that Shorewood and Whitefish Bay form a separate North
Shore water utility and construct their own water works.29
Faced with such opposition, the city backed down and stated that it
had every intention of providing water to the suburbs, if only the Rail-
road Commission could suggest a fair price that would allow the city to
make a reasonable profit on the transaction.30 However, it then an-
nounced that it was annexing a strip of land along the lake shore be-
tween Milwaukee and Whitefish Bay that would make the two munici-
palities contiguous. While ostensibly permitting Whitefish Bay to tap
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the city’s mains directly rather than through Shorewood (thus provid-
ing a higher-pressure supply), the real reason was less well-intentioned.
In fact, under the conditions of the state annexation codes, this conti-
guity was necessary for annexation to occur.31
During the years from 1927 to 1929, the city anxiously watched
the progress of two legislative proposals regarding the water depart-
ment. One would have declared a metropolitan water district with bound-
aries identical to that of the sewerage commission and, further, estab-
lish that although the City of Milwaukee would not be a part of this
district, it would be obligated to supply water to the entire district if it
had in the past supplied water to any part of it.32 At the same time, the
county introduced legislation that would give it jurisdiction over the
water department and fund the costs through taxation rather than by
the payment of rates. Milwaukee objected strenuously to this latter pro-
posal, pointing out that its residents would be responsible for the pay-
ment of 85 percent of the taxes involved, although they would be ex-
cluded by the statute from the district to be served.33 The first legisla-
tive effort was defeated in the assembly by a vote of forty-two to twenty-
six; the county petition was dismissed when the city offered to provide
water for the county institutional grounds at the same rates as for city
institutions. The county renewed its effort in the following year, how-
ever, and forced the city to back down on its threatened 1930 water
cutoff. The compromise provided that municipalities within the county
would pay a water rate that allowed Milwaukee a “reasonable” profit
and that Milwaukee would make no further efforts to cut off existing
service. In turn the county dropped its attempts for a regional water
district, at least for the time being.
In 1929 the Depression hit Wisconsin along with the rest of the
nation. Faced with a continued high level of indebtedness and the ne-
cessity of new construction, with its attendant costs, to the newly an-
nexed areas, on January 1, 1930, Milwaukee terminated its water con-
tracts with West Allis, North Milwaukee, and Shorewood, just as it
had earlier threatened. The suburbs sued, and although they won an
initial reversal of Milwaukee’s action in the county district court,34 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the termination—with a stipulation.
The city, the court stated, had every right to terminate the contract.
However, until a new contract was negotiated, the city was obligated
by Wisconsin law to continue to provide service under the terms of
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the previous contract.35 At that time, service would continue under the
new contract.
Shorewood dealt with the cutoff by refusing to make a new con-
tract while the court action was pending and also by refusing to pay the
new rate of twelve cents per hundred cubic feet. Although the court
would eventually rule that the new rates were also invalid because they
had not been resubmitted to the Public Service (formerly Railroad)
Commission (PSC)36 after the termination of the contracts,37 Milwau-
kee was unable to resubmit the rate proposals to the commission with
any likelihood of passage because of the economic effects of the De-
pression. Finally, in 1932 the city offered a rate of nine cents per hun-
dred cubic feet, up 50 percent from the previous rate, and Shorewood
signed. To clear up the outstanding charges from the time when no
contract was in effect, Shorewood agreed to make a one-time payment
of $75,000 to partially compensate the city for its lost revenue; the city,
desperate, agreed.38
Whitefish Bay followed suit with a new contract later the same
year, and Fox Point, a village to the north of Whitefish Bay, became a
customer in 1933.39 West Allis signed a new retail contract in 1935 but
would continue to engage in litigation with Milwaukee for an addi-
tional five years over what was owed for service in the period between
the contracts. Water was supplied wholesale to the Towns of Milwau-
kee and Lake, with the manner of distribution left up to the govern-
ments of those towns. These two towns, which had originally petitioned
for service in 1926, were becoming desperate in their attempts to re-
main independent of the city, while at the same time supplying neces-
sary services to their residents.
The city’s reason for not extending retail service to these latter
communities was, for once, not based on annexation. Economic down-
turns, largely stemming from the partial shutdown of the breweries and
related industries due to Prohibition, and the subsequent loss of in-
come from these very large water consumers had so impoverished
Milwaukee that it had abolished the office of annexation supervisor in
1932 and in fact made only six small annexations in the years from
1931 to 1940. Rather, each of the two towns in question were situated
on high bluff land, and service extension would have required the con-
struction of booster pump stations, capital expenditures for which even
the suburban surcharge was insufficient to reimburse the city. The Town
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of Lake took advantage of the expanded role of the PSC’s powers over
that of the Railroad Commission and petitioned that the Milwaukee
Water Works be forced to extend retail service under the provisions of
City of Milwaukee v. West Allis. The town argued that the provision of
wholesale water did, in fact, constitute service, therefore the extension
of such service to retail supply was required under the stipulations of
the court decision.40 Further, pointing out that Lake was the only mu-
nicipality bordering the city that did not receive water from it, the de-
nial of such service amounted to unjust discrimination.
The commission agreed. Pointing out that if Lake had constructed
water pipes, the city would have been required to extend a main to its
borders, allowing the town to connect its own mains to that of the city,
the commission decided that Milwaukee’s past actions of selling water
to Shorewood, Wauwatosa, and Greenfield were to blame for the need
to provide service to Lake. “Because,” the commission’s decision read,
“the City of Milwaukee has definitely held itself out to sell at whole-
sale to various cities and villages in the metropolitan area, hence it
cannot repudiate its public utility obligation as to this sole municipality
therein now served.”41
The city, not surprisingly, appealed. Claiming that it was not aware
that the water it provided wholesale was being distributed to the citi-
zens of Lake, it argued that such distribution was done without its con-
sent. Further, it argued that extension of service beyond the city limits
should be in the sole power of the city, as only the city had the knowl-
edge to judge the effects such service might have on the rest of the
system.42
Citing the Pabst case, the commission stated that it did, in fact,
have authority over such extension of water supply. It then proceeded
to state:
For many years the City of Milwaukee has furnished
water service to the public living outside of its city limits
and adjacent to its boundaries. The city recognized that
the practical method of meeting the requirements of the
Milwaukee area was by a large water system adequate
therefore rather than by a series of small systems each
designed to limit its services to any small systems each of
which might be formed adjacent to the city limits.
The contracts indicate that the city has voluntarily
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taken upon itself a public utility obligation of supplying
water to various municipalities. Once undertaken the
public utility may not arbitrarily discontinue it, nor may
the public utility arbitrarily continue it, or select its cus-
tomers. The City of Milwaukee holds itself out as a public
utility in a metropolitan area to render service by sundry
methods to all contiguous municipalities or to individuals;
the position of the city that it is under no obligation to
serve another potential customer outside its limits creates
an intolerably discriminatory situation.
Nor may we dwell too heavily upon the exigencies of
the moment or the convenience of a particular time to a
general plan which ignores the general development in
the normal growth and development of the system. We
must consider the matter of feasibility of the service in
this new area from the viewpoint of the whole metropoli-
tan area.43
The city was now truly trapped. Originally, it had approved the
selling of “excess water” (ignoring the needs of its own new immigrant
residents on the south side) in order to finance popular, and vote-get-
ting, improvements. The adoption of a proprietary mode of operation
had encouraged the city council to think of the waterworks not only as
a cash cow, whose resources could be milked not only to provide extra-
mural service but also as a hook to encourage residential and industrial
areas to annex themselves to the city. The council had never intended
that providing such service would obligate the city to go on providing
it when economic or sufficiency conditions made it inexpedient to do
so. The perceived antagonistic manner in which the city made its ser-
vices available angered the surrounding suburbs and spurred them into
increasing reliance on state authority to define and regulate the service
of the waterworks. With the review of the Town of Lake decision, the
city not only had to submit to the authority of the PSC and provide
service to surrounding municipalities without the reward of annexation
but had to do so even when the costs involved adversely affected the
ability of the waterworks to provide service to city residents. Unless
the city could obtain a reversal of the decision, it might find itself com-
pelled to provide water service to the entire metropolitan area, with
capital costs borne primarily by city residents. Given the existing eco-
nomic conditions, the city was most reluctant to do so. Although Hoan’s
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use of water supply as leverage for annexation because it was almost
the only tool he had available was not surprising, given the historical
background of city-suburban annexation battles, his failure to have a
contingency plan in place in case such leverage failed placed the city in
financial jeopardy when the PSC made its ruling in Town of Lake.
As mentioned above, the city was also supplying water wholesale
to the Town of Milwaukee. When that town, in 1937, put out bids for
the construction of water mains that were in excess of the amount to
which they were entitled by the contract to lay, the city moved to termi-
nate its contract with the town, effective in 1939.44 The town, when
served notice that the contract was to be ended, then petitioned for
additional water. The council indefinitely postponed action on this pro-
posal. The town promptly applied to the Public Service Commission
for an order requiring that their application be granted, based on the
decision in the Town of Lake case.
The commission heard arguments on December 31, 1940. The city
argued that, in operating a water utility, it was functioning not in its
proprietary mode but in a governmental fashion, and that its primary
responsibility was to provide water at reasonable cost to its own citi-
zens. Any supply to extramural customers was to occur only if such
supply was available and if the costs of providing such supply were not
unnecessarily burdensome to the city residents. Because of this possi-
bility of jeopardy to its own citizens, the city needed to have sole au-
thority to determine if and when extramural provision might so jeopar-
dize said supply. To support its argument, the city cited cases in South
Carolina, Minnesota, and Oregon, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.45 In that case,
the court had for the first time ruled on the legal status of a municipally
owned waterworks. It determined that “the acquisition and distribution
of a supply of water for the needs of the modern city involve the exer-
cise of essential governmental functions” and, further, “While these
cases do not decide, they clearly suggest that municipal water works
created and operated in order to supply the needs of a city and its in-
habitants are public works and their operation essentially governmen-
tal in nature.”46
The commission did not accept the city’s argument. It reasserted
its authority over the Milwaukee Water Works and held that by serving
the Town of Milwaukee in a wholesale fashion, it had already become
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a public water utility operating in the town and hence could not cease
its operations, under the provisions of West Allis v. Milwaukee.47 Strik-
ing an additional blow against the city, the commission stated that even
if the city were not serving the town as a wholesale customer, it could
be required to serve the town because it was already serving the area
around it, as in the case of Lake v. Milwaukee.48
Faced with such an appalling decision, the city appealed the ruling
to the Dane County Circuit Court, which upheld the commission. The
city then appealed to the state supreme court. In 1942 the court finally
ruled on the issue, which had been plaguing the city since 1935. On
October 13, 1942, the court held that the commission had interpreted
its powers too broadly. The question at issue was “whether a municipal
utility which, by contract with an adjoining town has assumed to serve
small, isolated, and precisely limited portions of a town, has become a
utility throughout that entire town, and bound to extend its service in
response to the orders of the Public Service Commission.”49 While the
city would have to agree to continue providing wholesale water to the
Town of Milwaukee, even if it canceled the contract,
this is a far cry from the conclusion that the City of Mil-
waukee has become a public utility in the Town of Mil-
waukee as a whole. Such a ruling would mean that it is
within the power of the Public Service Commission to
compel Milwaukee to construct mains in the Town of
Milwaukee, and to cover the entire territory in accordance
with the needs of its population. This is so out of line with
every limitation put by the City on its holding out that we
think it cannot be sustained.50
The court further concluded that the waterworks had done pre-
cisely what was necessary to avoid being considered a public utility in
the Town of Milwaukee as a whole and that it was not compelled to
serve the rest of the town. The jurisdiction of the commission as an
agent that could be utilized to order service by demand in the metro-
politan area was severely restricted. When the commission argued that
the city had itself, on numerous occasions, provided extensions of ser-
vice, the court replied that in unincorporated areas the city had the
right to decide to what extent it would provide service.51
The city, of course, was delighted with this ruling. It regained the
authority to determine which areas would receive water, at least areas
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that were not already receiving service, and it could continue to hold
out water service as a carrot with which to entice annexation. Although
the city had made only six annexations in the decade from 1931 to
1941, and the advent of World War II would restrict the ability of the
city to make major adjustments in the municipal lineup of the metro-
politan area, the ability to continue its planned expansion would prove
to be very useful after the end of the war.
With the onset of World War II, water consumption picked up. In
part this was because of a large increase in industrial use but also was
because the city agreed to supply water to a previously nonserved site
in the Town of Milwaukee that was designated the Milwaukee Ordi-
nance Area.52 This agreement, made with the Federal War Assets Ad-
ministration, not with the town, was specifically intended to provide a
service for the duration of the national emergency and did not, on the
part of the city, constitute an indication that it wished to serve the entire
Town of Milwaukee when the emergency was ended.53 Such legal hedg-
ing failed to protect the city when it attempted to shut off water to the
area in 1950, at a time when the existing armament factories had been
purchased by private companies and converted to other uses. The plain-
tiffs, Wisconsin Can Company, Joseph Schlitz Brewing, the Industrial
Research Laboratories, Inc., and E. R. Godfrey and Sons, appealed the
cancellation of water supply to the Public Service Commission. Reiter-
ating its decision in the Town of Milwaukee case, the commission ruled
that as the city was supplying the area around the former ordinance
area, it was obligated to supply that area as well.54
This example illustrates the problems that Milwaukee faced after
the war. Although the city’s annexations had provided additional land
and there was less congestion than there had been in the years between
the world wars, the city desired still more land in an effort to prevent
industries from leaving the city for the suburbs and their lower prop-
erty tax rates. The ability to refuse to provide water service to these
industrial customers was a necessary part of the city’s plan to retain its
large industrial base, and the requirement, as per the order of the PSC,
that these areas be served was a severe blow to the attempts of the city
to meet its goals.
The city had, in fact, attempted to define these goals in a rephrasing of
its water expansion policy in 1946, in part as a response to a blistering
editorial appearing on June 26, 1946, in the Milwaukee Journal. The
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editorial complained that the policy of extending water service to unin-
corporated areas as a lure for annexation was a negation of the tradi-
tion of using extramural sales to generate revenue, because once these
areas were annexed the profit would decrease; also, it pointed out the
fallacy of providing services before annexation was completed. If out-
side areas could receive water without previously agreeing to become
part of Milwaukee, why should they join the city? The system, insisted
the editorial, was wasting the best “carrot” available in the annexation
battles.
The policy statement that the city prepared in response insisted
that there would be no outside service provision in the future and that
annexation would be insisted upon in areas where service had already
been provided.55
Adherence to this policy brought the inevitable lawsuits before the
Public Service Commission. The commission repeatedly ruled that the
threat to cut off service in order to force annexation was a violation of the
role of the city acting as a public utility. The city’s operation of the water-
works was a proprietary function of the government rather than a strictly
governmental function, and the city was therefore bound by the same re-
strictions that would be upon it if the waterworks were privately owned.56
Attempts by the city to provide service for a strictly limited time period
were also denied by the commission when it concluded that the limita-
tion of obligation to serve could not be validated.57
In response to these rulings, Milwaukee again pursued a vigorous
plan of annexation, and often found itself attempting to annex land that
was being annexed by another municipality. In these cases, Milwaukee
was in a precarious situation. Although it wished to provide service to
the new residents of the city, in order to both gain revenue and reward
the loyalty and support of those residents after an annexation fight, it
was reluctant to provide water when the battle had not yet been won.
The recent rulings of the commission showed that provision to part of
a municipality meant that the city was operating as a public utility in
the entire municipality and would therefore be required to provide ser-
vice to the city as a whole should annexation fail. Faced with this no-
win situation, Milwaukee’s response was to delay provision to any dis-
puted areas until title should be finally resolved; this resulted in law-
suits by residents and developers of the disputed areas charging that
water service was necessary for the development process to occur. Not
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until 1958 would the PSC provide a ruling on this dispute, stating that
the city should provide temporary water service to the disputed area,
with the conditions that the service should be without prejudice to the
rights of the city and might be ceased in the case of failed annexation.58
The period immediately following World War II saw an influx of
veterans eager to acquire land for the construction of housing. This
search for undeveloped land caused a renewal of the city-suburb con-
flict that had characterized relations in the period after World War I. In
one case the federally funded Wingfoot development in Wauwatosa
was held up when Wauwatosa refused to allow the project to proceed
unless a guarantee were made that the area not be subject to annexation
by Milwaukee. The veterans who purchased lots, however, were largely
from the city and were more than willing to support annexation if it
would guarantee them access to city water.59 This was strongly opposed
by the political hierarchy of Wauwatosa, composed of long-time resi-
dents who found their political motivations to be greatly at odds with
that of the new residents, leading to yet more conflict with the City of
Milwaukee. This pattern of entrenched resistance to change among long-
time suburban dwellers contrasted with the desire of new residents to
receive services which the suburbs were not capable of providing, would
characterize much of the metropolitan conflict in water policy in the
decades of the 1940s and 1950s.
Relations with the Town of Lake were even more complicated. In
1936 the Public Service Commission had ordered the city to supply Lake
with water because it had supplied two areas of the town with water al-
ready and was thus operating as a public utility there. This order was re-
scinded in 1942 with the state supreme court ruling in the Town of Mil-
waukee case, and Lake decided to install additional equipment with which
to service its own residents. The well system that they installed was con-
stantly breaking down; in 1944 the town found it necessary to request
permanent wholesale water service from the city again. This was refused,
but the city did provide emergency service on a more or less permanent
basis. In 1946 the common council announced that it was tired of provid-
ing this service and that future service would depend upon annexation
petitions being signed by town residents within sixty days.60 Although the
threat was futile, the town decided that its future needs could best be met
by constructing its own waterworks.
Unfortunately, this only complicated matters further. Shortly after
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the town laid out its system, the city annexed a portion of Lake and
proceeded to install Milwaukee pipes in that area. The town then ap-
pealed to the Public Service Commission and argued that its utility
area was being invaded. The commission agreed and stated that Mil-
waukee could only extend its distribution system into the town with the
permission of the commission.61 Although this decision supported the
state’s policy of overlooking political boundaries when dealing with
utility questions, it resulted in the city being unable to provide its own
citizens with its own water. This access to city water had been a major
impetus for the residents of the annexed area to agree to annexation. In
an ironic twist, the city’s refusal to grant city water to the residents of
the unannexed portion of the town had led to annexed city residents,
who had supported annexation in order to get water, being forced to
obtain their water from the town.
In 1952 the Town of Lake disappeared. Of the part remaining after
Milwaukee had annexed a section, the rest was divided between the
existing Town of Cudahy and the newly formed Village of St. Francis.
The town’s water system was then dismantled and replaced with city
water.62
Shortly after the end of World War II, the suburbs had begun to
agitate for some form of metropolitan water district, as they had done
previously in 1927 and 1935. The city remained opposed to any sys-
tem design that would be funded primarily by tax dollars but would
confer most of the benefit upon the suburbs and also objected to a
metropolitan governing board in which the suburban representatives
would outnumber those of the city. No action was taken on the idea
until 1948, when county supervisor Eugene Warnimont proposed in
the legislature that a metropolitan district on the order of the sewerage
district be created.63
The common council appointed a committee to look into the pos-
sible repercussions of such legislation, and this committee prepared a
statement reflecting the city’s position on the creation of a metropoli-
tan water district.64 This stated that the city was in dire need of funds and
that ownership and operation of the waterworks was the chief factor in
helping to alleviate this financial crisis. The creation of a metropolitan
water district, and the removal of water revenue from the city’s coffers,
would thus “imperil the ability of the city to conduct a clean, sound and
efficient government.” They further contended that they would only
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“consider turning over the water works to such a newly created gov-
ernment having central authority and home rule.”65
The bill, as it was finally introduced in the legislature in January
1949, proposed to give the operations of the waterworks over to the
sewerage commission, which would have the power to purchase the
existing water plants in the county. The city objected most strongly to
this particular provision and managed to have the bill amended to ex-
clude Milwaukee’s water plant from purchase. Without this very nec-
essary provision, the bill died in committee, and the suburbs left off
threatening a metropolitan water district until 1957.66
The suburbs did not, however, entirely give up. Still trying to ob-
tain water supply without having to resort to Milwaukee for it, several
of the suburban communities banded together in 1954 and commis-
sioned an engineering study examining the possibility of forming a
separate suburban water district. The communities involved were Glen-
dale (which constituted most of the former Town of Milwaukee), Wau-
watosa, West Allis, St. Francis, Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, Fox Point,
Bayside, River Hills, Hales Corners, Greendale, the Town of Milwau-
kee (of which only a tiny remnant near Shorewood still existed), the
Town of Wauwatosa, and Greenfield. Glendale in particular had been
trying to get water from Milwaukee since the days when it was part of
the Town of Milwaukee. The incorporation of Glendale in 1950 came
as a blow to city officials, who had hoped to add that territory to Mil-
waukee. The Milwaukee common council steadfastly refused to sup-
ply Glendale, stating that the water was simply not available at the
present time. The study, completed by the firm of Alvord, Burdick, and
Howson, concluded that a system that would provide water for all these
communities could be constructed for slightly over $12 million and
could be completed by 1970. The pumping station and filtration plant
would be located in Whitefish Bay, to the north of the Milwaukee facil-
ity, because the contractors felt that the water conditions on the south
side of the county were less than desirable. It was to be financed with
forty-year revenue bonds, with all participating municipalities paying
equal rates.67 Although another study was done in 1956 by the same
firm for just those communities north of Oklahoma Avenue (thus ex-
cluding Greenfield, Greendale, and Hales Corners), the suburbs took
no immediate action on implementing either study.
Attempts to reach a negotiated settlement between the city and the
IF YOU CAN’T JOIN ’EM, BEAT ’EM 137
suburbs regarding water supply failed in their initial attempt. Milwau-
kee County introduced state legislation to support the creation of a
joint city-county-suburban board, with seven representatives from each
governmental jurisdiction, to discuss issues of joint concern. This com-
mission, designated the Committee of 21, met but twice, and its meet-
ings were characterized more by strife than by reconciliation and an
honest attempt to reach a middle ground. When the legislature refused
to consider enacting a law to make the committee an official body, it
dissolved.68 The next attempt was somewhat more successful.
In September 1956 Governor Kohler appointed a metropolitan study
commission to examine issues affecting the city and the suburbs. The
committee, which was responsible for the commissioning of Beveridge’s
work, among others, reported to the governor in December of the same
year. Among its conclusions:
Recommendation: We recommend to the City of Milwau-
kee a re-evaluation of its stated basis water policy,
namely, that to obtain city water, a suburb must become
part of the city.
Comment: The city has now acquired virtually all land
which could be obtained by annexation. Further expan-
sion could only occur through consolidation or merger. As
a consequence, this 50 year old policy needs reexamina-
tion in the light of present day realities.
The problem of sharing revenue derived from a re-
turn of state taxes is of vital importance both to the City
of Milwaukee and the suburbs, and what hurts one helps
the other and vice versa. We have recommended later in
this report a reexamination of this specific problem by a
Commission created by the legislature. In so doing, we
recognize (a) that when a business moves from the city to
the suburbs, the city loses tax revenue and (b) that the
movement of such a business may be influenced by the
adequacy of the water supply.
But since we also know that the movement of busi-
ness and industry is influenced by many considerations,
we do not believe that all of the city’s problems in this
area spring from a single source, namely, possible defects
in one phase of the state’s tax system. Nor do we believe
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that the City’s problems in this area can be solved—or
that it is even appropriate to attempt to solve them—by
using the city water as a lever, political or economic. The
City Water Department is a public utility assured by law
of an adequate return on its investment by the Public
Service Commission. The Water Department should pro-
vide a continuing and supplemental source of revenue for
the city. The sharing of revenue derived from a return of
state taxes and the furnishing of an adequate supply of
water to the City, the suburbs and the Milwaukee metro-
politan area are related problems but little progress has
been made in their solution. We believe that more
progress might be made by considering them separately
at this stage.
Recommendation: We recommend at the earliest date—on
a cooperative basis between the City and the suburban
communities under the aegis of the Commission hereafter
referred recommended—an area-wide study of the water
problem by a competent firm of engineers to establish a
factual base for long-range policy.
Comment: The water needs of Milwaukee metropolitan
area citizens must be supplied at a reasonable cost. At this
stage, fact-finding is the first step.
Recommendation: As part of a reexamination of its basic
water policy, we recommend the creation by the Common
Council of a Citizens’ advisory Waterworks Board, ap-
pointed by the Mayor, subject to confirmation by the
Common Council.
Comment: Such a board as we visualize it should be com-
posed of representative citizens of the community with
business, financial, legal, accounting, engineering, medi-
cal and public relations backgrounds. Its purpose should
be to a) recommend policy to the Common Council, b)
review performance of the City Water Works, and c) to
provide a forum for discussions of water problems by the
City and its customers, including the suburbs. Since the
Common Council is essentially a legislative body rather
than an administrative group, the existence of such a
Board should help free the Common Council from unneces-
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sary detail and simplify the formulation of policy without
the interfering with the Council’s prerogative to determine
the actual policies and to control expenditures.69
The members of the committee, as mentioned above, were appointed
by the governor. Only one was a city resident or employee, George
Parkinson. The other three members, Ebner Luetzow, Robert Foote,
and Clifford Randall, were all suburbanites, with business and political
ties to Governor Kohler. Further, the governor was a long-time politi-
cal enemy of Mayor Zeidler and an outspoken opponent of the contin-
ued power of Milwaukee in regional and state politics vis-à-vis the
suburbs. Given such a committee, and its recommendations, it is not
surprising that its resolutions were not adopted by the city.70
The recommendations were noted and acted upon by the suburbs.
In Wauwatosa and in the North Shore suburbs, village and city govern-
ments took steps to ensure that they would continue to receive
Milwaukee’s water on their own terms, rather than those of the Mil-
waukee common council.71 In Wauwatosa the problem went back to
1944. In that year, Wauwatosa had reconditioned its existing wells and
dug one new one to provide for the existing needs of its population. By
1956 these wells were insufficient to meet the needs of a greatly expanded
population, partially because of natural increase and partly because
Wauwatosa had doubled its size and population through annexation in
the postwar years. Wauwatosa demonstrated its desire to supply these
new residents by laying eight miles of mains in the affected areas but,
apart from drilling one additional well, made no other attempts to se-
cure an outside source until the publication of the Metropolitan Study
Commission report mentioned above. Receiving notice of the
commission’s findings, the mayor of Wauwatosa, John Knuese, urged
the council to pass a resolution demanding that Milwaukee supply
Wauwatosa’s water needs within ninety days or a petition demanding
such service would be sent to the Public Service Commission.72 Mil-
waukee quickly announced its refusal to provide service, citing a lack
of available water to meet the needs of its own citizens, and Wauwatosa
filed its petition with the Public Service Commission on November 14,
1956.73 In the meeting where this petition was drafted, Mayor Knuese
made it clear to the council that if the Public Service Commission failed
to grant their request, he would again petition the legislature to form a
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metropolitan water district that would be essentially under suburban
control.74
The basis for Wauwatosa’s petition rested on the historic provision
of water to the Milwaukee County Institutional Grounds located in
Wauwatosa. When Milwaukee had agreed to supply the grounds, Wau-
watosa had agreed to the laying of a main to the grounds, with the
proviso that it be allowed to tap the main at all street intersections, with
the understanding that “the City of Wauwatosa and the citizens thereof
may and shall be eventually supplied with water through said main
from the water supply of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.”75 Wauwatosa ar-
gued that because Milwaukee had never protested or disputed this
clause, it was the clear intent of Milwaukee to provide Wauwatosa
with Milwaukee water.
Milwaukee countered that such a stipulation was nonbinding, given
its age and the fact that the clause restricted supply to those residents
directly abutting the main, and therefore did not include service to Wau-
watosa as a whole. Further, its current water shortage meant that pro-
viding service to Wauwatosa would deprive its existing customers, in-
cluding those within the city, of an adequate supply.76 Wauwatosa coun-
tered that Milwaukee had been recently discussing hiring engineers to
prepare a report on possible system expansion; provision could and
should be made in this study for the supply of water to Wauwatosa, at
least on a nonpeak basis.
The commission’s decision was for the suburbs the culmination of
a fifty-year battle to receive a public service from Milwaukee without
the capital and construction costs involved in providing such a service.
After a summary that included a history of water services to the sub-
urbs by the Milwaukee Water Works, the PSC concluded:
The city of Milwaukee, as a water public service utility,
has and now is engaged in the provision of water for
resale to various municipalities which own and operate
water public utilities and which are contiguous or near by
the city of Milwaukee and has held itself out to furnish
such service to other municipalities which operate public
water utilities and are contiguous or near to the city of
Milwaukee.
Because of this, the furnishing of water for resale to
the city of Wauwatosa, as a public water utility, by the
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city of Milwaukee, as a water public utility, is necessary,
reasonable, equitable, and the refusal of such service by
the city of Milwaukee, as a water public utility, discrimi-
nates between the city of Wauwatosa, as a water public
utility, and other municipal water utilities to which Mil-
waukee sells water for resale.77
The commission further ordered that the city make plans to extend its
facilities to provide such service as was demanded.
Milwaukee was truly facing a serious situation. If it accepted the
ruling, it would lose the carrot of water supply in dealing with city-
suburban disputes and be forced to spend a great deal of money ex-
panding its water service operations in so doing. If, on the other hand,
it opposed and appealed the ruling, it ran the risk of the legislature
creating a water district dominated by the suburbs. Appealing the case
to the Supreme Court was no longer a viable solution, because the 1942
ruling in Town of Milwaukee had specifically referred to the city’s power
to refuse service in unincorporated areas. The total annexation of all
unincorporated land in Milwaukee County on May 4, 1957, meant that
the conditions of the court’s decision no longer applied. Two groups
arose in the common council; one favored opposing the commission’s
ruling by all possible means, the other favored accepting the decision
as the course of least resistance.
Each side issued resolutions stating their positions; the provision
which favored appealing the commission’s ruling won, eleven to eight.78
Mayor Frank Zeidler thereupon vetoed the resolution and urged com-
pliance with the ruling, “however unjust and contrary to our original
defense it may seem.” Given the existing political conditions in Madison,
Zeidler went on, it was likely that any appeal would fail, and the city
would then be liable for damages in addition to the costs of service
provision. Only by compliance with the order could the city hope to retain
control over its own water department. His veto ended with a cri de coeur
that showed very clearly the conditions to which the city felt the state
had subjected it.
This constant harassment of the central City of Milwau-
kee by its suburbs for services which they are unwilling to
supply for themselves, while at the same time they ob-
struct both the internal and external growth of the city, is
ultimately the responsibility of the state government. By a
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series of acts against the unity of the metropolitan area,
the state has created the confusion of governments and
fragmentation in this area, and the great inequality of the
burden of tax sharing.79
The mayor’s veto was sustained by the council by a vote of eleven to
nine, fourteen votes being necessary to override.
At the same time this controversy was occurring, the North Shore
suburbs were attempting some changes of their own. As mentioned
above, the city had fought a long battle with the City of Glendale (in its
previous incarnation as the Town of Milwaukee) and the other North
Shore suburbs, in the hopes of being able to avoid providing water
service to that municipality, while it continued to supply the communi-
ties of Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, and Fox Point. In 1956 Glendale
held a referendum, which citizens approved by a vote of 3,013 to 658,
to join with the two latter communities in the formation of a separate
water utility. Given Milwaukee’s stated inability to supply Wauwatosa,
citing lack of supply, it is surprising that the city took the action against
this proposed water district that it did. When the three North Shore
municipalities petitioned the PSC to allow them to form this separate
utility, Milwaukee countered by applying for an order to serve Glen-
dale, something which it had strenuously objected to in the past. The
city’s argument hinged on the commission’s ruling in the Wauwatosa case.
If it were to have the responsibility of serving the surrounding suburbs, as
the commission had ordered, it should be also granted the rig ts of a
public utility as to noncompetition. Since Milwaukee was serving as a
utility in Fox Point and Whitefish Bay, it should be permitted to con-
tinue doing so. The city’s brief stated: “While it may be argued that
Whitefish Bay and Fox Point, as customers of a utility, may in some
instances have the privilege of terminating sales, they have no author-
ity or right whatsoever to establish a competing utility district or utility
water plant for the purpose of selling water to the same area now served
by the city of Milwaukee.”80
The city contended that while a single community might be per-
mitted to cease its wholesale buying of supply from a utility in favor of
supplying its own water without constituting a separate utility, the combi-
nation of three communities in so doing did in fact constitute an unfair
restriction of trade upon the monopoly provision of the public utility stat-
utes. Glendale countered by arguing that Milwaukee was only oppos-
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ing the petition because it did not wish to lose Whitefish Bay and Fox
Point as customers, not because it really wished to serve Glendale. If
such had been the case, they argued, Glendale’s petitions for service
would not have been constantly denied by the city. The commission
decided for the suburbs, just as it had for so many years, and the North
Shore suburbs formed their own water utility in 1963.
Another step taken by the city at this time was the authorization of
an engineering study by the firm of Black and Veatch to expand the
city system and provide additional water for its own citizens as well as
the suburbs. In order to have available funds for the construction pro-
gram expected to be recommended by the study, the city also appealed
to the PSC for its first rate increase since 1939. Arguing that the in-
crease was necessary not only because of increased costs of supplying
water but also because of the low rate of return requested in the 1939
decision, Milwaukee obtained an increase in rates of at least 25 per-
cent, allowing it a return of 5.1 percent on its investment. The PSC,
noting that it had in 1939 stated its approval of such a return but that
the city had never taken advantage of it, approved the request. The rate
increase only affected customers within the city boundaries, as subur-
ban customers were already paying a premium.81
The Black and Veatch study had been commissioned not only to
deal with the inadequacies of the system to meet future needs but to
meet existing needs. The years 1955 and 1956 had been excessively
hot and dry, and areas at higher elevations had suffered low water pres-
sures as a result. Sprinkling restrictions failed to compensate entirely
for the lowered system pressure, and the decrease of lake and water
levels in that year made it more difficult and expensive for the city to
pump sufficient water to meets its customers’ needs. Residents on the
south side were also plagued by problems with odors emanating from
the Menomonee and Kinnickinnic Rivers as the lowered water levels
exposed layers of mud and debris that had not been uncovered since
the days prior to when pollution standards had been imposed in the
nineteenth century. The exposure of these old tannery and sewage wastes
to the air resulted in an odor that was “offensive to the nose and eye,
and hazardous to the health,” according to a Milwaukee Journal edito-
rial. South-side residents appealed to their state representatives for an
investigation of possible health hazards related to the odor, and a study
was performed by the Department of Natural Resources.
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This report, which appeared in June 1958, concluded that serious
problems affected the two river basins. In addition to the accumulation
of wastes in both streambeds, the DNR noted that every spring in which
there was a significant snowmelt with accompanying runoff, a high
bacteria count resulted in those rivers and in the portion of the Mil-
waukee harbor where the two rivers emptied. Additionally, the report
noted the presence of “unidentified organisms” which accompanied
the bacteria, “with unknown effects on the health and well-being of
the citizens exposed to them.” Copies of this report were sent to the
Milwaukee water department, the health department, and the sewerage
commission; the latter two organizations noted and discarded them.
The water department’s copy was stamped received and placed on file,
and was archived in 1960.82 More than thirty years later, the “unidenti-
fied organisms” would make their presence known in a more public
fashion.
The publication of the Black and Veatch study in 1959 marked the
acceptance of the change in the relationship between the city and the
suburbs. The study recommended a construction program that would
permit the city to supply Wauwatosa and Glendale, as well as providing
details for a plan that would permit the city to serve the water needs of the
entire county. Acknowledging the likelihood of the PSC ordering the ci y
to serve, if not the entire county, at least Wauwatosa and Glendale, the
common council voted to approve the study on September 3, 1959.
Funds to begin the improvements outlined in the study were authorized
at that time, and arrangements were made to finance new construction,
including a new pumping station, a new filtration plant, and additional
booster stations by the issuance of bonds.83
The new pumping station and filtration plant were to be located on
the south side of Milwaukee, below the harbor facilities. A new alder-
man, Robert Anderson, had led the fight to place the water plant on the
south side and argued that to place all the city’s eggs in one basket, so
to speak, regarding water supply was foolhardy. He discarded the ar-
guments that the quality of the water available on the south side was
less desirable than that on the north, arguing that with chemical treat-
ment and filtration the water could be made safe to drink. The decision
to locate the plant on the south side was made for three reasons: in
order to minimize the chances of either plant being destroyed in case of
nuclear attack (a common fear during the height of the Cold War in the
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late 1950s and early 1960s); to lessen the need for booster stations on
the south side by supplying water at a higher pressure to the residents
of the southern half of the county; and because the city already owned
an acceptable plot of land on the south side that was suitable for the site
of the filtration plant. To further minimize civil defense risks, it was
determined that a control center, which would monitor pumpage flow
data and provide information regarding reservoir and storage tank fill
levels, was to be placed in the downtown municipal building. From
here, pump changes could be made remotely in the case of disasters
overtaking the personnel at either filtration plant or at one of the pump-
ing stations.84
A major assumption of the Black and Veatch study was that de-
mand for water would continue to rise in the metropolitan area. Aver-
age daily demand in 1959 was 148 million gallons per day, and this
was expected to rise to 230 MGD in 1980 without the addition of Wau-
watosa and Glendale to the service area. The addition of Wauwatosa
and Glendale was expected to add 6 MGD in 1960 and 14 MGD by
1980. Maximum daily demand (the peak demand on the day of highest
usage, usually occurring in the dry summer months85 when lawn sprin-
kling occurs) was estimated to be 444 MGD by 1980, with the addition
of the two suburbs. Since the listed capacity of the existing water filtra-
tion plant, Linnwood, was 290 MGD, additional pumpage and filtra-
tion capacity was needed to meet the projected needs.86
The Black and Veatch report noted that the intake for the south-
side plant would be situated within the plume of the sewerage plants out-
flow, but this was not considered to be a problem. While it was recog-
nized that the water at this south side intake would be of poorer quality
than that available at the Linnwood facility, it was felt that additional
chemical treatment would take care of any problems.87 Additional costs
to the city for this treatment could be ameliorated by raising rates, and
the higher costs in general from the operation of new facilities could be
compensated for in the same fashion.
Accordingly, the city approached the PSC with a proposal to raise
rates. Announcing for the first time its willingness to serve the entire
metropolitan area (within Milwaukee County), the city proposed that
rates be approved which established new categories of usage. Instead
of charging by the hundred cubic foot, the rates were in steps of 10,000
cubic feet, with increased charges for the various categories of service
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mains. Additionally, the fixed charges for having service at all were to
be increased to pay for the additional metering and accounting services
that would be necessary. The PSC, having won its battle with Milwau-
kee over jurisdiction and suburban service provision, consented to the
increase and recommended an annual review of costs to allow for an-
nual increases in water rates.88
Construction began immediately, and the south side pumping fa-
cility (Texas Avenue Station) and the filtration plant (Howard Avenue)
went on line on June 1, 1962. The filter plant had a capacity of 90
MGD and was designed so that it could be expanded to 300 MGD
should water demand increase to the point where such expansion was
necessary. With the construction of the new facility, waterworks officials,
common council members, the suburbs, and the PSC were convinced that
all necessary steps had been taken to ensure the smooth provision of clean
water to the metropolitan area into the next millennium.
They were wrong.
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“The moral is to not let those who don’t un-
derstand the complex system influence how
to operate it properly. The conditions for
throwing the system out of control will al-
ways be present, so it must be controlled to-
tally, not piecemeal, so as to placate one group
that is supersensitive to something they have
read, but don’t understand.”—Herbert O.
Ranger, Water Treatment Chemist, Milwau-
kee Journal, September 11, 1993
W ith John Norquist’s election in 1988, the tradition of civil service in
Milwaukee underwent a sharp change. Norquist, who would later sum-
marize his opinion of city management in The Wealth of Cities: Revi-
talizing the Centers of American Life,1 campaigned on the platform
that he could lower property tax rates while improving services and
that the way to this somewhat utopian future lay in the restructuring of
city government. Earlier, positions such as department and bureau heads
had been filled from the ranks of the civil service, subject to approval
by the common council. The new mayor wanted a “cabinet” form of
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city government and requested that the city regulations on high-rank
employment be changed so that he could appoint those with whom he
could work effectively. Although department heads were still expected
to have at least moderate familiarity with the area they would be ad-
ministering, they were no longer required to meet the civil service stan-
dards that maintained expertise in their fields. Examples of this are the
appointment of Sandra Hoeh-Lyon, a former alderwoman, as superin-
tendent of the public works department, an area in which she had no
more knowledge than the average citizen, or the appointment of Paul
Nannis, a layman, to be commissioner of the health department. Norquist
also announced that his first budget, for 1988–89, would feature a low-
ered property tax rate for the first time in many years. This cut, how-
ever, would be offset by increases in tax rates for both the schools and
the county, and thus taxpayers would still pay more, although, accord-
ing to the mayor, not as much as they would have done had he not been
elected. Norquist believed that American cities were flawed in that they
thought of themselves as governing bodies rather than as businesses.
Run the city like a business, he argued, and taxes will go down, pro-
ductivity will rise, and everyone will be happy. Norquist argued that
businesses prospered because they did not tolerate inefficiency, dupli-
cation of effort, and low productivity, as these all cost money. A lean
business was the best business, he argued, urging that the city begin to
rely more heavily on outside contractors, temporary agencies, and con-
tract workers rather than hire city workers who had to be paid even in
times of low productivity and who would also have to be paid benefits.
Although the previous tradition relied on city employees for such things
as forestry, street repairs, and quarterly and annual billing for water
and taxes, those tasks could be done more cheaply if the city hired
temporary firms or contractors to do the work.2 The tradition had been
established during Daniel Hoan’s administration and was based on the
assumption that using city workers to do the city’s work would benefit
the city in the long run because the employees were required to reside
within municipal borders and would therefore pay property tax to the
city, as well as spend much of their disposable income there.
The power belonging to the position of waterworks superinten-
dent had long been ambiguous. Created in 1911 during Emil Seidel’s
tenure as mayor, the position was intended as a middle management
buffer between the rank and file workers of the waterworks and the
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superintendent and Board of Public Works. It had been argued as far
back as 1925 that the superintendent should have final say over all
aspects of operations, construction, and future planning concerning the
department; at the time the position was subordinate not only to the
superintendent of public works but also to the city engineer.3 The need
for cooperation between the engineer and the head of the water depart-
ment was fortunately enhanced by the personalities of the two indi-
viduals throughout most of the 1930s and 40s, but this situation did not
continue for long after the war. The appointment of Edward Tanghe as
waterworks superintendent in 1948 ushered in a new era in manage-
ment in the department. Tanghe made up his mind that the city needed
to upgrade its service and proceeded to make public statements adver-
tising how he planned to proceed with this goal. In particular, Tanghe
was bitterly opposed to the expansion of water service beyond the city
borders and argued that the extra money gained by such provision would
actually be against the city’s best interests. In this opinion he was reit-
erating the original report of the Public Works Commission in 1890,
which had argued that the best the waterworks could hope for was to
meet its bills and to use any profits to keep rates low rather than acting
in a proprietary fashion and using profits for general city revenues.
Instead of transferring money to the general fund, Tanghe thought that the
money should be reinvested in the department to pay for upgrades in pump-
ing and storage facilities and for the replacement of aging water mains.
Any additional funds could be returned to city residents in the form of
lowered water bills rather than property tax relief.4 The fact that these
improvements were officially in the realm of the city engineer to decide
upon did not slow down Tanghe’s enthusiasm for his perceived path, and
he and the engineer, Schwada, had numerous disagreements over the re-
spective spheres of influence of each of their offices.
Schwada retired in 1950, claiming that he had aged a decade in
two years of having to work with Tanghe.5 He had met his goals of
taking Milwaukee from a city with limited distribution and no filtration
capacity to one that supplied filtered water not only to the city resi-
dents but to much of the surrounding metropolitan area. In his parting
remarks, he suggested to Mayor Zeidler that the city “had too many
eggs in one basket” by relying upon a single intake and filtration plant
and that, given the trends in metropolitan development, the city would
do well to build an additional intake and plant in order to increase its
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revenues from the sale of water to the suburbs. Tanghe countered these
remarks by stating that his job was to provide the best water available
for the citizens of Milwaukee at the lowest cost, and to hell with the
suburbs. “It is not,” he said, “the proper role of the city to provide
services to suburbs when the cost of building the infrastructure that
permitted such services had been borne by the residents of the city.”6
The appointment of Lloyd Knapp to the position of city engineer
would mark the end of the collaborative effort. Knapp and Tanghe dif-
fered greatly on their respective roles, and Tanghe bitterly resented
having to submit all plans for construction and expansion to the
engineer’s office for approval.7 Tanghe managed to gather a group of
aldermen who felt as he did, and they instituted a resolution in 1951
that would make Tanghe solely responsible for the waterworks, and
make the engineer defer to the superintendent’s judgment in the area of
water engineering. Perhaps recognizing that given the two personali-
ties involved, such a resolution was unlikely to provide any relief from
the bickering, a substitute resolution was submitted that subordinated
both positions to the power of the superintendent of public works. This
second resolution passed by a vote of fifteen to eleven; two weeks later
the city charter was amended to reflect the resolution’s change.8
Over the next forty years, other organizational changes occurred.
The Bureau of Water Engineering was created as part of the Board of
Public Works to carry out the construction and engineering require-
ments of the waterworks. The water engineer was subordinate in power
to the water superintendent, in being a bureau head rather than a de-
partment head, and creation of the new bureau did much to smooth
relations between the engineers and the waterworks. Tanghe’s retire-
ment in 1960 was also a major help.
From 1960 to 1988, the relationship between the water department,
the city engineer’s office and the Board of Public Works was smooth.
Each division used the civil service evaluation procedures for hiring
and promotion, ensuring that those in positions of authority had proper
training and experience to complete their job assignments. In 1982,
under the direction of the new superintendent, Henry Balconi, the wa-
ter department instituted a new training program for its operations pro-
cedures, requiring additional training to be completed at each level of
the operations hierarchy. State certification was required of chemists
and operators in charge and recommended for those at other levels.9
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In-house seminars on topics ranging from safer application of chemi-
cal treatment to improved chemical analysis methodology were offered,
allowing workers to learn on the job. Finally, new hiring procedures
were implemented, requiring an associate’s degree in water treatment
as a condition of hiring for non-chemist positions.10
Balconi’s promotion to assistant supervisor of public works in 1987
led to the promotion of Fritz Wengler as superintendent, the last such
appointment to be controlled by the civil service procedures. Wengler
retired at the end of 1992, leading to the appointment of Jesse Cooks at
the direction of the mayor. Cooks had held the position of chief opera-
tor (now assistant water treatment plant superintendent) at the Linnwood
facility, after previous experience as an instrument technician. His sub-
sequent rise through the management hierarchy did not include posi-
tions where he was called upon to make public statements regarding
department operations; but in fact, water department officials were rarely
called upon to make such statements. The pattern of high-quality water
provision had persisted in Milwaukee since the opening of the Linnwood
facility in 1939; although quantity discussions might invite the com-
ment of a department superintendent, as in Tanghe’s case, quality had
never been an issue since the filtration plant’s completion. The public
role of the waterworks superintendent was supposed to be limited to
signing the annual report, releasing the department surplus to the gen-
eral fund, and representing the city at annual conferences of the Ameri-
can Water Works Association. The combination of Cooks’s unfamiliar-
ity with his new position and the fact that no superintendent had been
called upon to defend the quality of the supply in over fifty years gave his
public statements, when he was finally called upon to make them, an air of
unease and mistrust. Cooks’s experience had not prepared him for the
events of April 1993.11
Cooks was taking over a department that had changed during Mayor
Norquist’s tenure at the uppermost levels. In addition to being the first
superintendent to not hold a graduate degree in water operations or
engineering, Cooks headed a department that was more vital than ever
to the city coffers. With the mayor’s continual drive to reduce property
taxes, a move made possible only by draining the $586 million surplus
built up during the Zeidler and Meier administrations, the transfers of
funds from the water department to the general fund grew, in percent-
age as well as in dollar amount, each year. For 1993 the waterworks
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was scheduled to transfer nine million dollars, or 1.9 percent of the
total city budget.12
The winter of 1992–93 was noteworthy for its refusal to leave.
Cold weather and snow persisted into late March, a time when the usual
weather pattern would have brought cool days with high winds to sub-
limate the remaining snow and assist with the evaporation of runoff.
Instead, spring in 1993 began with large snowbanks left over from late
March storms and cold temperatures that did little to stimulate melting.
On March 23 the temperature suddenly rose into the sixties, and the
snowbanks that had been around for weeks began to melt rapidly, clog-
ging sewers and filling gutters with their meltwater. Local rivers and
streams quickly filled and overflowed their banks in some low-lying ar-
eas. The waste material that had accumulated in the layers of snow was
washed into the sewers and the streets, ultimately finding its way to either
the sewerage treatment plant or into the drainage basin of the three main
rivers, where it was emptied into Milwaukee’s harbor.13
The colder than average winter took its toll in the area of public
health as well. The snow kept people congregated indoors later than
usual, and the season of communicable diseases seemed to continue
unabated. From February to early April, the health department recorded
record levels of respiratory and diarrheal illness. They began to sus-
pect the presence of a persistent rotovirus, a source of gastrointestinal
disease, in the population. Such high percentages of metropolitan resi-
dents, especially school-age children, were taken ill with diarrhea that some
schools closed.14 Health department officials appeared on television and
in newspaper articles, urging residents to observe proper hygiene and to
remember to wash their hands frequently. Sales of nonprescription
antidiarrheals reached a new high. On April 8, 1993, residents of Mil-
waukee awoke to see banner headlines in the local morning paper. These
announced that on the previous night, Mayor John Norquist had re-
vealed the presence of cryptosporidium parvum in the fecal sample of
a Milwaukee resident hospitalized for severe diarrhea and dehydra-
tion, and that the city’s water supply was the suspected source.15
C. parvum, an oocyst that is capable of causing both severe diar-
rheal illness and bypassing the standard water treatment regime, had
recently received some media attention in outbreaks near cattle cor-
rals in the West. The mayor had, at the suggestion of a state epide-
miologist and an internal medicine specialist, instituted a boil order
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on all customers receiving water from the Milwaukee Water Works.
Within hours, local supplies of bottled water were depleted, and the
National Guard brought in supplies from outlying regions and eventu-
ally from surrounding states. By the time the crisis was declared to be
over on April 15, the media reported that over 400,000 individuals had
suffered illness as a result of the outbreak, and over 100 deaths had
been attributed in part to cryptosporidium exposure.
The story was quickly picked up by the national media. It was the
lead story on CNN’s Headline News by noon and was featured on the
three main network broadcasts. Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and
World Report all carried articles on the topic, and the N w England
Journal of Medicine cited the case in its June 1993 issue. Milwaukee’s
cryptosporidium outbreak was considered to be the worst case of water-
borne illness to occur in an American city since water treatment be-
came standardized in the early twentieth century. Jay Leno joked about
the subject on the Tonight Show: “NAFTA is working in Milwaukee.
The Canadians are sending them their weather, and the Mexicans are
sending their water.”16
Given Milwaukee’s dedication to the provision of a clean water
supply, how did such an event occur? At American Water Works Asso-
ciation conferences, Milwaukee consistently won high marks for the
purity and taste of its water and had always exceeded the purity stan-
dards of both the EPA and the much stricter standards of the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources. Milwaukee’s water was so pure, in
fact, that for several months during the year, even the untreated raw
water from Lake Michigan met both the federal and state standards.17
If Milwaukee’s supply was called into question, what did this mean for
other municipal water systems with less pure supplies, and what im-
pact would this episode have on the future of water purity standards in
America? At the local level, panic continued, albeit on a more subdued
level. Sales of bottled water continued to be very high, as many indi-
viduals chose not to believe the media reports that the water was now
safe for drinking. Many households discarded large portions of food
that had been processed or prepared locally, fearing that it might con-
tain cryptosporidium oocysts, even when this food required long-term
cooking. Beer customers nationwide rejected brands that were based in
Milwaukee, even when the actual brewing took place in some other city.
On the morning after Mayor Norquist’s announcement, I even received a
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call from a professional colleague, an academic Ph.D., who questioned
whether eggs boiled the day before in the contaminated water were
safe to eat. In short, the reputation of Milwaukee suffered great dam-
age, and the search for a scapegoat began.18
In the weeks that followed, a hastily assembled commission consist-
ing of officials from the health and water departments, along with repre-
sentatives from the common council, began to investigate the source and
extent of the outbreak. A class action lawsuit was filed by the victims of
the outbreak, and the investigating commission sought to forestall criti-
cism by instituting changes in both the structure of the water treatment
plants and in the operations carried out there. The state decided to re-
quire the testing for cryptosporidium in all water systems, and the federal
government was expected to follow suit. After including damages to city
businesses, costs to insurance companies, city costs to update the filtration
plants, and federal and state regulatory costs, the financial burden of
the outbreak was estimated to be in the range of $300 million.19
Conspicuous in their silence were representatives from the water
department. Despite the blow to the reputation of the city’s only money-
making division, no representative from the water department made any
kind of public comment on the situation for more than a week. While
newspaper and television reporters investigated operating conditions in
both filtration plants and pored over records of chemical treatments and
water conditions, from the superintendent on down to the lowest laborer,
no comment was made. Jesse Cooks, who had become superintendent on
the retirement of his predecessor less than six months before, was not
questioned by reporters and, more surprisingly, was not asked by the mayor,
who had handpicked him for his cabinet, to make any sort of explanation
or comment.20
The actual beginning of the story goes back to the previous year.
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources had recently issued new
guidelines regarding lead levels in drinking water. While Milwaukee’s
water contained no measurable amounts of free lead, its high pH caused
the leaching of lead solder from old service pipes in many areas of the
city. These levels of lead could be easily purged from water pipes by
allowing the water to run for a few minutes each morning before using
it for drinking purposes. The DNR’s previous guidelines had determined
that in these cases the responsibility for lead removal rested with the indi-
vidual householders whose plumbing included the old pipes, but it was
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considering requiring local water utilities to alter the chemical compo-
sition of their water supply to prevent the lead leaching process. A con-
sortium of local environmental organizations had taken the lead in the
fight to change this regulation, arguing that requiring individuals to
purge their systems by running water was unreasonably difficult.
Through lobbying in Madison, the president of one of the organiza-
tions, attorney Susan Mudd, had convinced the city that they should
proceed with the chemical alteration without awaiting a federal direc-
tive.21 Mudd cited the example of Minneapolis, which had recently
completed a test program using a new polymer coagulant (poly-alumi-
num chloride, or PAC) that lowered the treated water’s pH to a level
where sediment was deposited in the tainted pipes, forming a protec-
tive barrier over the lead solder.22
The waterworks purchased PAC in October 1992 from the General
Chemical Company of New Jersey. Although the chemical cost more
per pound than did alum, which the waterworks had used as a coagu-
lant since the first filtration plant was put into operation in 1939, com-
pany officials assured the city that PAC’s superior power would re-
quire that less be used, leading to a decreased cost in the long term.
Company officials, according to the business and purchasing manager
for the waterworks, estimated that savings of over $500,000 a year
could be gained from the use of PAC. The city could reduce the lead in
the water, and make money by doing so. Since the water department
was scheduled to increase the amount of monies transferred to the gen-
eral fund, this would be beneficial to the city overall. Although General
Chemical submitted the second-lowest bid for the chemical, rather than
the lowest as required by city directive, the waterworks argued that they
supplied a superior product, and the extra expense was justified.23
Coagulants are used to clean large and small particles from water.
After an initial dose of disinfectant (usually some form of chlorine), water
is piped to a large underground area called a mixing basin, where a floccu-
lating coagulant is added to the water. The chemical is distributed through-
out the water by means of large paddles called baffles, which ensure that
all portions of the water receive equal exposure to the coagulant. The wa-
ter then passes into a settling basin, where the coagulant has an opportu-
nity to surround particles in the water, joining them into increasing larger
clumps known as floc. After a sufficient time in the settling basin, the
water is pumped into the filtration chambers, where it passes through a
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fifty-one-inch deep sand and gravel filter. The floc is accumulated in a
gel-like mat on top of the filters and actually performs the most sensitive
part of the filtration process by the removal of the smallest particles. The
filtered water then passes to a clearwell, where additional chemicals are
added to protect its treated condition, and it is then rel as d into the distri-
bution system.24
Correct dosage of coagulant depends upon water conditions. Some-
what surprisingly, conditions when high turbidity, or cloudiness, of water
exists can often be best treated by lowering a coagulant dosage, at least
when alum is the coagulant in question. This is because the addition of
too much coagulant can result in the formation of large floc particles
that fail to capture all the microscopic biota in the water. Additionally,
these large particles result in clogged filters, which must be washed
more often, preventing the formation of a substantial mat on top of the
filter, thus allowing smaller particles to pass through. Proper dosage is
determined by a method called a jar test, in which water samples are
placed into individual jars, and different levels of coagulant are added
to each jar. A mixing machine mimics the agitation and filtration pro-
cess, and the remaining water is examined for maximum clarity. Be-
cause of PAC’s propensity for forming smaller particles, the perfor-
mance of jar tests to examine for correct dosage with PAC is
problematic. Higher doses produce more particles, hence more turbid-
ity, which can lead an investigator to conclude that a lower dose would
be more appropriate.25
This coagulation process lowers the pH of the water in part be-
cause it removes organic molecules that contribute to the higher pH.26
This acidification is reduced in part because alum bonds with some
free ions in the water that contribute to acidification. In the case of
alum, this lowering accounts for about a .5 lowering in the pH scale,
from about 8.3 to 7.8, meaning that the acidity of the water is increased
about 260 percent.27 PAC, because it is a polymer, bonds with fewer
free radicals in the water and thus lowers the pH by about 1.0 on the
scale, to 7.3, for about a 1000 percent increase in acidity. Since lead is
leached from solder when water has a pH higher than 7.6, the use of
PAC should help, in theory, to prevent this occurring.
As mentioned above, Minneapolis had used PAC for its water treat-
ment beginning in 1991. Special seminars were held for chemists there to
help them determine proper dosing of the chemical, and a pilot program
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was installed to make sure that the chemical met the needs of the sys-
tem.28 Milwaukee’s use of PAC began in autumn, a time of year when
water conditions in Lake Michigan tend to be excellent. The cold tem-
peratures inhibit the growth of algae, bacteria, and other waterborne
particles, which results in a lowered demand for all treatment chemi-
cals. During these months, the use of PAC proved to be quite efficient,
as dosages would remain constant for days at a time. Years of experi-
ence with alum had convinced chemists that jar tests were the correct
method for determining coagulant dosage, and when water conditions
began to decline in quality with the spring runoff in March, this was the
method resorted to.
Treated water must meet federal, state, and local utility standards.
At the time in question, the federal government, through the auspices
of the EPA, regulated levels of seventy-four minerals and chemical
residues in drinking water. It also determined appropriate standards on
purity, clarity, taste, and odor and had the power to enforce these regu-
lations through the use of fines and the authority to shut down systems
that violated these standards consistently. As long as these standards
were met, the method was not regulated. Hence New York City, receiv-
ing its water from the reservoirs of upstate New York, did not have to
filter its water, and neither did Seattle. As long as these cities could
meet federal standards, they were off the hook.
At the state level, the DNR maintained authority over water qual-
ity with standards over 117 minerals and chemicals, and its purity quali-
fications were stricter than those of the federal government. At the lo-
cal level, the Milwaukee Water Works had internal standards that
required notification of management when quality decreased below
certain levels. These management officials were then to determine and,
if possible, correct the situation causing the adverse conditions. Local
standards were more stringent than those at either the state or national
level, and Milwaukee took pride in the fact that these levels had very
rarely been exceeded in the life of the waterworks filtration plants.
An example of these more stringent standards is in the area of tur-
bidity. The EPA required that turbidity in treated water not exceed a
daily average of five NTUs for more than two days, with a monthly
average not to exceed one NTU.29 The DNR required daily averages
below three NTU, with individual test levels not to exceed five NTUs.30
City standards required that management be notified when treated wa-
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ter exceeded one NTU, and that the DNR be notified when levels over
one NTU persisted for longer than a day. NTU readings were taken on
an hourly basis31 from raw, chlorinated, settled, filtered, and finished
water. Often potential problems with filtered and finished water clarity
could be forestalled by high readings in settled water, leading the ana-
lyst to add more coagulant to decrease high turbidity levels. Water al-
ready passed through the settling process could be clarified by allow-
ing a longer filtration time, and any finished water that exceeded hourly
levels could be mixed with other finished water of lower turbidity to
lower its cloudiness. Fifty years of treatment experience had led the
water department to conclude that these methods were satisfactory for
dealing with all possible conditions that Milwaukee’s treatment plants
might experience. If the federal and state governments maintained that
their standards would ensure the safety of water consumers, then main-
taining even stricter standards should fully protect both the water sup-
ply and the health of the water drinkers.
This plan worked because it was assumed that standard treatment
eliminated all pathogens from water. Chlorine killed all organic par-
ticles, coagulation clumped the dead particles together, and filtration
removed the clumps. The introduction of PAC to Milwaukee water changed
the decades-old equation because its differential coagulation rate was not
readily adaptable to spring runoff conditions in Lake Michigan.
The Milwaukee Water Works operates two filtration plants. The
northern plant, the Linnwood Water Treatment Facility, is located about
two miles north of the city harbor, and its intake extends outward into
Lake Michigan to a distance of slightly over one mile at a depth of
sixty-four feet. This depth prevents the water being taken into the plant
from being greatly affected by surface turbulence conditions and also
helps provide cooler water during the months when the surface waters
are heated by the sunshine to unpalatable levels. This facility has a
capacity of producing 290 MGD and supplies the northern and western
half of the service area in Milwaukee county as well as the downtown
business district. The southern plant, the Howard Filtration Facility, is
located two-and-a-half miles in from the lake on the south side of the city.
Water is provided from the Texas Avenue pumping station, located on the
lakeshore directly to the east of the filtration facility. The Texas Avenue
intake extends 7,600 feet into the lake but is only 30 feet below the surface
of the water, due to the shallowness of Lake Michigan at that point. The
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intake is also situated within the plume formed by the disposal flowage
from the sewerage treatment plant located to the north of the Howard
Filtration Facility. Because of the increased pathogenic levels and the
increased turbidities from the shallowness of the water, Howard has,
since its inception, had to deal with water of a lesser quality than the
north-side facility. Although raw water facilities rarely exceed ten NTUs
at Linnwood, even during the most severe runoff or storm conditions,
Howard has reported NTUs in excess of one hundred on more than one
occasion.32 Howard supplies Milwaukee’s south side, as well as
Greenfield, West Allis, and portions of other south-side suburbs.33
This water quality problem has led to higher chemical dosages for
all chemicals at Howard and the inclusion of some chemicals in the
treatment process that are not used at the northern plant. Tables 5 and 6
show the chemical doses used per million gallons of treated water at
each facility from 1987 to 1993.
Chemical 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Fluoride 8.06 7.91 7.55 7.76 7.98 8.5
Alum 91.51 103.38 109.47 104.82 115.37 129.87
Ammonia 2.37 2.26 2.28 2.28 2.26 3.3
Carbon 4.09 8.36 12.98 15.41 16.19 20.81
Chlorine 16.12 16.55 16.9 17.39 17.29 20.63
PAC — — — — 40.72 41.65
KMnO30 0.43 0.66 0.98 0.81 1.57 0.41
Table 5: Chemical Dosages in Pounds per Million Gallons of Treated Water
at the Howard Plant, 1988–93
Chemical 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Fluoride 9.46 7.87 7.8 7.44 8.22 6.83
Alum 97.12 93.8 100.73 100.19 64.54 106.26
Ammonia 1.82 2.33 2.48 2.53 2.17 2.31
Carbon 1.06 3.3 3.57 2.45 3.12 5.53
Chlorine 14.4 16.02 16.62 15.44 16.14 15.65
PAC — — — — 10.26 8.64
Table 6: Chemical Dosages in Pounds per Million Gallons of Treated Water
at the Linnwood Facility, 1988–93. Source: Milwaukee Water Department
Annual Reports, 1988–93
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During the late 1980s and until the cryptosporidium episode, po-
tassium permanganate was added at the Howard facility to enhance the
disinfecting properties of chlorine treatment and to assist in taste and
odor control. At other times phosphoric acid was added to lower the
pH of the raw water to improve disinfection. The addition of perman-
ganate results in a slightly yellowish tinge to the water that is rarely
noticeable unless one is looking for it.34 Although Howard’s water can
be distinguished from Linnwood’s during summer months by the ex-
perienced water taster, few persons prior to 1993 had any indication
that the two plants experienced such different water quality conditions.
On March 23–24, 1993, temperatures rose rapidly, causing the lin-
gering snowbanks in southeastern Wisconsin to melt. As water ran into
the sewers, they filled, causing the sewage plant to overflow water into
the lake without treatment. This water came from snow that had re-
mained on the ground for as much as five weeks, accumulating in that
time animal wastes and air pollution residue. Lake overflows were not
uncommon at that time, for the sewerage commission resorted to them
on average fifty to sixty times a year.35 However, at the same time as
this was occurring, the melting of river ice in the Milwaukee, Menomi-
nee, and Kinnickinnic river basins led to increased runoff from these
sources. These river basins pass through many farming communities,
where animal wastes had been accumulating over the winter months.
Some of these wastes may have been swept into the rivers and carried
into the harbor, although most were probably deposited in the river
beds. On the afternoon of March 24, strong easterly winds arose, blow-
ing the Lake Michigan waters back toward the shore and causing a
roiling up of the lake surface waters. These three circumstances com-
bined to raise turbidity levels sharply in a matter of a few hours.
As levels rose, chemists at the Howard facility, inexperienced with
working with PAC under adverse water conditions, performed jar tests
to figure proper coagulant dosage. As indicated above, when using alum,
jar tests can indicate that dosages should be cut in order to deal with
high turbidity levels rather than raised. When jar tests showed more
cloudiness with higher levels of PAC (because of the smaller floc par-
ticles), the chemists cut the dosage accordingly. Because PAC is not
alum, however, the dosage failed to provide sufficient coagulation to
remove the particles, and the turbidity of the treated water on March
26 rose toward one NTU.36 Although these levels did not exceed any
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standards, the Howard Avenue plant superintendent, A. J. Henry, noti-
fied the waterworks superintendent about the problem. Cooks notified
the DNR on March 27 when the turbidity exceeded one NTU. Cooks,
along with Henry and assistant waterworks superintendent James
Wegner, stepped in to rectify the problem by shutting off the potassium
permanganate and using the emergency chlorine feeders to increase
the dose of disinfectant. Between March 29 and April 1, several changes
in PAC dosage were attempted, none of which significantly improved
the turbidity of the finished water. On April 2 it was determined that the
best course of action was to abandon the use of PAC and return to
alum. Within eight hours after alum dosing began, turbidity in the fin-
ished water returned to levels of 0.1 NTU. During this time period,
bacteriological testing indicated that complete disinfection had occurred
and that no bacteria were present in the finished water.37
However, people began to notice the problem. Beginning on March
25, calls to the Howard facility increased. Consumers had noticed the in-
creased cloudiness in the water and for the first time had noticed the yel-
lowish tint caused by potassium permanganate, which had been added to
the water for several years. Many asked whether the water was safe to
drink and were assured by water plant officials that the water met all clean-
liness standards. The calls reached a peak of forty-five on March 29, when
the finished water reached a level of 1.7 NTUs38—noticeably cloudy, but
not exceeding state or federal standards. Several customers accused the
plant workers of lying or concealing water problems and demanded that
something be done.39
On April 6 both Milwaukee papers reported that diarrheal illness
was present at high levels in Milwaukee’s population. The reports stated
that the health department had called on the resources of the state hy-
giene laboratory and the Centers for Disease Control to help identify
the culprit. Health department officials suspected a rotovirus40 ather
than a bacterial source, as the diarrhea contained no blood, a common
sign of bacterial infection.41 The article mentioned that several schools
had been closed in the metropolitan area and that double the usual ab-
sentee rates were evident in suburban schools, including New Berlin,
Muskego, Pewaukee, and Waukesha.42 The article in the Sentinel also
quoted Kathy Fessler, the health department epidemiologist,43 a  say-
ing that the epidemic could not in any way be traced to the water sup-
ply, as had been rumored for several days.
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Given these reports, the mayor’s revelation that cryptosporidium
had been found in the fecal sample of an individual suffering gastrointes-
tinal distress and that the water supply might be the source of the infec-
tion was a surprise. Paul Nannis, the city health commissioner, an-
nounced a free testing program for cryptosporidium available at the
city’s downtown clinic; over the next week 803 samples were collected
and sent for analysis to the CDC, where they were analyzed for all
known vectors causing gastroenteritis. The CDC reported that crypto-
sporidium was the only organism found in the samples that was ca-
pable of causing the exhibited symptoms, appearing in 39 percent, or
313, of the samples.44
Cryptosporidium parvum is an organism about which more is un-
known than known. First identified as a source of infection in humans
in 1976, crypto, as it is commonly known, is an oocyst that is com-
monly present in the feces of cattle and sheep. It is a small organism,
commonly one to two microns in length, and has a hard outer shell that
is resistant to chlorine disinfection. Large doses of chlorine (using a 70
percent bleach solution), ammonia, ozone, and formaldehyde are known
to definitively kill crypto, but the use of formaldehyde and ozone in
large-scale water treatment plants is problematic. The 1976 research-
ers identified crypto as the culprit in an otherwise healthy three-year-
old child in a rural farming community in Tennessee. A second case,
this time in an adult college administrator, followed within two months,
and other cases were soon identified as well. In these cases, severe
gastrointestinal symptoms were in evidence, with no evidence of E.
coli or other bacterial sources. Over the next six years, the world litera-
ture documented many cases, primarily among immune-deficient indi-
viduals. In non-Western countries, these cases were often found in ru-
ral communities among the malnourished; cases in Western nations
with more adequate food stocks were found among those undergoing
immune-suppressant radiochemical treatment or in AIDS patients.
In 1982 the first multiple-victim outbreak among immunologically
healthy people occurred on a Colorado cattle ranch, where twelve cow-
hands had succumbed. CDC’s research indicated that the workers had
become infected from handling calves with crypto-induced diarrhea.45
Veterinary specialists subsequently developed tests to examine herds
for crypto in the early 1980s; surveys of Wisconsin veterinarians
servicing farms in the Milwaukee River basin indicate that standard
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cleanliness and hygiene procedures have made occurrences of crypto
almost nonexistent since 1990.46
Cryptosporidia had been involved in several cases of waterborne
illness. An outbreak in San Antonio, Texas, in 1984 was linked to con-
tamination of a well by sewage outflow.47 Drinking of untreated sur-
face water was responsible for an outbreak in New Mexico in 1986, as
well as in Sheffield, England, the same year.48 In January 1987, an
outbreak affected an estimated 13,000 individuals in a county of 64,900
residents in western Georgia—at that time the single largest water-
borne disease outbreak in the United States attributable to an identi-
fied agent.49
Not much is known about the effects of crypto on people either. Initial
theories and research proceeded on the premise that only one oocyst was
needed to produce gastroenteritis,50 but later studies have indicated that
the number is much higher.51 In most cases, crypto must be ingested to
cause infection. Theories that infection could be spread by airborne means
arose because some studies found the presence of oocysts in the respira-
tory tracts of those infected; further studies have indicated that this re-
sulted from internal spread of the oocyst rather than as the source of pri-
mary infection.52 In healthy individuals, infection results in moderate to
severe diarrhea, during which time cryptosporidium spores are shed through
excretion. The course of infection lasts from five to ten days, leaving the
victim moderately dehydrated, but not permanently impaired.53 In healthy
individuals, recovery is generally complete within two weeks, although
oocysts may continue to be shed for an additional month. Once recov-
ered, the individual is immune to a repeat infection. No test exists that can
determine prior infection; individuals who fail to succumb after exposure
to high levels of C. parvum are assumed to be immune due to prior
infection.54
In immunodeficient individuals, however, the story is quite differ-
ent. In these cases, C. parvum can cause severe dehydration, contribut-
ing to death. It has also been found in these cases to cause hepatitis,
gall bladder disease, pancreatitis, arthritis, and a variety of respiratory
problems. Low levels of disease resistance can lead to chronic crypto-
sporidiosis, with diarrhea and the presence of oocysts continuing for
several years. The lack of sufficient IgA in the individual’s bloodstream
prevents the formation of natural antibodies, and repeat infection can
occur upon exposure.55
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Crypto testing was not widely available. An Illinois laboratory was
hired to evaluate the water supply, and officials were somewhat disturbed
to discover that there would be no quick answers. The test procedure re-
quired a special filter that would take twenty-four-hour water samples; the
filter then had to be ground up, treated with chemicals, and examined
under a microscope for oocysts. This took another twenty-four hours.
Preliminary results would not be available for at least two days, and
the water would have to be pronounced free of crypto for at least forty-
eight hours before the boil order could be lifted. Public dissatisfaction
with the water department and with the city in general was likely to
remain high until the water was again pronounced safe to drink.
However confidence in the water supply and the city’s administra-
tion might suffer, the city would not be likely to suffer any loss of
customers. Water for drinking purposes uses less than 1 percent of all
supplies, most water going for industrial use that does not involve con-
tact with food or beverages. The main household use is for flushing
toilets and bathing. Since the waterworks enjoyed a monopoly, busi-
nesses and residents would still have to get water for these nondrinking
purposes from the city, even if they drank bottled water. The financial
blow to the city would come in the form of new equipment to prevent a
recurrence, and possible lawsuits over damages suffered.
On Saturday, April 10, the public was informed that crypto had
been found in treated water at both plants.56 Levels at the Howard Av-
enue plant were one organism in fifty liters of treated water and those
at the Linnwood plant were one in seventy-eight liters. While these
results were in one way alarming, because the organism should not
have been present at all in the treated water, they were in another way
reassuring. The levels indicated that the infestation was minimal and
that significant amounts of water would have to be consumed to allow
for the ingestion of even one oocyst. Because the number of oocysts
necessary to cause symptoms was unknown, at the time the test results
raised as many questions as they answered. They did not tell what the
levels of cryptosporidium had been in the water on March 27 through
29, the time at which the high turbidity levels indicated that something
was wrong at the Howard Avenue plant. The levels did not explain how
so many people had become ill if the rate of infestation was indeed as
low as the tests indicated; and finally, they did not identify the source
of the infestation.
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With the positive identification of crypto in the water, Mayor
Norquist ordered the temporary closing of the Howard Avenue facility
on April 9 until a complete examination of the plant could be performed.
The consulting company CH2MHILL was hired to perform the exami-
nation and make recommendations as to the best method of removing
any existing organisms and designing a system that would prevent fu-
ture occurrences.
By Tuesday morning, officials were able to report that the crisis
was almost over. If tests that day indicated that no organisms were
present in the water, the health department indicated, the boil order
would be lifted on Wednesday the fifteenth. Also on Tuesday, the mayor
issued a statement that he had given the waterworks ten days to devise
new standards to replace the previous ones; these would ensure that the
situation would not again arise. These included new lower limits on
turbidity; the introduction of regular tests for crypto; providing the city
lobbyist with a list of legislative reforms, both federal and state; sub-
mitting monthly water quality reports to the mayor and the common
council’s Public Safety Committee; establishing a water quality im-
provement team within the department; and improving customer com-
munication. Response to the orders was given by the superintendent of
public works, James Kaminski. There was, as yet, no public comment
from the water department or its superintendent.57
The main point of the mayor’s orders seemed to be that the high levels
of public dissatisfaction had arisen because of the water department’s un-
satisfactory response to complaints about color, taste, nd odor in the
water after March 27. Requiring the department to report to the mayor
and council was meant to reassure city residents that “their” officials
would oversee the department workers and ensure that such a calamity
would never again occur. However, the assumption of guilt on the part
of water department workers because of the complaint calls is specious
at best.
All but two of the ninety complaints58 complained about the color,
and three mentioned an odor in the water. No one mentioned becoming
ill. Despite the fact that color and odor are not accurate indications of
the presence of any organism, cryptosporidium in particular, in the water,
the mayor’s focus on this period indicates that he was more concerned
with political fallout from the event than with finding the source of the
outbreak.
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In fact, complaints about the water have little, if anything, to do with
water conditions. A statistical analysis of complaints at the Linnwood and
Howard facilities from 1993 through 1995 shows that the relationship be-
tween media reports about water conditions anywhere in the world and
complaint calls is a far greater explanation for those calls than are poor
water conditions. Even when poor conditions exist, the fact that a report is
delivered by the media regarding these conditions explains a large part of
the complaints. Even when calls are separated into those complaining of
illness versus more routine calls regarding dead-end mains or standing
water that needs to be identified, a greater correlation exists with media
reports than water conditions. Table 7 shows the R-squared values for
these regression analyses for each plant. The variables Linnwood and
Howard total calls and Linnwood and Howard sick calls refer to the
total number of calls received in the three-year period cited. “Effluent
days” refers to those days in which water distributed from the plant
was of less than pristine aesthetic appearance but still met health qual-
ity standards.
Linnwood Linnwood Howard Howard
Independent Var. Total Calls Sick Calls Total Calls Sick Calls
Media reports 0.818 0.119 0.35 0.275
Effluent days 0.172 0 0.005 0
Table 7: R-Squared Values for Bi-Variate Analysis of Total Complaints and
Sick Complaints for Linnwood and Howard Facilities, 1993–95. Source: Mil-
waukee Water Department Customer Complaint Logs, Howard Avenue and
Linnwood Treatment Facilities, 1993–95, Milwaukee Journal, Milwaukee
Sentinel, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 1993–95.59
This indicates that calls to either plant are far more dependent on me-
dia reports of waterborne illness, whether locally or elsewhere, than they
are upon actual water conditions. It is interesting to note that on days when
the water quality of each plant’s effluent was less than pristine, there were
no calls complaining of illness at either plant, although there were com-
plaints about the appearance or taste of the water. Media reports, however,
generated a much larger number of calls, both for sickness and for aesthet-
ics, even when the reports were about water quality issues in such coun-
tries as India.
The above table does not explain the difference in R-squared values
for complaints versus media reports for the Linnwood and Howard pl nts.
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If the data are combined, however, it becomes evident that the patterns
of complaint are very similar.
Variable Co-eff. Std. err Std. co-eff. T
Constant 45.88 2.983 0.001 15.381
Plant –34.58 –0.3.461 –0.664 –9.991
Media 1.692 0.504 0.504 7.581
Table 8: Multiple Regression Results for Linnwood and Howard Facilities:
Complaint Calls versus Media Reports (Where Plant Variable 0 = Howard
and 1 = Linnwood)
Dependant Variable: Plant N = 1942
Adj. Multiple R-Sq: 0.686 Standard Error of Est: 14.68
Mean Monthly Calls Linnwood = 11 Mean Monthly Calls Howard = 46
Table 8 shows the record of complaints received at each plant for
the years from 1993 to 1995; binomial regression on both plants reveals
that Howard has a much higher base of complaints than does Linnwood.
In any given month, the Linnwood plant can expect to receive eleven
calls, while the Howard plant will receive forty-six. This is to be expected,
as the Howard plant has a poorer quality water at the in ake and requires
more chemical treatment.
Multiple regression results reveal that every instance of a media
report will increase the number of calls at each plant by 1.7 calls per month.
In a month such as April 1993, there were over 100 media reports, gener-
ating many more calls to each plant. The multiple R-squared fo  this re-
gression is .692, indicating that 70 percent of the variance is accounted
for by the plant itself and media reports.60 Since the Howard plant re-
ceives about four times as many calls on a monthly basis than the
Linnwood plant, the effect of media reports on Howard total calls is less
than at Linnwood.
Norquist had been voted into office in 1988 after a lackluster race
against Martin Schreiber, a former governor. Norquist’s political expe-
rience included several terms as a state assemblyman for his south-side
district, during which much of his focus was on reducing nonpoint
source pollution in Wisconsin rivers. Once in office, his political agenda
in this area continued, with much invective being addressed toward the
governor and the DNR for their failure to adequately control this form of
water pollution. One of the first suggestions his office made regarding the
source of the cryptosporidium outbreak was runoff from upstream farms,
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the same culprits he had indicated were responsible for much of the
nonpoint pollution he had so decried.
The evening headline for Tuesday, April 14, also indicated that the
crisis was nearly ended. Significant in this report is the first public com-
ment from waterworks superintendent Jesse Cooks. Responding to a
reporter’s questions as to why the health department had not been noti-
fied about customer water complaints, the reporter indicated that Cooks
responded, “We were trying to correct a problem, no question about it. I
don’t think there was any contact with the Health Department.”
Cooks remembers the conversation somewhat differently. He re-
calls that when Neil Rosenberg, the Journal reporter, asked him why
the health department had not been notified, he responded that it was
not normal practice to involve other city departments with internal prob-
lems. He also recalls asking whether Rosenberg would expect the health
department to notify the water department for a measles outbreak.61
The Journal then performed a survey of 400 households, asking
whether any member of the household had been ill with diarrhea since
the middle of February. The results of that survey, sorted into week-
long time periods, revealed that 59 percent of the population surveyed
reported at least one family member ill during the week of April 1–8.
The Journal extrapolated this figure to the population of the metropoli-
tan area, and estimated that between 165,000 and 211,000 of the popu-
lation had become ill from cryptosporidium. In a companion article,
the Journal reported that the immediate source of the outbreak was the
improper cleaning of filters at the south-side filtration plant.
Figure 1. Diarrheal Illness, February–April 1993.
Chart Source: Milwaukee Journal, Thursday, April 15, 1993. Error = 5%
The Journal’s data, as displayed above, is somewhat problematic.
First, there is no indication as to whether all those surveyed were within
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the water service district of the waterworks. Although some who lived
outside the district may have been thought to contract cryptosporidiosis
from drinking water at their places of employment, presumably within
the service district, there is no control for this. Secondly, and perhaps
more importantly, what caused all the people to become ill before the
fourth week of March? If, as the mayor suggested, the whole problem
had begun on March 27, when turbid water entered the Howard Av-
enue plant, and that water was released the twenty-eighth, then, using
the standard infection delay of seven to ten days,62 no one could have
become ill prior to April 2, the date when both plants switched back to
alum. The survey data, however, indicates that there was a 42 percent
positive response in the last week in March, when crypto, according to
the mayor’s reasoning, could not have been the culprit. While the health
department’s samples as analyzed by the CDC showed no other source
of infection, viral sources affecting the population in February or March
would not show positive for virus when analyzed in April. The samples
taken in April were from those sick in April. Something was making
people ill in February and March—if it was crypto, then the turbidity
problems were not an indication of oocyst presence, and correcting the
treatment process for turbidity control would not stop further outbreaks.
If the earlier disease was not crypto, then the actual maximum effect
of crypto could only be the difference between the number of house-
holds affected after the outbreak occurred on March 27 (plus time for
infection to occur) and the peak of the earlier rates. In other words, 59
percent minus 42 percent, or 17 percent of the households. This gives
a much smaller figure for possible cryptosporidiosis, of between 40,000
and 60,000.
The question of improperly washed filters was also a problem. Fil-
ters are generally washed when the rate at which water flows through
them reaches a certain limit. The filters are then removed from opera-
tion, with no further settled water from the sedimentation basins being
introduced. The level of the water in the filters is then allowed to de-
crease until it is about one inch above the surface of the gelatinous mat
on the filter’s surface, at which point filtration is shut off. Treated wa-
ter from the clearwell is then forced upward (backwashed) through the
bed, removing the mat and any particles which might have passed
through the mat into the top layer of the bed. The water that is used for
the filter wash is diverted into gutters abutting the bed and sent to the
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raw water intake, where it reenters the treatment stream. The wash
process is ended when the water coming off the bed appears clear to
the operator performing the wash. The bed is allowed to settle for two
hours, water from the sedimentation basins is reintroduced, and filter-
ing is restarted.63 Because it is the mat that forms on top of the filter bed
that performs the removal of the smallest particles, washing a bed too
frequently will allow more small particles, rather than fewer, to pass
through the filters into the clearwell. Therefore, gauging the proper
time for bed washing is a balancing act between efficiency of filtration
rate, or time, and treated water turbidity, or quality. Most large water
utilities, including Milwaukee’s, severely discipline employees who
wash beds at inappropriate times, as this wastes water and degrades
quality. Milwaukee in 1993 adhered to all recommended standards re-
garding the timing of bed washing;64 the report of improper procedure
came not from the DNR office of water operations, but from Jeff Davis,
an epidemiologist. His argument to this effect would be presented dur-
ing the hearings held by the common council’s Water Crisis Fact Finding
Committee.
On Wednesday, April 15, both papers and the local television sta-
tions announced that the crisis was over. The water, they announced,
was safe to drink unboiled, and the steps that had been taken to exam-
ine the water for crypto would continue in order to prevent a second
occurrence. It was further announced that the common council’s hear-
ings on the water crisis would commence on April 26.65 This action
was apparently insufficient for one alderman. Feisty Bob Anderson, a
south-side council member who represented the area in which the highest
percentage of confirmed crypto cases was reported, demanded that all
employees of the water department be fired, with the loss of all pension
and benefits.66 Anderson’s remarks, while widely reported, received little
support, despite continued anger on the part of the infected. Anderson’s
outburst also led to his exclusion from the common council’s commit-
tee, as the chair, John Kalwitz, strove for an unbiased attitude among
the committee members.
In the eleven-day interval between the end of the crisis and the
beginning of hearings, media attention began to focus on other com-
munities’ water systems. Reports from Door County, about ninety miles
to the north of Milwaukee, revealed that several small town systems
there had also found evidence of cryptosporidium in their systems, in
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this case accompanied by elevated bacteria counts. Boil orders were
imposed in Door County, seriously damaging the spring tourist influx.
Bottled water had to be imported from Minnesota and Iowa, as sales in
the Milwaukee area continued to overwhelm the available local sup-
ply, despite the lifting of the boil order there. By the last week of April,
both local papers reported that more than 50 percent of individuals
surveyed still distrusted the Milwaukee Water Works’ supply.67
The hearings of the Water Crisis Fact Finding Committee began
with heavy media coverage. They were carried on the local govern-
ment channel on cable, and all three major local television stations sent
reporters and camera teams to record testimony and comment. A major
item carried on all three channels was a woman from the south side
holding up a jar of brown turbid water and announcing that it had come
from her tap. The powerful image spurred more invective from Ander-
son as he renewed his call for punitive action against the water depart-
ment.68 The committee heard testimony from individual residents, from
water department employees of the Howard Avenue plant, and from
outside experts, including consultants and public health officials. One
such official was Jeffrey Davis, epidemiologist from the Wisconsin
Department of Public Health.69
Davis speculated that returning the wash water to the treatment
process was the source of the in-plant spread of crypto. Since the filtra-
tion process removed, by most estimates,70 91 percent to 94 percent of
the oocysts, these organisms would thus be present in the wash water.
Returning them to the treatment process would then introduce a con-
centrated source of oocysts, which would raise the number present.
Thus the next round of filtration would remove 91 percent to 94 per-
cent of this larger number, allowing more organisms to pass through
the filters. Davis recommended that the wash water be discarded by
being sent to the sewerage plant and recommended more frequent bed
washing.71
Davis’s theory neglected two important points about the water treat-
ment process. Firstly, although the number of oocysts in the wash wa-
ter would be higher, the presence of coagulant already in the water
would mean that these organisms would be trapped in larger particles
of flocculant, raising, rather than lowering, the amount removed by
filtration. Secondly, more frequent bed washing would allow any or-
ganisms not so trapped to pass through the bed more easily because the
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gelatinous mat would have less time to form and thus would perform
less efficiently. Because C. parvum is a very small organism, it would
be much more likely to pass through a nongelled bed than a larger
particle. The lack of response on the part of the water department on
these two points would lead to the adoption of a treatment policy that
actually increased the possibility of another outbreak rather than re-
ducing it.72 Davis also ignored the fact that without a source for the
infection, adding wash water that, in his opinion, contained crypto to
the sewers would mean that it would be added to the sewage plume
from which the Howard plant obtained its supply.
Other testimony came from nationally known epidemiologist Joan
Rose. Rose testified that cryptosporidium affected approximately 85
percent of all surface waters in the United States and was effectively
reduced in filtered water supplies by about 91 percent to 94 percent.
She cited examples of several large cities without filtered supplies, in-
cluding New York City, Seattle, St. Louis, and Houston, to illustrate
the potential for even larger-scale outbreaks. Rose also indicated that
in these cities, as well as in cities where filtration plants existed, out-
breaks of cryptosporidium had probably occurred and not been recog-
nized as such. In fact, given the endemic existence of ryptosporidium in
most water supplies, many individuals had been exposed to the oocyst,
suffered through the requisite diarrheal infection, and recovered, which
rendered them immune to further infection. Milwaukee’s case was unique
in that cryptosporidium was not endemic in its water supply, allowing
a more marked example of infection. She further indicated that while
the USEPA had been considering adding cryptosporidium to the list of
infectious agents to be tested for, budget constraints under the Reagan
and Bush administration had made this nonviable.73
Additional testimony along the same lines came from EPA engi-
neer Kim Fox. Fox made a revelation which considerably startled the
committee, as well as many of those in attendance, when he revealed
that no standards governing bottled water existed. He reported that the
EPA had found that much bottled water was simply tap water poured
into containers; the water that had been supplied by the city of
Sheyboygan, Wisconsin, during the crisis had, in fact, tested positive
for cryptosporidium.74
Another testifier was Ken Miller, vice president for municipal water
management for the consulting firm CH2M Hill. Miller recommended
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that the city install an ozone purification system in both treatment plants
as the only effective means of preventing future outbreaks. Miller cited
the recently built ozone facility in Lake County, Illinois, and a test
project plant in Los Angeles as examples of plants where such a system
had been introduced.75 However, there had never been an instance where
an existing plant had been retrofitted for ozone purification. Interest-
ingly, no one was asked to provide testimony against Miller’s recom-
mendations, although he was speaking from the standpoint of a busi-
nessman representing a company that produced ozone purification
products.
The final testimony came from water department officials and
employees. While plant operations staff detailed the steps they had taken
to counteract the adverse water conditions in the last week of March,
they admitted that unfamiliarity with the quirks of operating with a
new chemical may have adversely affected water quality. These opera-
tions employees emphasized that they had taken all established and
necessary steps to deal with the crisis and had reported their difficul-
ties to management officials. When Jesse Cooks testified, he empha-
sized that the department was aware of the crisis, but since his tenure in
office had begun only in January, he was not completely familiar with
the ramifications of his position. He also stated that the decision to use
PAC had been made by the previous superintendent, Fritz Wengler, at
the recommendation of the mayor’s office, and that he was not respon-
sible for any difficulties that arose as a result. The media chose Cooks’s
testimony to display on its newscasts, portraying a department whose
superintendent was more interested in protecting himself than in ac-
cepting responsibility for and resolving the crisis.
An interesting area of testimony came from three officials from
the state department of natural resources. These individuals—Ronald
Kasmierczak, the assistant director of environmental protection; Sharon
Schaver, the district hydrologist; and Elizabeth Spaeth-Werner, an en-
vironmental engineer—pointed out that given Milwaukee’s usual dearth
of crypto, a possible site of infection might be pinpointed, rather than
nonpoint source pollution. Tests performed by the DNR in the weeks
immediately after the crisis revealed that little or no crypto was found in
the surface waters leading to the watershed which formed Milwaukee’s
harbor, a result which indicated that this was not a likely source of
infection, contrary to what the mayor had suggested. Examination of
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sewerage outflow, however, did indicate positive presence of the oo-
cyst, indicating that the source was either spores still entering the sys-
tem from infected individuals or from a site located within Milwaukee
itself. Suspicion fell on the Peck Meat Packing Plant, a slaughtering
and rendering facility located on the banks of the Menominee River.
Peck had previously come under attack from both the city and the DNR
for air pollution violations. The plant’s operations produced a rancid,
fetid odor that was most marked during the hot days of July and Au-
gust, rendering breathing in the downtown area difficult. Peck coun-
tered that they had maintained all necessary pollution standards and
were not the source of the infection.76
Conspicuous in their absence from the hearings were the local AIDS
support groups. The chair of one group, the Milwaukee AIDS Research
Council, had announced on April 9 that AIDS patients in the Milwau-
kee area had been suffering from crypto for several months and had
been shedding spores during the intervening time period. This infor-
mation had been reported to the health department (a contention which
the health department denied)77; the AIDS groups contended that this
was evidence that crypto had been present in the water supply prior to
the last week of March. Additional information regarding this conten-
tion was never made available to the health department or the media,
and it is not known whether the allegedly infected individuals were
infected in Milwaukee or in some other city. Although the vast major-
ity of the deaths attributable in part to the outbreak were AIDS patients,
further information detailing the patient’s cases and medical histories
was not forthcoming to the health department.
The committee spent surprisingly little time discussing solutions
to the problem and what could be done to prevent it. Davis had recom-
mended that the wash water be sent to the sewers rather than recycled,
and Miller had recommended ozonization. The city engineer recom-
mended that the intake for the Howard plant be extended an additional
three-quarters of a mile into Lake Michigan, where it would draw wa-
ter from beyond the sewage plant’s outflow and in an area where the
water was deeper. The water department recommended that the filter
beds be replaced with new filtering material and that improved sam-
pling techniques be installed that would trigger alarms if particle counts
in the one to two micron range reached levels considered potentially
hazardous. The relative costs for the recommendations varied. The
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ending of wash water recycling would cost about $15,000 per year in
additional sewage bills, replacing the filters would cost about $3 mil-
lion, extending the intake for Howard would cost about $15 million,
and an ozone plant would cost between $50 and 70 million. The com-
mittee decided to adopt all of the recommendations, to be funded by
bonds repaid through increases in the water bills, and ordered that all
the improvements be installed simultaneously, without any provision
to see whether the less costly solutions might eliminate the problem.
The committee’s report was released in June 1993. It also recom-
mended a number of changes in the operation of the water department,
including the establishment of a total quality improvement division
and a total quality management supervisor to facilitate communication
and training within the department. It further recommended the imple-
mentation of ozone treatment at both facilities, as well as increased
monitoring of turbidity conditions, improvements in chemical dosing
equipment, and updated systems of plant operations monitoring. The
estimated cost for these improvements was $90 million.78 On the ques-
tion of fault, the committee determined that no employees of the water
department were responsible for the outbreak.
The committee made two final recommendations. The first was
that the city, along with the state and other interested parties, lobby the
federal government to establish standards listing cryptosporidiosis as a
nationally reportable disease under the auspices of the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and, further, that the USEPA establish new standards re-
garding the control of waterborne particles of one to two microns.79
The final recommendation was that the city develop an official emer-
gency plan that would define what constituted an emergency and, in
the event of one occurring, direct appropriate media release of infor-
mation. This emergency plan was to be placed under the auspices of
the common council, rather than the mayor, and was officially to per-
mit the dissemination of “timely and accurate” information to the council
and the public.80
The finding by the committee that no water department officials or
employees were at fault was not accepted happily by many victims and
their families. A Chicago law firm announced that it was instituting a
class action lawsuit against the city for damages in the crypto crisis and
advertised heavily for class action members.81 Other firms likely to
profit from the episode were makers of water filters and water soften-
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ers and purveyors of bottled water. Ads for filters purporting to remove
crypto spores from water appeared as early as April 10, 1993; despite
warnings by the state consumer protection agency that no filters were
capable of performing such a task, sales were high. Many individuals
purchased water softening units, despite the fact that water softeners
do nothing to remove or reduce oocysts from water. Home bottled wa-
ter systems received the greatest boost, as consumers wary of the tap
water rushed to purchase “reliable supplies.”
The question of water quality and safety became a Midwestern
issue in May 1993. The heavy rains that had brought on the conditions
of turbidity in Milwaukee continued unabated across the upper Mid-
west and the Mississippi River basin, leading to flooding of the river.
As the flood waters moved south, town after town lost its riverside
water treatment facility, leading to the ironic situation of Milwaukee
having to supply bottled water to the very communities that had earlier
supplied it with water. In many cases the damage to riverside plants was so
severe that residents in those communities were without water supply for
over a month, as heavy silt and mud had to be removed from pumps and
filter beds, and the filter beds had to be rebuilt with fresh sand and gravel.82
When the sewage treatment plant at St. Louis was overwhelmed by the
flood, CDC officials feared outbreaks of typhoid and cholera from raw
sewage entering floodwater and recommended that all persons located
south of St. Louis and receiving water from the river undergo typhoid and
cholera vaccination. Treatment plants in Arkansas, Mississippi, and
Louisiana doubled their levels of disinfectant in the water treatment
process to prevent the occurrence of these diseases.83
Western Wisconsin was severely affected by the flooding, although
it received little national media exposure. Given the spring episode in
Milwaukee, the DNR moved quickly to institute testing and safety
measures for treatment plants in the western half of the state and estab-
lished a statewide testing program for cryptosporidium and giardia in
November. The results of the two-year study, published in 1995, con-
cluded that both organisms were present in all areas of the state, in all
types of surface waters. This contradicted the statements of Joan Rose
at the common council hearings that crypto was not normally present
in Milwaukee surface water. Neither organism was found to be statisti-
cally associated with any particular type of land use, such as agriculture,
but both appeared more frequently in conditions of spring runoff.84 While
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avoiding any conclusions regarding the source or cause of the Milwau-
kee outbreak, the report does state that even the highest levels of either
organism found in Wisconsin are below the average for other states. It
further states that there is no statistical relation between turbidity of
water samples and the presence of cryptosporidium or giardia.85
A major issue that neither the city nor the state report considered
was what effect the opening of the Milwaukee River dam at North
Avenue might have had on the episode. Since 1991 Citizens for a Bet-
ter Environment, the group headed by Susan Mudd, had urged that the
North Avenue dam on the Milwaukee River be opened to allow the
lower reaches of the river to return to a more natural state. The dam
was opened on November 1, 1992, and water levels above (north of)
the dam promptly dropped, providing a wide bank that could be used
by hikers and fishers.86 Below the dam, the water flowed more quickly,
and DNR reports indicated that the water quality had been improved
because of the increased scouring action of the water on the river bed.
Concerns over possible chemical and biological contamination of the
water from the release of long-buried residues in the river bed were
ignored by both city and local officials.
By 1995 the crypto episode had been largely forgotten. It was still
possible to buy souvenir T-shirts at the downtown mall that recalled
crypto, including “Milwaukee—Don’t Drink the Water!” and “Beer
Town—for good reason,” but the vendors revealed that they were
marked 70 percent off and sold only infrequently. Despite lowered con-
fidence in city government, cited by media and official polls, support
for the mayor continued high, and he easily won reelection in 1996.
Renovations continued at both water plants, with new positions and
facilities being established to increase monitoring of the water and to
ensure early warning of any possible infestations. However, perma-
nent damage had been done to the reputation of the water department.
The mayor and common council had no choice but to convene the
hearings in order to investigate the outbreak. Failure to have done so
would have caused even more harm to the reputation of the city, de-
spite the fact that consumers literally had no choice of source for water
for nondrinking purposes. If the city wished to continue its operation of
the waterworks as a municipal monopoly, it had to appear to be doing
something to discover the source of the problem and to prevent its
recurrence.
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Unlike other businesses, such as automobiles, computers, or even
other utilities, alternatives to water supply are not available except for
bottled supplies for drinking purposes. The cost of bottled water (about
$1.32 per gallon average in three local supermarkets in 1995) made its
use for cooking, bathing, or other purposes prohibitive. However, the
image of Milwaukee as a city with unclean water might seriously af-
fect the decision of existing and potential manufacturers to locate in
the Milwaukee area. It is perhaps interesting to note that sales of beer
from companies headquartered in Milwaukee, even when the beer was
brewed elsewhere, continued to decline after 1993, leading in 1998 to
the closure of the Pabst brewery. Since the mayor and council wanted
to improve the city’s commercial and industrial base, any negative im-
ages had to be addressed as rapidly as possible.
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CHAPTER 6
A CITY  IS NOT A BUSINESS
“The policy analysis paradigm specifies
work for a single client. That client may be
an embodiment of the public interest, like a
mayor taking a particularly heroic stand on
an issue seen as vital to city residents. Or the
client might hold a very personal agenda,
like re-election, that could well work in
opposition to the public interest.”—Carl V.
Patton and David S. Sawicki, Basic Meth-
ods of Policy Analysis and Planning
The previous narrative shows that, throughout its operation, the op-
erations of the Milwaukee Water Works have been greatly affected by
politics. This meant that the department consistently suffered from a
lack of a definitive policy of governmental service provision. At a time
when East Coast cities had been providing water for half a century and
Midwestern cities had begun to offer such service as a necessary com-
ponent of urban life, Milwaukee was still struggling with balancing
the desires of its citizens, the opinions of different political parties
regarding the best method for service provision, and the best means of
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providing those services. The fragmented political system led to a frag-
mented supply of public services.
The pattern of disunity that persisted in Milwaukee after the join-
ing of the three original settlements was continued in the largely au-
tonomous authority of the individual ward officials. Each ward was
responsible for individual improvements, originally only at the request
of the property holders who would benefit by those improvements, and
ward councilors, supervisors, and aldermen considered the graft that
could be gained from contracting out those improvements to be an un-
official perquisite of office holding. Despite the scandals that resulted
from kickbacks and poorly done work, the pattern of autonomy was so
entrenched in Milwaukee’s governmental duties that it took almost a
decade before substantial improvements were made in the provision of
city services. Milwaukee residents reveled in the tradition of having
politicians who could get things done (and with annual elections, those
who did not get things done would soon be out of a job) and felt de-
prived of a voice in the political arena when the move toward citywide
service provision came about. Residents who had previously been able
to get streets paved, get sewers laid, or see parks developed in their
neighborhoods now had to see their local desires prioritized on a
citywide basis, and lack of funding could mean that one neighborhood’s
pet project was sidetracked while some less important (at least in the
eyes of the first neighborhood) area received funding for its own im-
provement. As the change in financing of services from Einhorn’s “sub-
scription service” to the special assessment and later to the property
tax developed, not only did the first neighborhood have to see its projects
delayed in favor of another but it had to help pay for it as well.
Another major factor influencing water supply in Milwaukee was
the strong tradition of democratic participation. One of the reasons why
there was so much reluctance to change the system of individual ward
autonomy was because of the belief that such a system gave more rec-
ognition to individuals and interest groups in all areas of city govern-
ment. The power of groups such as the chamber of commerce, labor
organizations, and citizen action committees to influence debate and
media discussion, and the tradition of including these groups’ opinions
in the decision-making  process, meant that it was always took more
time and compromise in Milwaukee to get something done. Milwaukee’s
decision to use a municipally owned waterworks exacerbated many of
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these disputes. Because participation in the process of democracy was
so revered in Milwaukee and because political expediency required
maintaining the favor of interest groups, city officials were constantly
aware of the realm of perception in determining what course of action
should be taken regarding the provision of, and funding for, services.
The desires of groups with opposing viewpoints had to be examined in
connection with those groups’ voting power. Decisions expressed by a
majority could be subordinated with the realization that a minority view-
point might represent a more viable source of political support. These
groups arose in part because of the need for extra-neighborhood action
to regain the power that had before been in the hands of individual
wards. These groups often supported specific candidates for office,
and their squabbling was mirrored by the squabbling of “their” repre-
sentatives. Further, groups which had power bases in more than one
ward could threaten aldermen and councilmen that they might be re-
moved in the next election if the groups’ agendas were not met. Few
groups agreed on anything; the “right answer” to the city engineer,
such as the need for a water filtration plant, might be the wrong answer
to the chamber of commerce, which would see elevated taxes and wa-
ter rates not worth the “minor” problem of annual typhoid cases. How-
ever altruistic one’s motives might be, there was likely to be a group
that saw anyone else’s proposals as anathema, making change a pro-
cess of convincing not only the politicians but everyone else as well.
Since a supermajority of votes was necessary in the common council
for any expenditures, different interests had to be balanced and com-
promised upon, a process which took time.
It was largely as a result of this influence that initial implementa-
tion of the waterworks and, later, the construction of the water filtra-
tion plant were delayed. Although similar delays in service provision
were noticed in Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Chicago, these
cities experienced delay because of their inability to choose between
private purveyors of water supply.1 Once these cities accepted the idea
that water supply should be a public municipal service rather than a
private one, the cooperation between governments and citizens allowed
for rapid implementation of water supply. New York’s involved history
in many ways replicates that of Milwaukee, as citizens and govern-
ment argued over the need for water supply and the necessity of fund-
ing it. In New York’s case, it would take cooperation between some
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groups and some city administrations (which changed often) and, even-
tually, the state government to implement a water system.
These patterns did not disappear in Milwaukee with the Civil War.
Despite the insistence of the state legislature that the Board of Water
Commissioners be composed of private citizens, the idea remained that
service provision should ultimately provide financial benefit if not to
the officials, at least to the city. Even the board was not immune to
using its position for financial gain, as witnessed by the favoritism in
bid awarding or by Guido Pfister’s magnanimous reward for acting as
board secretary. Although the idea of getting something extra for one’s
work was not unknown in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and
while graft and shoddy work had characterized Milwaukee’s earlier
history, the whole point of a nonpolitical board was to eliminate this.
The appointment of businessmen to the board, however, created
another pattern. As noted in chapter 2, the pattern of distribution sup-
ply indicates that areas with heavy concentrations of industry, particu-
larly the businesses of the board members, were watered first. Supply-
ing large-scale customers first makes sense from a business standpoint;
after all, the money generated from these large consumers would gen-
erate funds that would hasten the installation of mains in residential
areas and retire the bonds floated for construction of the waterworks
itself. The Milwaukee Water Works has always supplied a larger amount
of its water to business customers than to residential ones; those large
industrial customers received, and still do receive, a price subsidy for
their usage. Meter reading was not a major expense in the years prior to
the turn of the century, but quantity issues—such as the large-scale use
by industry making a new intake a necessity by 1892—prevented the
supply of water to residential customers prior to that time. However,
by establishing this pattern from the beginning, the Board of Water
Commissioners, perhaps unwittingly, set up the proprietary attitude that
would later characterize the operations of the waterworks. Clearly the
Board of Water Commissioners and its successor, the Board of Public
Works, thought water supply was to be for business’s benefit first, and
that residential requirements could be subordinated to the profit mo-
tive. Since appointments to the Board of Public Works Commissioners
that followed were in the control of the mayor, and only indirectly sub-
ject to the control of the electorate, pleasing the mayor and council by
continuing to generate revenue would be firmly established even be-
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fore the waterworks generated a profit in 1893. While the Board of
Public Works’ 1893 annual report would caution that these surpluses
should be used to extend supply in unwatered areas and to maintain a
reserve for maintenance and repair, the political benefits of extra rev-
enue were too great for city officials to change the pattern of ignoring
residential concerns, especially in an area that had little political clout.
In Property Rules, Robin Einhorn contends that the reason many
Midwestern cities took so long to address issues like localized pollu-
tion and denial of services to certain city areas was because cities were
not designed with the idea of transferring assets from one group for the
benefit of another. Her discussion on the origins of special assessment,
arising from “subscription,” indicates that most cities underwent a pe-
riod in which it was felt that improvements that would benefit a spe-
cific area or individuals should be paid for by those individuals and not
be financed from general tax revenues by those who would receive
little, if any, benefit from those improvements. It was not until the cit-
ies reached the stage of needing large-scale public works projects such
as water and sewer provision2 that this thinking would be influenced
by concerns over public health and the need for services in poorer ar-
eas, justifying city-wide financing on the rationale that such improve-
ments benefited the entire city, even if one area did receive a more
direct benefit. This idea seems to have short-circuited in Milwaukee,
as the democratic process made any one influence weaker.
Although the establishment of special assessments to fund water
distribution indicated that there was a growing willingness to engage
in some transfer of wealth as long as the overall benefit to the city was
enhanced, the pattern of ward officials’ enriching themselves from the
provision of services would be reinforced in the example of the board
using its position for financial gain and the establishment of the pro-
cess of profit transfer. Despite the protest of the Board of Public Works
Commissioners, the fact that the aldermen rather than the commission-
ers had the final say on how revenue surpluses were handled was to
establish a tradition of proprietary service unlike that of other cities
with municipally operated water works.
Milwaukee’s political arena in the years from 1890 to 1910 was
that of competition between four major parties. The traditional Repub-
licans had experienced a split in their ranks with the formation of Rob-
ert LaFollette’s Progressive wing (later the Progressive Party), which
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helped to reduce the impact of growing conservatism among the Ger-
man voters, now rising into the middle class, who had earlier supported
the Democrats. Democrats seemed assured of the support of the south-
side Polish voters because the perception of these largely Catholic vot-
ers toward Republicans (including Progressives) and Socialists was
negative. Rose and his Democratic machine could use their power over
water supply provision, as well as other services, against the Poles with
little fear of retaliation because he clearly saw that for the Poles there
was no alternative electoral choice. It took concerted efforts on the part
of the Milwaukee Socialists to overcome the influence of German anti-
Slavic prejudice and convince the Poles that socialism was a viable
alternative and that supporting the Socialist Party would bring tangible
rewards in the area of services and patronage.
Although the department spent its first two decades establishing its
infrastructure and distribution service, the fact that surplus transfers
began only fifteen years after the waterworks began its operations in-
dicates that there was a deliberate intention to ensure that the depart-
ment not only not be a drain on the resources of the city but actually
generate funds for it. In contrast, Philadelphia went thirty-four years
(until 1868) before making a modest profit, Baltimore for forty (1874),
and New York fifty-two (1888).3 Midwestern cities that provided a
public water supply chose to forego profit transfers, instead rolling any
money back into the system. Chicago’s municipal water system has never,
in its nearly hundred and fifty years of operation, transferred any money to
the general revenues of that city once initial expenditures had been re-
couped. Detroit, Cleveland, and Minneapolis, relying more heavily on bond
issues for their construction, used their profits to retire the bonds early, and
subsequent funds were earmarked for future construction, maintenance,
and improvements. Despite these examples, Milwaukee chose profit.
With the transfer of authority for service and improvements from
individual officials to the city Department of Public Works, there should
have been a concomitant transfer of a philosophy of provision from a
proprietary to a governmental utility. Instead of offering street paving,
sewers, or water because residents of a particular area would benefit,
the concept that water would benefit the entire city came into play, at
least in other cities. In Milwaukee, however, it became the means by
which the city could enrich its coffers, benefiting whichever political
party was in the ascendant. The frequent turnover of office between the
A CITY IS NOT A BUSINESS 201
parties prior to Rose’s mayoralty and the reign of the Socialists did
nothing to deter utilizing the waterworks as a money maker because
each party recognized that upon gaining office, they too would benefit.
With additional supply available, the earlier “business is king” ratio-
nale developed into a philosophy of “profit is all.”
If this line of reasoning is considered, much of the subsequent his-
tory of the department becomes clear. The expansion of service to the
south-side Polish neighborhoods was delayed because the profit in such
an undertaking was less than the profit that could be gained from sell-
ing the same water to suburban customers at a premium. Further, the
relative lack of political and commercial clout on the part of the Polish
citizens meant that they lacked a powerful enough voice to demand
such services as a right. The media outlets for this community were
largely ignored outside that community, and the more traditional major
newspapers were relatively uninterested in covering the news and opin-
ions of the Poles. The relative isolation of the Polish communities and
their lack of large cultural and commercial organizations, coupled with
the power of the parish priests in recommending the Democratic Party
as the only alternative, meant that the populations of the eleventh,
twelfth, and fourteenth wards were not considered important enough
to be heeded in their call for service. It took the efforts of the Socialists
in the first decade of the twentieth century, through both political ac-
tion and media coverage, to make the Poles aware of their power and
demand the provision of service as a reward for political loyalty. While
the Socialists did not stop the water revenue transfers, they clearly felt
that decreased profits from supplying the Polish wards were a reason-
able payoff for gaining the political power to achieve their goals.
By agreeing to see that the Poles received services, particularly water
supply, in return for votes, the Socialists were not acting purely out of
altruism but rather taking a necessary step in their plan to use water supply
as a hook for annexation. Although aldermen under Rose had denied wa-
ter to the south side, choosing instead to sell it to suburbs and suburban
factories, in fact supplying the south side with water had little effect on the
actual availability of water. Because many of the desired new customers
were located just outside the city boundaries on the south side, mains would
have to be laid in the general area even if service was to continue being
denied to the Poles. Supplying water to the eleventh, twelfth, and four-
teenth wards was also a good advertisement, as it let individuals residing
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just outside the border know that such services would be available to them
if they were only part of the city. Finally, using up some of the available
water might create an eventual shortage, which would help lend support to
Socialist calls for improvements to the intake and pumping stations and
eventually for the construction of a filtration plant.
The Socialist attempt to tie water service to annexation was ulti-
mately the cause of increased state regulation over the waterworks.
Despite the provision of service to areas within the city that had previ-
ously been denied it, the continued practice of transfers of waterworks
surpluses to the general fund and the increase in the value of these
transfers that took place after the Socialists took office indicate that the
Socialists continued to think of the waterworks as a proprietary service
rather than a governmental one. The Socialists could have canceled the
pattern of transfers and used the funds to lower water bills within the city
and establish an account to build the desired new intake, yet they did not
do so. Lower-cost water would have made using it as a hook for annex-
ation even more valuable, as this would have meant a bigger difference in
the price paid between the surcharged amount (which was fixed by con-
tract) and the lower city rates.
Since the annexation lever failed, the perception of the railroad com-
mission that Milwaukee was primarily interested in providing service to
the suburbs because it made a profit doing so must also be considered in
any examination of the commission’s rulings. Although Milwaukee was
the victim in these rulings, its failure to come up with any alternatives
made it at least partly responsible for the commission’s decision.
Seidel’s and, later, Hoan’s inability to force through their improve-
ments in water service were also important factors influencing the com-
mission. The political stalemate that Hoan, in particular, faced while
trying to implement construction of the filtration plant meant that the
state regarded the city as incapable of managing its existing water sys-
tem. Since the only matter regarding water supply upon which both
Nonpartisans and Socialists could agree was the attempt to use water
for annexation, the state had a point. Had the department surpluses
been used to generate a building fund for the filtration plant, much of the
squabbling between the parties would have disappeared, and the decision
of the state might have been different.
The operations of the waterworks from 1910 to 1940 show that
many of the decisions that had to be made were simply too important to
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be left on the local level, at least in Milwaukee, where things took more
time. It had required state intervention in 1871 to form the Board of
Water Commissioners in the first place, and a similar move by the leg-
islature was necessary to establish the Sewerage Commission in 1913.
Placing these boards under the control of local government meant that
local political considerations took precedence over the provision of
these services, leaving Milwaukee without an adequate supply of pure
water for decades after the initial recommendations of health and engi-
neering professionals. Examples of similar problems in other cities are
common; perhaps the best-known is the frequent scandal emanating from
the Chicago Sewer Commission, where commissioners were appointed as
political favors and frequently pocketed money intended for service im-
provement. New York experienced a similar situation in service provision
during the Tammany Hall era.4
Before 1910 the biggest problems tackled by the Board of Public Works
Commissioners had been securing permission to establish reserve and
backup facilities and replacing malfunctioning machinery. The addition of
new facilities or equipment that ensured both higher-quality water and
additional supply was much more easily approved than those that only
affected purity. Thus, the replacement of the North Avenue intake in 1892,
and even the Linnwood Avenue intake, were funded and completed much
more swiftly than the filtration plant. The filtration plant affected only the
purity of the water, and since it actually made less water available (the
filtration capacity was 290 million gallons per day, while the combined
pumping capacity of the Riverside and North Point stations was 310 mil-
lion gallons per day), it received less support. It also required more money
to operate and made less profit for each gallon produced. For a city that
had been running the waterworks like a business, less profit was a difficult
stand to take. Annexation would also be opposed in part by business inter-
ests in the 1940s and 1950s because it meant less water would be available
to city industry. The Howard plant, which would supply additional quan-
tity, was approved very quickly, despite arguments that the quality of wa-
ter it provided would be less than what customers were used to.
Just as in the initial battles to secure a water supply in the 1860s,
the placement of oversight authority for the department under the po-
litical control of the common council allowed various groups to block
or delay construction of necessary facilities. Such power made it pos-
sible for one political faction to delay construction on a particular
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facility which they opposed, as in the case of the Nonpartisans’ delay of
the Linnwood Avenue intake or in Hoan’s blocking construction of the
sewerage plant. Political vicissitudes impaired the construction and opera-
tion of facilities designed to improve the purity of the water and positively
affect the general health of the population, despite the political attention
gained by the use of such rhetoric as Bading’s “typhoid highball.”
Politics was the most important component of waterworks policy
from 1910 to 1940, in the sense that the Socialists had always included
the improvement of the city’s water supply, in both quality and quan-
tity, as a major plank in their platform. Although Seidel had only one
term as mayor, and Hoan had to deal with the problems of a common
council that never had a Socialist majority, the support of such figures
as Henry Bohmann, who was waterworks superintendent from 1912 to
1940, and Joseph Schwada, the city engineer, helped to eventually con-
vince the council that pure water was a necessity. The fact that the
filtration plant would not benefit all the water customers equally (indus-
trial consumers do not usually require filtered water for their processes)
helped in the formation of groups that were opposed to the plant’s con-
struction. The strong presence of business interest on many of the groups
involved in the fight, including the American Chemical Society,5 the Cham-
ber of Commerce, and the Citizen’s Government Research Bureau illus-
trates this point. Because politicians controlled the running of the water-
works, business interests, which had a large voice in the media and which,
through campaign contributions, greatly influenced elections, enjoyed a
strong voice in the decision-making process regarding water supply. Poli-
ticians who necessarily feared for their jobs were more sensitive to argu-
ments that might affect the city’s employment picture than were water
department employees, who enjoyed civil service protection.
Milwaukee in 1940 was a very different place than it had been sev-
enty years earlier. Greatly increased in size (43.7 square miles as opposed
to 15.1), much higher in population (500,000 versus 71,440),6 with a di-
verse industrial and commercial base, Milwaukee was luckier in its engi-
neers and planners than in its politicians. Unlike the forty-year lag in the
provision of basic services, Milwaukee in 1940 had a water system that
seemed well equipped to provide not only for the ne ds of its existing
citizens but for future needs as well. With daily pumping capacities of
310 million gallons, filtration capacities of 290 million gallons, and
storage capacity of 40 million gallons, measured against an all-time
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peak use of 142 million gallons, the city appeared to have designed its
waterworks to meet current as well as future needs.
The practice of using the water department as a source of revenue
for the city through the transfer of money to the general funds had been
beneficial to the city since it began in 1883. Despite the city’s willing-
ness to see a low rate of return on its investment in order to keep rates
low in order to lure annexation, the practice still allowed for the trans-
fer, by 1940, of almost three-quarters of a million dollars a year to the
general fund for the reduction of the tax levy. While this transfer, par-
ticularly during the Depression years, was greatly to the benefit of the
citizens, its continued use in the decades following World War II would
have far less satisfactory results. The amounts of the transfers, the total
waterworks revenue, the amount of the city budget, and the percentage
of that budget accounted for by the funds transfer are shown in table 9.
Year Transferred Revenue General Fund % of Fund
1900 0.076 0.458 7 1.1
1910 0.092 0.605 6.9 1.3
1920 0.225 1.235 14.7 1.5
1930 0.3 2.399 16.8 1.7
1940 0.72 2.862 13.4 5.3
1950 0.5 4.279 30.3 1.6
1960 1.54 8.365 57.5 2.7
1970 5.22 14.05 116.8 4.7
1980 4.08 32.413 258.6 1.6
1990 5.78 45.722 407.7 1.4
1991 6.67 56.584 446.2 1.5
1992 6.76 53.163 461.5 1.5
1993 9 60.749 474.8 1.9
1994 6.52 61.098 478.7 1.4
1995 10.61 62.81 486.3 2.2
Table 9: Water Department Funds Transferred to City General Fund, Total
Water Department Revenue, General Fund Budget, and Percentage of Gen-
eral Fund Accounted for by Transfer, for 1900–1995 (in millions of dollars).
Sources: City of Milwaukee Budget, 1900–95; Water Department Annual Re-
port, 1900–1995.
After the war, Milwaukee continued in its efforts to enlarge itself
through the annexation of unincorporated land or at the expense of its
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suburban neighbors. The pattern of provision to parts of suburbs in the
previous two decades had indicated that the city was interested in pro-
viding utility service beyond its borders. The unavoidable fact that they
had only done so because they did not expect those areas to remain
outside the borders for long was not considered by the commission,
which looked at results rather than intentions. It is certain that Milwau-
kee was acting in a governmental rather than a proprietary manner when
it chose a far lower rate of return on its investments than permitted so
that its citizens could receive water at the cheap rates, and the city used
just this argument in its briefs regarding the 1934–39 rate case. But to
the PSC, this was just another example of Milwaukee’s acting in a
proprietary fashion, because it believed that Milwaukee had chosen
the lower rate of return as a sales ploy to convince the suburbs to do
business with them. Once contracts had been signed, the city was free
to return to the commission and request rates at the (considerably higher)
permissible rate of return. Because the State Supreme Court had ruled
in West Allis that a contract could not be voided just because a cus-
tomer suburb objected to a rate change, provided of course that the
commission had approved the change, the apparent reasoning of the com-
mission was sound. It would have been impolitic in the extreme for the
city to openly argue that it had made the choices that it did in order to
secure annexation, despite the fact that everyone was quite aware of this
fact. Despite Milwaukee’s population, the suburbs, none of which had a
Socialist government, had a closer relationship with the almost entirely
Republican governors of the state, who had serious problems dealing with
the Socialists.7 Since the Public Service Commission members were ap-
pointed by the governor, they would be naturally more sympathetic to the
cause of the suburbs than to that of a Socialist city.
Milwaukee’s struggle to retain control over its waterworks was
rooted in the internal city politics that had been a tradition in the city
since its founding. With frequent elections, it was difficult for any party
to gain control over the office of mayor and the council, and if it managed
to do so, it was unlikely that such control could long prevail. The resulting
stalemates in arguments over new policy direction, such as beginning water
supply, building a sewage plant, building a filtration plant, and extending
service beyond the city borders meant that a regulatory body outside
the purview of the city was necessary for getting things done. That this
body eventually turned out to be a state regulatory commission dominated
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by the political interests of the suburbs rather than by interests sharing the
city’s concerns was merely a result of the city’s inability to resolve its own
problems.
For 125 years, the people making decisions about Milwaukee’s water
supply have been the people who wanted to make money from it. In the
initial implementation stages, the Board of Water Commissioners was
heavily dependent upon the expertise of the engineer they hired, but they
did not always heed his advice, especially when it prevented the quick
accumulation of profit. The siting of the reservoir, the order in which the
wards were watered, and the bidding process were areas in which the
board decided the course of action to be followed, with occasional dis-
agreements from the waterworks engineer and the health commissioner.
Both of these individuals possessed knowledge and expertise far beyond
that of the board, the engineer in the area of fluid mechanics and the opera-
tions of a water system, and the health commissioner in the effects that a
water supply would have on the health of the city residents. During the
tenure of the board and later, when the operations of the system were
turned over to the Board of Public Works but placed under the supervisory
authority of the common council, decisions were made on the basis of
politics or economics. The decision to forego the watering of the south
side was one such example. The selling of water to the suburbs on a whole-
sale basis meant that not only would the city receive 125 percent of the
fees for the same water that they would receive from supplying to the
Polish wards; the fact that the supply was wholesale rather than retail
distribution in the city meant that they were spared the capital expense
of having to lay distribution mains in those wards. The resulting extra
profits could be used by the party in power (from 1890 to 1910 this
was largely the Democrats) to provide political lagniappe in an effort
to secure votes.
However faithful the Socialists were in their provision of city ameni-
ties such as water, sewers, and paved streets to the beleaguered Poles,
their pattern of utilizing political control over the water department did not
end. Although permission for water quality and quantity improvements
and equal access to distribution did occur, the desire of the Socialists to
use water supply to annex extramural territory was ultimately respon-
sible for a massive increase in state regulatory authority. Additionally,
the continuance of the policy of transferring funds from water depart-
ment revenues to the general fund would eventually have a delaying
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effect of its own in the fight for the filtration plant. When it was real-
ized in 1925 that water pressure and quantity were insufficient, requir-
ing the construction of a new pumping station, funds were not readily
available due to the policy of transfer. The need to float bonds for this
necessary construction would result in a depletion of waterworks rev-
enue, which would delay construction of the filtration plant once it was
finally approved. The need to apply for assistance through the Works
Progress Authority and the debacle of the termination of that program
were responsible for additional delays in construction, so that the plant
was not brought on-line until 1939. Ironically, had the Socialists been willing
to forego the transfers, the filtration plant might not only have been built
earlier, but there might also have been less difficulty in using water supply
for annexation. Water rates that were 10 percent to 15 percent lower
(figures are from table 9) could have removed much of the Public Works
Commission’s objections.
The role the media would play in the cryptosporidium episode would
be much greater than that it had enjoyed in earlier arguments about water
supply. By the 1980s, the media of Milwaukee no longer automatically
supported the role of city over suburb. With the migration of many
members of the editorial board and staff to the suburbs, criticism of city
government appeared in editorials and in slants given to city vs. suburban
interest stories. The dislike both papers, the Journal and Sentinel, held for
Mayor Henry Maier, particularly in his later terms, showed in frequent
condemnation of Maier’s attitudes of “pampering” city workers and criti-
cism of his continued support for a strong city rather than unified city-
suburban government. The newspapers’ support of John Norquist for mayor
in 1988 did not change this direction in editorial opinion, despite the better
press image the new mayor enjoyed. The media reports during the
cryptosporidium crisis greatly enhanced public fear over the reliability of
the water supply and outrage over perceived attitudes of misconduct by
city employees.8
The decision of the common council’s Water Quality Committee
to implement all the recommendations that were made meant that ma-
jor renovations would have to be made at both of the existing filtration
plants. The estimated cost for these renovations and installations was
$90 million, to be financed by water bonds that would be paid for by
increases in the water bills over a twenty-year period. These improve-
ments included the installation of a crib feed system whereby chlorine
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could be fed at the intake, 7,000 feet out under the lake, in an effort to
reduce zebra mussel infiltration; the construction of a new, longer in-
take for the south-side Texas Avenue pumping station, which would
bypass the sewage output plume; the installation of a new stainless
steel driver for the flocculation baffles, which would ensure greater
mixing of flocculant in the settling basins; the installation of particle
counters and a computerized monitoring system for them; the addition
of two kinds of synthetic polymers to the filtration beds, one to en-
hance the cleansing properties of the wash water and one to enhance
the filtering capacity of the beds; the substitution of hypochlorite for
chlorine in an effort to improve safety; and an ozone treatment system,
which would replace the chlorine disinfection system that had been
used since the plants began their operation. All but the hypochlorite
and ozone had been installed by the end of 1995; with the exception of
the intake, all the systems failed to operate correctly. The new intake
provided much-improved water to the south-side plant, with turbidity
levels at about 90 percent less than they had been with the earlier in-
take, making Howard’s water as good, on most days, as Linnwood’s.
Somewhat ironically, the contractor that constructed the new intake
was the same one who had refused the commission to build the original
intake and Howard plant in 1960, pointing out that the water brought in
would be contaminated by sewage.
The city council’s decision to adopt the consultants’ recommenda-
tions was admittedly based on the evidence existing at the time. How-
ever, given the overall relative lack of evidence available and given
that the outbreak spurred investigation into the prevalence of rypto-
sporidium in American and Wisconsin surface waters as well as re-
search into the actual infection process of cryptosporidium, a better
choice would have been to delay funding the entire recommendation
until the results from the first completed improvements were made.
The move to adopt such a wide-ranging plan, without any indication to
see whether the proposed systems would indeed even function together,
indicates that the improvements were undertaken to improve the politi-
cal image of the mayor and council rather than through a genuine con-
cern to fix the problem. In other areas where an ozone treatment sys-
tem had been adopted, particularly in Los Angeles and Lake County,
Illinois, pilot projects were established to determine the operational
stability of the new components. Milwaukee’s proposed new system
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would be the first to incorporate all new forms of technology in a single
plant, as well as the first to retrofit an existing plant for ozone. Using
Norquist’s business analogy again, it made more sense for the bottom
line to see whether all the recommendations were necessary or whether
a lower-cost solution might solve the problem. The city, after all, was
not likely to lose customers, since it enjoyed a monopoly. However, the
business/proprietary attitude still held in other ways.
The issuance of bonds to finance these improvements indicates
that the city still thought of the waterworks in a proprietary fashion.
Table 9 shows that from 1993 to 1995, $26.3 million was transferred to
the general fund. Using these figures, the city could have chosen to
finance the improvements through foregoing the transfer of these rev-
enues, allowing for a payoff in under eleven years—as opposed to
twenty for the bond scheme—with no increase in rates. However, this
would have meant raising the property tax to cover the missing transfer
money. Norquist’s theme for his entire incumbency in office had been
keeping property taxes low, and he was not above using unusual meth-
ods to accomplish this. The city’s decision to accompany the water rate
increase with a corresponding switch in financing city electrical street
lighting from the property tax to a part of the water service charge
supports this argument.9 Since fees, unlike property taxes, are not de-
ductible on the federal income tax, transferring this source of revenue
meant that not only did residents get charged more, but the city did not
have to wait so long to receive its money.
The council’s decision to adopt all of the recommendations was
made before additional scientific evidence on the nature of C. parvum
could be obtained. This decision, made in the need to be seen as ad-
dressing the problem and taking decisive action to resolve it, meant
that the possibility of an overkill response existed. Second, the rush to
implement the changes did not allow for sufficient time for city engi-
neers and contractors to fully determine the conditions under which
the new equipment would be operating, as in the case of the particle
counters and the floc driver. Further, with the installation of multiple
systems at once, there was no time to determine the effectiveness of
each improvement and to determine its maximum efficiency of opera-
tion. Although each of the proposed changes would improve water
quality when considered individually, the combined effect could not be
measured until they were installed. In the tradition of the law of dimin-
A CITY IS NOT A BUSINESS 211
ishing returns, implementing all of the improvements together meant
that the change in quality that each gave was marginal at best. If a
longer time to adopt the new implementations had been allowed for,
many of the problems could have been eliminated.
All of these examples are evidence that the city’s improvement
program was less concerned with real quality issues than with improv-
ing public perception of the water department, and by extension, the
city itself. Since the crypto crisis had largely been caused by the intro-
duction of a new variable into an existing treatment equation without a
proper procedure for testing whether that variable was the best solu-
tion for a problem, it seems that introducing multiple new variables
into the system would create even more problems. A more measured
investigation, less dependent on time pressures, would have eliminated
many of the problems involved, such as the fact that the floor of the
settling basin was insufficient in strength to support the greater weight
of the new baffle shaft or that the humidity in the pipe galleries was too
high to permit proper operation of the new electronic monitors placed
there. With more time available to fully examine the plants and their
operations, the potential for these mistakes could have been eliminated
and other existing hazards recognized.
While these improvements were taking place, other necessary im-
provements were not. One glaring example concerns the electrical trans-
former housing located outside the Linnwood plant. The base of this
housing, through which high voltage is transmitted into the pump build-
ing, had cracked in 1991 and had the potential for sparking when water
from rain or snow leaked into the housing. The transformer station was
located directly next to the ammonia tanks, where the highly explosive
gas would explode if it received such an electrical charge, causing dam-
age and possible fatalities over a large portion of the eastern side and
downtown regions of the city. Electricians at the Linnwood plant had
tried unsuccessfully to get funding to fix the problem since it was discov-
ered in 1991; it was finally fixed in 1994 at the direct intervention of com-
mon council president John Kalwitz.10 Despite the possibly deadly out-
come of this problem, none of the three consultants who made
recommendations regarding plant improvements in the wake of the crypto-
sporidium episode noticed it.
How much improvement was necessary? Nationwide studies per-
formed by the American Water Works Association between 1990 and
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1995 indicate that the average concentration of cryptosporidium oo-
cysts in United States surface waters were 10.2 oocysts per hundred-
liter sample and that the oocysts were found in 60 percent of untreated
surface waters and 17 percent of treated waters on a regular basis.11
Surprisingly, surface waters around Milwaukee, including Lake Michi-
gan, were found to contain no oocysts during the testing. Additional
testing by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources found that
the only location where cryptosporidia were found near Milwaukee on
a regular basis was in the output of the sewage treatment plant. Other
than that location, the highest level ever found in Lake Michigan water
was 2.8 per 100 liters, far below the national average.12
Of course, there is no way of knowing what the levels of crypto-
sporidium were in Milwaukee water during the 1993 outbreak. It is
significant, however, that reports of diarrheal illness began to climb
rapidly after the topic was discussed in the local media. Since testing
did not begin until the onset of diarrhea, about a week after the high-
turbidity incident, any measure of the levels a week earlier were unobtain-
able.13 However, given that Dupont’s research indicates that the ID50 rate
for infection in healthy individuals is 132 and given that most adults, who
were the hardest-hit segment of the population, on average consume no
more than a quart of water per day (four glasses), this would necessitate
levels of cryptosporidium of over 10,000 per 100 liters in filtered water.
None of the testing performed, including that on the ice, indicated levels
even a thousandth as large. The results of the analysis on the relationship
between media reports and complaint calls indicates that much of the epi-
sode can be attributed to Hawthorne effect.
Why, then, was the city so eager to expend $90 million on a prob-
lem that might not even exist? As mentioned above, public perception
of the Milwaukee water supply remains low. The expenditure of money
to improve or, at least, change the treatment process provides the per-
ception to the public that something is being done. Since the mayor had
declared that the water crisis constituted an emergency, it was neces-
sary for his public image to be seen as doing something to abate the
problem.14 The reinforcement by the media that these changes were
necessary—despite the facts that only 338 cases of cryptosporidium
were confirmed, with 70 percent of them occurring in immune-sup-
pressed individuals, and that healthy individuals, once infected, could
not become ill again—was not discussed.
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Future changes outlined for both plants include the installation of
SCATA, a computer-driven monitoring system, and the subsequent re-
duction by 20 percent of operation crew size from five to four. In con-
trast, the Chicago Jardine Filtration Facility, which is about three times
as large as Milwaukee’s Linnwood plant and ten times larger than
Howard, has crews of thirty.15 While SCATA purports to provide greater
protection for water quality, in that it includes the ability to summon
additional personnel in the event of problems, the fact that operations
crews will be cut might well cause problems to develop that might be
forestalled by the retention of a larger crew.
The 1993 cryptosporidium episode is just the latest example of
how politics and the idea of proprietary service have shaped water
policy in Milwaukee. From the beginnings of the system, when fraud
and corruption shaped public perception to believe that only a board
composed of private citizens could effectively establish a water sys-
tem, to the denial of service to a large segment of the city population
because of their lack of political influence, through the delays in the
construction of a filtration plant, the imposition of state regulation,
and the 1993 crisis, the provision of water in Milwaukee has always
depended on what the city officials believed would make money rather
than what might be actually needed at the time. At every stage, there
were individuals who tried to convince the appropriate officials that
they were following an improper course, yet they were consistently
ignored. The decision-making process broke down because of politi-
cal pressure that “something be done.” The decision to solve the prob-
lem by throwing money at the water department made it appear that
something indeed had been done. It wasn’t, however, necessarily the
right thing.
Over two thousand years ago, the Roman philosopher Marcus
Tullius Cicero said, “The welfare of the people is the highest law.” In
a business, the highest law is to make money for the stockholders who
own the company. In a city, there are no stockholders, although resi-
dents can be assumed to meet this function. In this case, using the
profits (tax revenues and income generated through fees) to pay out-
of-town or out-of-state vendors defeats the purpose of reducing costs.
Income is ultimately lost from the city (business) when funds previ-
ously spent internally, generating a return through property taxes and
fees, go elsewhere. In addition, the sense of community, which often
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has more to do with the choice of potential residents and businesses to
move to a certain city, is lost. The ability for redress over poorly per-
formed services, or even services not performed, is lost when workers
are low-paid temps or private contractors. With no investment in the
city other than their paychecks, these workers have no larger ties to the
community to inspire them.
Even as many large corporations downsize in the 1990s, others are
learning that educating their workers to perform work previously
outsourced reduces expenditures, increases productivity, and leads to a
greater sense of worker loyalty. Every year, companies that do this are
listed as the best places to work in America. If Milwaukee wants to be
a city where people want to live and work, it would be well for it to
follow the trends of these companies rather than the profit chasers of
Wall Street. If not, it might find that competition has made it unprofit-
able for residents to remain.
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